




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


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




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
THE BALKAN QUESTION



THE "BALKAN QUESTION"

THE PRESENT CONDITION OF THE BALKANS
AND OF EUROPEAN RESPONSIBILITIES.
BY VARIOUS WRITERS

EDITED BY LUIGI VILLARI¹
III



LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

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PREFACE

THE idea of this volume first arose in consequence of the terrible events of the autumn of 1903, when Macedonia was the scene of one of those wholesale devastations, accompanied by massacre, which are a periodical feature of Near Eastern history. The situation is still one for great concern. The country has been laid waste, and the resources of the insurgents severely strained, while the Turks for the moment are afraid that the Powers, or some of them, might really be moved to act with energy, if they recommend their accustomed work. This has helped to keep the Macedonian Question less prominent than it was some eighteen months ago; and at the same time the more exciting events in the Far East have distracted the attention of Europe even from such significant symptoms as have not been absent in the Balkans.

But the eternal Eastern problem is by no means solved. Both parties are merely staying their hands, owing to circumstances of a purely

temporary nature, and European public opinion will soon be faced by another and more terrible phase of the crisis. There is risk that this respite may make the Powers forget their responsibility and their danger, but that responsibility and that danger are as great as ever, and it is most necessary that England, at all events, should keep watch and ward, and be prepared to face, and have some means of solving the difficulty. Although the Western Powers—England, France, and Italy—are clearly interested in avoiding any extension of the power and influence of the great military States, the two so-called “interested Powers”—Austria and Russia—have been pursuing their own policy of pure selfishness, and preparing the way for territorial conquest, when the opportune moment shall arrive. Such conquests, besides being most distasteful to the populations concerned, would be a great and serious danger to the balance of power, and to the Liberal Western nations.

While the book has been passing through the press, little has happened beyond a constant interchange of diplomatic notes between the Powers and the Porte, and the addition of another weary period of procrastination, bringing nearer, we must hope, the final reckoning, when the apparently inexhaustible patience of Europe

will be worn out. The Mürzsteg Scheme, dated October 1903, provided an Austrian and a Russian Civil Assessor to assist with their best advice, the Inspector General, Hilmi Pasha, the hero of the unspeakable "pacification" of the same year, who still governs Macedonia. It also included the remodelling of the gendarmerie by sixty foreign officers, and a sufficient number of non-commissioned officers, deputed by the powers. It was not till May, 1904, that General De Giorgis, the Italian Commandant, and twenty-five officers without any subordinates, reached their posts clad in a Turkish uniform, designed by the Sultan himself, and receiving Turkish pay, but with no executive power;—for this the Porte has obstinately refused to grant. Since then there has been a constant effort to increase the number. Additional Austrian and Russian officers at length arrived, smuggled in, it is said, as private individuals, and donning their own uniforms when they had reached their posts. The other Powers are also making slight additions, but the Porte steadily refuses to recognise any of these newcomers. As a result, the Ambassadors of the two mandatory Powers, in clear contradiction of an optimistically worded memorandum based upon the reports of the Civil Assessors which had already appeared, have

presented several joint notes, calling attention to the anarchy in which the country is plunged. These have been followed by the familiar collective notes of the five Powers concerned, in the same sense with the addition that persistent opposition would entail "serious consequences," which have been verbally explained as the raising of the whole question *de novo* and new measures.

So we must leave the situation. It is the old familiar, half-comic, wholly humiliating one; the Powers are protesting, the Porte is triumphant. The Mürzsteg Scheme is not only a failure, but a farce. It could not be otherwise, for its essential principle is truly described in the memorandum of the Civil Assessors as "The strengthening of that very *régime* (the Turkish) on a modern basis." If the reader is not convinced that no more fallacious principle was ever cherished than the belief that it is possible for Turkey to reform from within, the pages that follow have been written in vain. The expectation that the Powers would be as good as their word and take new measures if the Scheme failed has fortunately kept the bands inactive throughout 1904. If, and when, that expectation is to be fulfilled, it were well that in the hour of fulfilment some thought should be taken of that other principle which the memorandum ascribes

to the Revolutionary Committees, but contemptuously rejects for the Powers, the "radical transformation of the condition of affairs here by the overthrow of the Turkish *régime*."

The desirability of impressing the British public with the real nature of the Eastern Question is the motive of this book, and it was thought advisable to obtain the assistance of different writers, and to entrust to each a chapter, so that the whole should constitute a collection of expert opinion that may prove a useful guide. As the problem concerns not England alone the chapters dealing with French and Italian interests were entrusted to influential writers of those two nationalities. All the writers in the volume are qualified by residence in or personal knowledge of the Near East, and many of them are already well known in connection with the subject. Mr Chirol is known as a writer on the politics of the East, Far and Near, and Mr Pears, who has long been leader of the consular bar in Turkey, as the historian of "The Destruction of the Greek Empire," and "The Fall of Constantinople." M. Berard is Editor of the *Revue de Paris*, and author of "Pro Macedonia." Mr Ponsonby was formerly a member of the British Embassy at Constantinople.

The Editor must express his warm appreciation

of the assistance afforded to him by the various writers who consented to collaborate in this volume, and also to others who, although not contributors, helped him in obtaining contributions, especially to Mr Noel Buxton and some other members of the Balkan Committee. He sincerely hopes that their joint efforts may result in inducing people, without distinction of party, both in this country and in France and Italy to realise the great importance of the Balkan problem from a political as well as from a moral point of view, and to be ready to face the necessity for a definite and satisfactory solution. Above all, the humanitarian aspect of the question, on which so much has been written in the past, has been less insisted upon, and greater prominence given to its political side.

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PAGE 145. Last line : *For "East" read "West."* ✓

THE BALKAN QUESTION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

By JAMES BRYCE, M.P.

THE condition of the Turkish Empire, a matter which formerly affected only the neighbouring States of Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia, has now for a century or more become an important factor in the general politics of Europe, and a source of great concern to Great Britain. Once, in 1853, it dragged us into a war to defend the Turks against Russia. Since that time it has thrice—in 1876 (at the time of the Bulgarian massacres), in 1885 (when Eastern Rumelia insisted on uniting herself to Bulgaria), and in 1895 (when nearly 100,000 Armenians were massacred in Asia Minor)—become a menace to the peace of Europe. Yet, often as the attention of Englishmen has been called to the misdeeds of the Turk and the miseries of his subjects, few Englishmen understand those salient features of the situation, which must be

understood by whoever wishes to form a just opinion upon the policy Britain ought to pursue.

It is in order to supply such a comprehension of the facts of the case and of the conditions which affect any attempt to deal with them that this book has been prepared. Every one of the writers has a direct first-hand knowledge of the subject. Every one of them has travelled in the country and has reflected upon the difficulties of the problem. Their articles contain the data necessary for mastering the subject, and will give the English reader a mass of information which, I venture to believe, he will find nowhere else stated so clearly, so concisely, so carefully, and so fairly. I shall not attempt to repeat, or even to summarize, what the several writers have said, but confine myself in these few introductory pages to some general observations on the broad aspects of what is called the Eastern Question—that is to say, to the best means of removing or mitigating the evils from which the Turkish East suffers, and of facilitating, with as little strife and bloodshed as may be, that extinction of Ottoman rule which is plainly inevitable.

That it is inevitable will not be doubted by anyone who has studied either the present conditions of the Sultanate or its history during the last three centuries. When decay has proceeded for so long a period, and is so plainly due to deep-seated maladies, there remains no hope that decay can be arrested. The high-water mark

of Turkish conquest had been reached when Vienna was saved by the Polish King, John Sobieski, in A.D. 1683. Ever since then the recession of the waters has been uninterrupted. Empires may take a long time to die. Looking back, we can see that the East Roman Empire steadily lost ground from the death of the Emperor Manuel Comnenus in A.D. 1180, yet it was not destroyed till the capture of Constantinople in A.D. 1453. Much more rapid has been the decline of the Turkish power. One by one its European provinces have been stripped away. Hungary was lost, and then in succession, Transylvania and Bessarabia, and the two Danubian Principalities which now constitute the Rumanian Kingdom, and Greece, and Servia, and Bosnia, and Bulgaria, and Thessaly, and Eastern Rumelia, and Crete. In Asia also Russia has twice advanced her frontiers over territory that was once Ottoman. Egypt was long ago detached, and in our own time so also has Cyprus been. Everywhere in the modern world the weak Powers break up under the impact of the strong, and the Turkish dominion is exceptionally weak in proportion to the vast area it covers. It would, indeed, have before now been torn to pieces by revolt or absorbed by rapacious neighbours had not the mutual jealousies of the European States interposed a check, and had not the power of purchasing modern arms of precision given to the Government, as it gives to every Govern-

ment, advantages against insurgents which did not exist in earlier days. If during the last hundred years the Turkish Empire had stood alone and unbefriended, as the East Roman Empire stood alone in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it would before now have perished from the earth.

The process of decay goes steadily on for the most obvious of all reasons. The governing class in Turkey is incorrigible. Its faults are always the same. It cannot or will not change the policy which has brought the country to ruin. Sultans come and go, one is abler or more vigorous, another is feeble and heedless, or perhaps a mere voluptuary. But, so far as the administration goes, there is no attempt at improvement. One scheme of reform after another, extorted by the European Powers, is promised or formally enacted, but no step is ever taken to carry out any of the promises. Sultan Mahmud was a man with occasional bursts of energy, but his energy found its chief expression in the massacre of the Janizaries. The present Sultan is probably the ablest, and certainly the most industrious, who has sat on the throne of Othman for many generations. He is an adept in that characteristically Oriental diplomacy, which consists in contriving pretexts for delay and playing upon the jealousies of other States. But the only contribution he has made to the government of his dominions has been the assertion of his Khalifial pretensions and a stimulation of Muslim fanaticism

which has led to the massacre of myriads of Asiatic Christians. The conditions are such that even if, by some amazing chance, such a man as Soliman the Magnificent, or Akbar the Great, were to come to the throne, there is little probability that the process of decline could be arrested. It advances with the steady march of a law of nature. Every European statesman knows this. Every thinking man in Turkey itself knows it. That hopefulness must be blind indeed which does not recognize that the problem now is not how to keep the Turkish Empire permanently in being, as some Englishmen even so late as 1878 tried to persuade themselves was possible, but how to minimize the shock of its fall, and what to substitute for it.

Not that its fall is necessarily close at hand. It may be delayed for some decades, conceivably even till near the end of the present century. Three of the European Powers seem to be at present seeking to delay it, two of these because they are not ready yet to deal with the situation which its collapse would create, the third because its subjects find commercial advantages in the present state of things. But since the fall must come in the long run, those States which, like Britain, France, and Italy, have no interest in a policy of delay, and those persons everywhere who, apart from the special interest of their own country, survey the position in its effect on the general interests of humanity, may well desire to see so deplorable a position honestly faced, and an effort

made to deal drastically with it. In one part of Europe—Macedonia—and in one part of Asia—Armenia—the case has long been urgent. No change, no so-called “scheme of reforms” which leaves power in Turkish hands, will do anything either to strengthen the Sultan’s throne or to improve the condition of the people. On this point the experience of the last seventy years is conclusive. The only kind of reform which has ever succeeded is that which removes a province from the Sultan’s control. This plan succeeded in Eastern Rumelia, has succeeded in the Lebanon, is succeeding in Crete. And this plan, applied on a large scale by successive steps to successive districts, means the substitution of a regular and comparatively civilized administration for that organized brigandage which has been the only kind of government the Turks have hitherto bestowed upon their subjects. To suffer the present anarchy or misrule to continue does not make an ultimate solution easier. There are cases in which a dilatory policy may be a curative policy, because naturally recuperative processes or softening tendencies are at work, drawing unfriendly races together, or making them contented by increasing their material prosperity. That is not the case in Turkey. Things there grow rather worse than better from year to year. There are also cases in which a conflict of jarring States which now seems imminent may become less probable in the future. Neither,

so far as anyone can foresee, is this likely to be the case in Turkey. Those who allege the risk of a struggle between Austria and Russia cannot show that this risk, whatever it may be, promises to be any less grave for a long time to come than it is at this moment. Nothing, therefore, is to be gained by prolonging the *status quo* in Turkey, and subjecting another, or possibly two or three more generations of men to those oppressions and miseries under which the Christian population has so long groaned. Such has been the sum of accumulated suffering in Macedonia as in Armenia, ever since 1878, when the Treaty of Berlin withdrew the protection Russia had then promised to Armenia, and threw Macedonia back under the Turk, that we need not wonder when we see the revolutionary party prefer insurrection and war with all their horrors to a continuation of what they and their fathers have suffered.

This is the first point to be insisted on. The time has come for a solution, and the need is all the more urgent because in the European provinces insurrection is already on foot. What ought the solution to be? I am not going to deal with current politics, for their aspect changes from week to week, and they are dealt with in other parts of this book. Let us fix our minds on the larger bearings of this great and secular problem. Let us try to forecast the fate of the East Mediterranean peoples in the same spirit in which we examine the causes which brought calamity upon those

peoples many centuries ago. The student of history can see what were the errors, and what the sources of the errors, that bore a part in the ruin of Syria, Egypt, Asia Minor, Greece, and Thrace in the later days of the Roman Empire. Looking back, he can perceive what were the tendencies to good and evil, and what the means of strengthening the former and weakening the latter, which were then available to avert that ruin. Explanation is easy as prediction is difficult: yet it is possible to discern, in a broad and general way, what are now the alternative courses which the evolution of Eastern politics may take, and to conjecture the consequences which each course may involve.

The Turkish Empire stretches from the Adriatic to the Persian Gulf. It includes what were once the most populous and flourishing districts of the civilized world. Its population is now scanty in proportion to the vast area, and is probably (though no trustworthy statistics exist) rather declining than increasing. The Musulman element is attenuated by moral and political causes and by the drain of military service; the Christian element by massacre. But once a stable and progressive government has been established, these regions will no doubt begin to recover; and within two or three centuries they may, such are their natural resources, such the advantages of their geographical position, rival or surpass their ancient prosperity. The question of their future is there-

fore a question of the highest interest in its economic as well as in its political aspects. I speak of the comparatively distant future, but the events of the next few decades will probably determine the ultimate fate of communities which have still the possibility, if only the possibility, of growing into nations.

Broadly speaking, there are two possible solutions of the Eastern problem. One is the absorption of the existing nationalities into the great dominions and great nations which border upon Turkey. The other is the growth of those nationalities, or some of them, into nations and States. European Turkey, for instance, may be conquered and seized by Russia, or be partitioned either between Russia and Austria, or perhaps between Russia and Austria, with some concessions of territory to Italy and Greece, the Bulgarians, Servians, Vlachs, and other inhabitants losing after a time their individuality, and becoming blent in the great Slavonic mass of the two Empires, and especially of Russia. Asiatic Turkey may be annexed to Russian Transcaucasia, or divided between the Tsar and some one or more of the European States which are believed to seek new dominions. Such an absorption would undoubtedly bring some immediate relief to the wretched subjects of the Sultan—Musulmans as well as Christians. (Let it be always remembered that the Musulmans as well as the Christians must be considered, and have almost as much to gain

by the destruction of the existing system as the Christians have.) Even the least progressive European Government gives security for life and property, permits wealth to accumulate and population to increase, and makes some provision for education. As Egypt has thriven under English administration, so has Bosnia under Austrian. If the Christian nationalities do not wish to be incorporated in the Austrian or Russian dominions, it is not because they prefer the Turk to the Russian or the Austrian, but because, looking for the early extinction of the Sultanate, they have ulterior hopes for their own people which that incorporation would destroy.

There would, therefore, be some immediate gain to the inhabitants of the Turkish provinces from the extension of European, and primarily of Russian rule. This solution is that which seems easiest, and which may probably come about if things are left to themselves, Russia dividing with Austria the European part of the Ottoman dominions, and subsequently either acquiring for herself or dividing with Germany the Asiatic part. The same law which has carried her over all Northern Asia and over half of Central Asia, the law which carried the English in a century over all India, will naturally bestow upon her Turkey, or so much of Turkey as other European States do not prevent her from appropriating.

Is this result to be desired in the interests

either of other States, or of the peoples of the East, or of mankind at large?

States which like France and Great Britain have got all they want already, and seek no share of the spoils, may well be unwilling to see an Empire already gigantic extend itself over territories which might one day become formidable additions to its strength. Into the special motives which France may have for safeguarding her influence over the Catholics of the East, or Britain may have in respect of her presence in Egypt and in India, there is no need to speak, for apart from those much-debated interests, the general interest which all States have in seeing no one State abnormally expand is evident enough.

The races and religious communities of the East—it is by religion rather than by race that men are united and organized in those countries—are animated by a sentiment which is in some, as among the Musulmans generally, religious rather than national, and which in others, as with the Bulgarians and Armenians, is now quite as much national as religious. It is in all cases opposed to absorption by any European Power. These races have not behind them the splendid record of great achievements in literature, in art, in government, which in France, Spain, Germany, Italy, and England inspires national feeling. But they have the recollection of a tenacious adherence to their faith and language through centuries of grievous oppression, mingled with the dim

traditions of their ancient days of independence, and brightened by the hope of a national life in the future. These aspirations deserve more respect from the Western nations than they usually receive, for there is nothing in which men show more want of imagination than in the failure to appreciate under a different exterior the sentiments which they value among themselves.

Apart, however, from the wishes of the several Eastern peoples, apart from those special interests which each of the European States has, or thinks it has, in the settlement of these questions, what is it that ought to be desired by those who, studying the tendencies that have been at work, and the forces that are now at work in moulding the world, seek what will be ultimately the best for progress? What sort of a reconstitution of the East will best serve the common interests of humanity in that future which the evident decay of Musulman power has for two centuries been preparing?

The most conspicuous feature in the evolution of the modern world has been the effacement of the smaller, and the growth of the larger nations and nationalities. The great States have become greater, while the small States have been vanishing. The great languages are covering the world; the minor languages are being forgotten. Only a few types of character, of intellectual life, of social organization, each associated with a great

nation, are now visible where formerly there were many. That any one of these now dominant types will ultimately so prevail against the others as to absorb them cannot be predicted, for at least four or five of the types are immensely strong. Yet, speaking broadly, uniformity tends to increase, variety to disappear. Local patriotism, with all that diversity and play of individuality which local patriotism has evolved, withers silently away. The process is in civilized Europe nearly complete; and the Mediterranean East is almost the only part of the world in which there are left nationalities with the capacity for developing into independent nations that may create new types of character and new forms of literary and artistic life. Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks, Armenians—it might seem fanciful to add Albanians and Kurds, yet each of these two small races has a strong individuality and a capacity for greater things than it has hitherto achieved—have in them the makings of nations which might, in a still distant future, hold a worthy place in the commonwealth of peoples. If I were to argue that the small States have in the past done more for the world in the way of intellectual progress than the gigantic States of to-day are doing, I might be involved in a controversy as to the differences between past and present conditions, and might be told that many of the small States of to-day, such as most of the republics of Spanish America, make no

contribution to the common stock. But without insisting upon such an argument, one may venture to say that humanity has more to expect from the development of new civilized nations out of ancient yet still vigorous races than from the submersion of these races under a flood of Russianizing or Germanizing influences emanating from any one of the three great Empires.

The principle of nationalities finds less support and sympathy nowadays, even in countries which, like Germany, have profited by its application, than it did in the past. But those who sympathized with the successful efforts of Italy and Hungary, and the unsuccessful efforts of Poland, not to mention more recent instances, may well extend their sympathies to those nationalities in the East, which after so long a night see a glimmer of dawn rising before them. Failings may indeed be discerned in the men who belong to these nationalities, failings which are the natural result of the conditions under which they have had for centuries to live. But the tenacity with which the Macedonian Christians have clung to their faith when they had so much to gain by renouncing it, the courage which the Armenian Christians showed when thousands of them chose in 1895 to die rather than abjure their Saviour, prove the strength of fibre that is left in these ancient races. He who, looking above and beyond the dust of current politics, will try to fix his eyes, as Mr Gladstone did,

upon the heights of a more distant landscape, will find reason to think that the development of these nationalities has in it more promise for the future than the extension of the sway of one or two huge military Empires, and will believe that to encourage and help them to grow into nations is an aim to which such great and enlightened peoples as those of England, France, and Italy may fitly direct their efforts.

CHAPTER II

A DESCRIPTION OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT

BY EDWIN PEARS, LL.B.

Author of The Destruction of the Greek Empire ; The Fall of Constantinople

THE Government of Turkey is an absolute monarchy. All civil and military power is centred in the hands of the Sultan; his sovereignty is undisputed and untrammelled.

The present ruler, during the Conference in Constantinople of the Powers to consider the reforms necessary for the better government of Bulgaria and Bosnia, promulgated on December 23rd, 1876, a Constitution which provided a Parliament, thus changing the Government from an absolute to a limited monarchy. In the following spring the Parliament met, and showed considerable aptitude for the discussion of public affairs, and especially of the abuses of administration. Its unexpected independence alarmed the Turkish Ministers who had replaced Midhat Pasha, the principal author of the Constitution, and one of them declared that either the members of Parliament or the Pashas would have to be sent about their business. The Constitution having served

its turn—since its promulgation had been made the pretext for rejecting the reforms proposed by the Powers—no great surprise was felt when the news came one morning that the members had been suddenly shipped off from Constantinople during the night to their homes, and that the articles of the Constitution which provided for a Parliament were declared to be in abeyance. They have so remained ever since.

But the Sultan is not merely an autocrat in temporal matters. He claims, and his claim is acknowledged by his Muslim subjects, to be Khalif, that is, the head of all Muhamedan believers, as being in lawful possession of the right of supremacy bequeathed by the Prophet. At no period in the history of the Ottoman Empire has this claim been more seriously entertained than during the present reign. It is now, in Turkey at least, practically undisputed among Muslims. The revolution which dethroned Sultan Abdul Aziz in 1876 was made by the chiefs of the army and fleet, in conjunction with the Softas of the capital, *i.e.* the professors and students of the Sacred Law. At various times since that event the loyalty of the Softas has been in doubt, but their immediate dispersion to their homes has prevented them from giving trouble.

It will thus be seen that all power, civil and religious, centres in the Khalif-Sultan. To his subjects he is King of Kings and the Shadow of God.

The rule of succession to the Turkish throne differs from that obtaining in other European monarchies. The heir-apparent is the eldest male member of the Imperial family, and therefore very rarely the son of the reigning Sultan. The practice of killing younger brothers, which was made legal by Mohammed II., the Conqueror of Constantinople, has for some time fallen into disuse. The rule of succession is, however, a hindrance to the prosperity of the country: the heir is not allowed to take part in public affairs, he sees no foreign statesman, he is almost always regarded with suspicion, and is kept under strict surveillance. The usual result is that the older he becomes the less competent is he to guide the policy of the Empire when he succeeds to the throne. The present Sultan, as far as diplomatic ability is concerned, might seem to be an exception to this rule; but it must be remembered that he came to the throne as a young man, and not according to the strict rule of succession, but by deposing his brother, Murad V.

The Sultan appoints the Ministers who preside over the great departments of the State, and who have their offices in Stamboul. The chief of these is the Grand Vizir. In a normal condition of things these Ministers would be the principal advisers of the Sultan. Their power, however, is now small, when compared with what it was in former reigns, and with that of a body of irresponsible and unofficial advisers who are in

constant attendance at his Majesty's palace. For some years there has existed a dual government in Turkey—that of the Porte, by which is meant the Ministers, and that of the Palace or Yildiz, *i.e.* the influence of the persons immediately surrounding the Sultan. The latter body is now by far the more powerful.

The division of the country for the purpose of administration is into provinces or vilayets, over each of which a governor or *vali* presides. The vilayets are again divided into *kazas*.

The administration of law is under the direction of a Minister of Justice. Two systems of law are in operation throughout the Empire, and are constantly in conflict. The first and most important is the Sacred Law of the Muhamedan religion, known as the "Sheri." The Muslim accepts the Koran not only as a sacred book, but as the supreme guide in all matters, legal as well as religious. He is aided in its interpretation by certain "Traditions," and by recognised collections of ancient legal texts and decisions, called *fetvas*, of special questions, the most important collection being one which was largely compiled in the early days of Islam from the Pandects of Justinian. Among a people exclusively Muslim, this body of sacred law, though not meeting all the requirements of modern life, would be fairly sufficient, and would be deservedly respected. But for many reasons, the chief of which is that equality between Muslim and Christian before the law is

contrary to all its tenor, Sheri law is unsuited for application to a mixed population of Muslims and Christians. The following illustration will show this:—it is an established rule that no Christian evidence is admissible before a Sacred Court against that of a Muslim. Hence when justice is meted out to a Christian, it is usually due to the personal character of the judge and not to the strict application of the law. Such instances, however, are extremely rare.

The other system of law which is administered in the Empire is divided into Civil and Commercial Law. The distinction is unknown to English jurisprudence, though recognized in most Continental countries. Codes of law have been framed for use in the Civil and Commercial courts which are adaptations of the Code Napoleon. The Criminal Law has also been codified, and the procedure under it is very similar in theory to that practised in France. In these courts Christian evidence is admissible.

As all questions regarding the ownership of land and the successions of Turkish subjects are within the competence of the Sacred Courts, the exclusion of Christian testimony in these tribunals constitutes a very grave injustice. It is true that Turkish rulers have formally decreed, notably in a great Charter called the Hatt-i-Humayun, that this injustice should cease; but in practice it continues, and no Sultan has been sufficiently powerful to override the religious prejudice of

the Muslim population or the opposition of Muslim judges who believe themselves to be administering a law of Divine origin.

Municipal government for the control of the police, of drainage, of street-cleaning, lighting and other matters, exists in theory in the cities, and to a certain extent in practice; but the appointment to office rests exclusively with the Palace, and nothing like popular election for municipal and other offices is known. In Constantinople itself, the streets are practically undrained, ill-lighted, and ill-swept. No local post for the transmission of letters exists. Needless to say, that while Athens, Sofia, and other cities once under Turkish rule possess electric light and telephones, the Turkish Government has provided neither.

In the above slight sketch of the organization and administration of the Turkish government, it will be seen that as regards form and theory there is little with which to find fault, once the absence of elective government is overlooked. The theory of administration is good enough: its worst defect lies in centralization. In this respect the government is probably worse than it was a century ago; for at that time there was a considerable amount of local government under landowners or chieftains known as *Derrebeys*. All governors of provinces, all judges, indeed all officials of high rank, are now appointed direct from the Capital. Their term of office depends

upon the will of the Sultan, who is a most industrious worker. As, however, the work of attending to all the details of government, including all appointments, is greater than can be done by any mortal, his immediate advisers obtain a large amount of patronage.

It is when we pass from the theory of administration to the practice that we find everything wrong. I have not enough space to discuss the causes of the mischief, but the reader may accept it as a fact that the reports of a long series of British ambassadors and consuls, from the time of Queen Elizabeth to our own day, and a long series of books by observant travellers from England, France, and other Western nations, are in absolute accord that Turkish administration has always been corrupt through and through. It would be easy to fill volumes with such testimony. Ricaud, secretary to Lord Winchelsea, ambassador to the Grand Turk in the time of Charles II., wrote a history of Turkey, after a residence of six years in Constantinople, and many pages of his book describing the abuses then existing, the corruption of the State, massacres of Christians, and general misrule, might be reproduced now as applicable to present times. The well-known remark that "Turkey never changes," though trite, is nevertheless true. The corruption existing then and now is simply appalling, and has made many well-wishers of the Turkish race hopeless of its amelioration.

The higher officials have usually to buy their places, and in return exact from those below them, and especially from the peasants, Turkish as well as Christian, all that they can. Salaries are irregularly paid. Justice is bought and sold. Trade is hampered until much of it is driven away from the country. Life and property are not secure. The tax-farmers have to bribe in order to obtain their contracts, and in return are allowed to exact double or more from the agriculturalists than they are entitled lawfully to receive.

As the abuses in the collection of taxes have done more, perhaps, than anything else to make the peasants of Macedonia discontented with their lot, by reducing them to the verge of starvation and to drive them into revolt, it is desirable to show at some length what these abuses are. The heaviest tax which has to be paid is tithe or *dime*. Its assessment and collection form a good illustration of the difference between the theory of Turkish law and its administration. The law provides that the collection of tithe for the Government shall be put up to auction or to public tender—that is, that bids shall be invited from private persons for the payment of a lump sum to the Government for the right to collect one-tenth of the forthcoming harvest and other agricultural produce, such as the increase of sheep, cattle, and goats, in a specified village or district. The surplus over and above the accepted offer will

be the legitimate profit of the tax-farmer. The bid is often highly speculative, and the successful bidder has to take his chance of bad weather, deficient crops, and a mistaken estimate. The Government requires that the payment of the accepted tender, if any be accepted, shall be guaranteed by an approved third person. Its rights are thus secured. The person whose tender has been accepted then arranges with the local authorities to make a valuation of each peasant's next harvest. For this purpose he, together with the peasant and one or more of the local authorities, visits the crop upon which the tax is to be levied and makes the valuation. The tax-gatherer has usually made an arrangement by which, in addition to the sum secured to the Government, a further sum will be paid to the local authorities. In all probability it is just in consideration of such a private arrangement that his tender has been accepted. When, therefore, a valuation is made, it is almost invariably far in excess of what it ought to be. If the peasant wishes, he has the right to appeal against this excessive valuation to the local Council, whose decision will be final. He is well aware by experience that their decision would be against him, and he therefore makes the best arrangement as to the valuation that he can, without wasting time on appeal. His bargaining will be on the excess of the estimate beyond the legal levy. Should he refuse to accept an excessive

valuation, the tax-collector has a terribly powerful weapon which he does not hesitate to use against him. The harvest is not allowed to be gathered until the authorities have given their consent, and this is refused until the illegal estimate has been paid. Sometimes the practice varies, and the peasant has the right to pay the tax in kind. But even thus he is no better off. The tax-gatherer, who has the right to be present at the harvesting in order to see that he gets his full tenth, waits until the harvest is nearly or quite ready. In many cases, indeed, according to foreign consuls practically in all, he demands much more than his tenth; and if the peasant does not acquiesce in the illegal demand, the tax-gatherer will not find it convenient to come round and give his permission to begin harvesting. An honourable Jewish merchant, who knows Macedonia thoroughly, and who has no sympathy with the Bulgarian movement, recently expressed his opinion that this almost universal practice of extortion has been the main cause of the readiness which the peasants have shown to join the insurrectionary bands. The peasant sees his crop rotting on the ground or rapidly wasting away because he cannot obtain permission to gather it, but he is powerless. To save a remnant he will sometimes sacrifice half of what remains. The local *zaptiehs*¹ are at the service and in the pay of the collector, and until they receive word from

¹ Policemen.

him they will see that no obstinate peasant begins harvesting. There is no commoner form of injustice done to the peasants than the refusal to give permission to gather their crops until an illegal as well as the legal portion of them is conceded to the tax-collector. If the peasant remains obstinate and refuses to pay the illegal contribution, preferring to let his crop perish, even thus he does not escape. The *zaptiehs* do not hesitate to seize and sell his cattle, and even his seed-corn. The policemen are in fact regarded by the peasants, not as their protectors or as the representatives of law and justice, but as persons entirely at the tax-gatherer's disposal. It may be said on their behalf that they are merely the tools of the higher officials, and that they as well as the local *bekjis* or watchmen are miserably paid. Their pay is almost invariably many months in arrears, and their daily ration of bread is barely sufficient to support existence. To a large extent they live upon the poverty-stricken peasants who are forced to tolerate their exactions. The evils of collusion between the tax-gatherers and the local authorities press hardly on Muslim and Christian peasants alike; but as the *zaptiehs* employed are Muslims, they naturally act more willingly against the unbelievers than against their co-religionists. Unhappily the peasants of both creeds have learned by long experience the hopelessness of any appeal to the law courts, and either remain patient under their exactions or, as the

Christians have done in recent years, make appeal to the insurrectionary committees who have often executed a rough justice on their oppressors.

Two exceptions to the general rule, that the collection of tithe is farmed out, may be noted, although they do not affect the preceding remarks. Sometimes no tender is made which the local authorities consider sufficiently good. The occupation of the tithe-farmer or publican is as unpopular as it was in Palestine in the time of Christ, and the money wrung out of the peasants is even now spoken of by the Turks as unclean. In these cases the local officials undertake the collection. In certain important districts through which the new railways pass, the collection is made under the control of the Department of the Public Debt, which is managed by the representatives of the foreign bond-holders, in order to see that the sums necessary for furnishing the kilometric guarantee for such railways are forthcoming.

It is not in the collection of tithes only that gross abuses exist. Many other taxes and contributions, both legal and illegal, are exacted. Sometimes these are so excessive as to defeat the object for which they are imposed. Not long since, in one district, hundreds of apricot trees, on the dried fruit of which the people largely subsist during winter, were cut down by the peasants themselves in order to avoid the annual tax levied upon them. Vineyards near the capital even have been rooted up for the same reason. The growth

and export of the hair of the Angora goat, which when manufactured is known as mohair, ought to be one of the most profitable enterprises in Turkey. Thirty years ago this goat only existed in the Ottoman Empire, but the tax levied upon the animals was so heavy that great numbers were killed, and Turkey has for some years had to take a second rank in the production of mohair.

It is uncertain whether the taxes levied have always received the Sovereign's sanction; but it is beyond doubt that their method of collection is in violation of all law and justice. Already in many districts the taxes due upon the next harvest have been collected, and the general belief is that there will be double taxes for the year. Generally speaking, the more remote from the capital the greater is the irregularity and the oppression in the collection of taxes. But in justice to the provincial rulers it must be explained that they are constantly called upon to remit large sums to Constantinople. Demands are frequently made which are not provided for by law, and the destination of which is unknown to the governors themselves. These are special levies, and the governors, if they would retain their places, must contrive to find the money and remit it. Their usual method of obtaining it is to summon the heads of the local religious communities and to apportion the sum to be provided by each. Every man is inscribed as belonging to one or other of these communities,

and is forced to pay the amount allotted as his contribution by the head of his community. Such demands are irregular, they cannot be foreseen, and are often very heavy.

But added to all these burdens there is another which, not only in Macedonia, but even as far as Syria, is still more grievous. In describing it I am merely repeating what is believed generally not only by those who have to bear the burden, but by consuls and others who speak confidently on the matter. The governors and other officials, who are appointed from the capital, have in many cases to pay the persons who have used their influence to have them named. This payment sometimes takes the form of a periodical contribution. The official recoups himself by taking pay and toll from the subordinates whom he in his turn appoints. These again make good their losses out of the peasants. A convenient way of accomplishing this is to add the proportion intended for the officials to the amount which has been levied for transmission to Constantinople. Receipts are constantly refused, and the same sum is levied twice or three times over. Very commonly the practice is varied by giving receipts for a smaller sum than has been exacted, and the difference finds its way into the pockets of the collectors and local officials. One of the results of these irregular contributions is that the peasant never knows what he will have to pay. He believes, and not without cause, that

the measure of taxation is whatever can be squeezed out of him.

In addition to these taxes and irregular demands for money he has in many parts of the Empire, and notably in Macedonia, to meet the demands of men, in the last-mentioned province, usually Albanians, who enforce exactions to which their legal right is of the most shadowy description. They or their fathers have chosen, as the Kurds likewise do in Armenia, to levy contributions from certain villages, nominally for protection against other brigands; but it is a protection with which the peasants would willingly dispense. Between the exactions of the tax-collectors with the *zaptiehs* at their beck and call, and those of these unsolicited "protectors," the life of the peasant becomes absolutely intolerable.

It is no part of my task to point out the wrong inflicted by such protectors and by the *zaptiehs* upon the women of the peasants. It is sufficient to say that they are such as in all ages have "turned the coward's blood to flame." The extortions alone—heavy, arbitrary, irregular, levied upon all that the peasants produce, and enforced by *zaptiehs* and other officials, who can take the oxen from the plough, or seize the few cooking utensils, which are all that he may possess, and, in case he is supposed to have property which he is concealing, can send him without trial to the tortures of a prison—ought not to be endured. The peasant, in fear of official and private rapacity,

is afraid to let it be known that he possesses anything of value. Living usually in constant fear of starvation and oppression, hopeless of any amelioration of his lot under existing rule, he becomes ready to risk his life in support of any movement which promises to better his condition.

Without adducing further illustrations, I may safely say that our Consular reports abound with instances of the most gross injustice.

England during upwards of a century considered that the existence of a strong Turkish Empire was a necessity for maintaining the balance of power in Europe, and some of her ambassadors, especially the singularly able, energetic, and hopeful Canning, better known as Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who spent nearly forty years in the country, devoted much of their energy in endeavouring to persuade Turkey to reform. At one time Lord Stratford sincerely believed that Turkey might become a civilized nation. But all his efforts were in vain. Some of the changes suggested by him to strike at corruption and to enable the Christians of the Empire to be fairly treated were formally accepted; but he lived to see that they were not carried into execution, and in his later days he regarded it as hopeless to expect a reformed Turkey. His biography, indeed, furnishes evidence that Turkey has retrograded rather than advanced since the time when he was ambassador. The experience of Canning has been that also of subsequent ambassadors. Sir Henry Layard came to

Constantinople with the firm conviction that he could persuade the Turk to accept reforms which, while altogether favourable to the general prosperity of the country, should render life and property safe in Asia Minor, especially for the Christians of Armenia. No ambassador ever worked more strenuously to secure such a result. Plan after plan was presented and rejected, and although he was a favourite and had great personal influence with the Sultan, for whom he had a great esteem, his last famous despatch to her Majesty's Government was the despairing cry of one who had to recognise that his task was hopeless and that his efforts had failed.

The history and present condition of the country justifies a feeling of despair for progress among the Turkish people. It is bad enough to find roads and bridges once well built now fallen into decay; to see towns like Konia and Nicæa, which even within Turkish times were populous and flourishing, now little better than heaps of ruins; to trace the sites of others which have entirely disappeared; to see to-day the same hindrances to trade and manufacture at work which have succeeded in past times in the impoverishment of a naturally rich country. It is worse to find that there has existed neither moral force nor patriotism sufficient at any time to strike at the all but universal corruption which is the principal cause and symptom of this decay.

The condition of the Turkish Empire to-day

gives no evidence of ability on the part of the race to govern even a Muslim people. The Eastern proverb says that "Grass never grows where the Turkish hoof has trod." It is the simple truth that every province held by the Turk has become less productive than it was before, and has fallen in civilization under his rule; his misgovernment retards the progress alike of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects, though it falls with far greater weight upon the Christians. An experienced diplomatist remarked a short time back that while Europe was taking the interest of the Macedonians to heart, the reports he received from his consuls throughout Asia Minor and Syria showed that misrule and disorder are as rife there as they were a few years ago. Insecurity for life and property, and corruption in every department of the State, are the stock subjects of complaint which characterise Turkish rule over all its subjects alike.

But the full measure of the Turkish incapacity to govern is only shown when he has to deal with the Christian subject races. Four and a half centuries ago the Turk became master of Constantinople. Though greatly reduced in population and wealth from what it had once been, its people and the other Christians who came under his rule were probably the most generally civilized people in the world. Under Turkish rule Constantinople has become the most retrograde capital in Europe. Under such rule, Athens, Bucarest, Belgrade, and

Sofia, eighty years ago, were mere collections of mud huts, occupied by dejected and poverty-stricken people. Since their inhabitants got rid of Turkish oppression these villages have rapidly grown into towns, have adopted the appliances of civilization, and are all making good progress. The first two, which have enjoyed freedom for a longer time than the others, are now well-built and well-governed cities with bright, intelligent, and progressive populations, and Sofia will soon run them close. To pass from any of these towns to Constantinople is to pass from a civilized to a barbarous city. The Turk has been unable either to assimilate the civilization which he found in the country, or to profit in any appreciable degree by that which exists in Western nations. He could, and did, prevent the Greeks and other Christian peoples who were subject to his rule from making that progress of which their recent history shows them to be capable. His treatment of the races subject to him absolutely barred anything like amalgamation with his own race, and the gulf which separates the conquerors from the conquered is wider now than it was when the Turks first entered the country.

The explanation of the failure of the Turks as rulers over the Christians is to be found in the facts that the latter are conquered peoples, that they are more industrious and intelligent than their conquerors, and, above all, in the difference of religion.

The Turks came into the country as nomad conquerors, and the Christians were largely dispossessed of their lands. But the Turkish nomads who obtained them, or who settled alongside of the Christians, have seldom shown any aptitude for agriculture, for manufacture, or for trade; and wherever Turkish and Christian villages have existed side by side, the latter, by the industry and intelligence of their inhabitants, have invariably shown more signs of prosperity than the former. Poverty-stricken though the country everywhere now is, it still remains true that to pass from a Turkish to a Christian village is to pass from appalling poverty to poverty less conspicuous and less hopeless. Still, the Turk has never forgotten that he belongs to the conquering race; and though the Turkish peasant has just cause of complaint against his rulers, he has never ceased to believe that the Christians ought to be his inferiors in every respect, and especially in the possession of property. In other words, the comparative wealth of his Christian neighbour appeals to his cupidity. It has been one of the main causes why the Turkish population, when permitted to plunder their neighbours, as seven years ago in Armenia and twenty-seven years ago in Bulgaria, has looked upon massacre largely as an opportunity for loot. Massacres of Christians have in fact not only been one of the regularly recurring incidents in Turkish rule, but have always appealed to the desire for plunder on the part of the poorer Muslims.

While the unvarying testimony of history shows the Turk to be incapable of doing justice to a subject Christian race, he is seen at his worst when his religious prejudices come into play. It is these prejudices more than any other cause which have always prevented, and still prevent, him from being a just ruler. The religion of Islam, or Resignation, supplies a teaching which in certain respects works for righteousness, and in an early stage of human society undoubtedly constituted a progress on the existing systems. Of this aspect of its teaching I have nothing here to say ; but I may be allowed to remark that while it is difficult to find words too strong to condemn the corruption and misrule which exists in every department of Turkish administration, I must not be understood to condemn all Turks. The common peasant, when not under the influence of religious prejudice, is sober, kindly, and hospitable. When, however, he rises to office, he is incapable of resisting the evil influences of his environment. Even among the governing class there are found honourable and upright men who lament the general corruption and keep their own hands clean. But they are, unfortunately, powerless to mend matters. On the other hand, it must not be supposed that the Christians in Turkish service are much better than the Turks themselves. Some of the most striking examples of men who could be named to-day as representatives of everything that is bad in the methods of Turkish rule are so-called Christians.

Speaking of the system generally, and excluding individual cases, Turkish officials are incapable of even striving against the evils which surround them and by which they seek to profit.

Nevertheless the statement is true that the religion of the Turk tends to make him incapable of being a just ruler over Christians. Muhamedanism produces this result by directly encouraging the domineering spirit of the conqueror over the vanquished, by hindering the moral and material progress of the conquering race, and by widening the gulf between the rulers and their subjects.

The spread of Islam was largely due to the sword. Its teaching is that the *caffers*, or idolaters, are to be rooted out, but that the "People of the Books," that is, the Christians and the Jews, are to be spared if they submit and pay tribute. At all times an unbeliever could save his life if he would accept Islam. Every career becomes open to the apostate. The dream of the pious Muslim is that all races shall be driven within the domain of the Khalif. He is convinced that by virtue of his acceptance of the true faith the believer is placed on a higher plane than unbelievers. He is appointed to be a ruler over the "People of the Books," who are to be his *rayahs*,¹ or cattle. With such a belief it would indeed be remarkable if the conquerors' pride were

¹ The term *rayah* is applied to all the non-Muhamedan subjects of the Porte.

not greatly increased, and if they did not become the most grievous of task-masters. A keen observer, of long experience in India, who is specially anxious to secure educated Muhamedans for the service of the State in numbers equal to their proportion of the population, declared that the greatest obstacle to their progress is what he calls "spiritual pride." As in Turkey, so in India the Muhamedan considers himself to be on a higher plane than the adherents of any other faith, Christianity included. He almost belongs to a different species. He is a ruler by divine right, and Christians are, or ought to be, his *rayahs*. Nevertheless in India he fails to compete successfully with the adherents of other, and even non-Christian, faiths, just as his co-religionist in Turkey fails in general progress when matched with the Christians. Of course, to men who hold such opinions regarding their relationship to the professors of other creeds, all suggestion of equality before the law, or of equal rights with themselves, is nonsense. They have no desire to assimilate races whom Allah has placed in subjection to them. In Turkey this pride is increased by the fact that while the Muslim is a soldier, the Turkish army being at all times co-extensive with the nation, the subject races are not allowed to bear arms. It is this pride which has prevented the Turk from profiting by the learning and experience of the West. It is this proud and domineering spirit, engendered by conquest and

strengthened and sanctioned by religious belief, which makes the Muslim incapable of being a just ruler of Christians.

The other characteristics of Muhamedanism which tend to prevent the Turk from acting justly to subject races are mainly two, viz., the position assigned to woman, and the deep-rooted belief in, and influence of, fatalism. Though these are of great importance in examining the influence of Islam upon the Turkish race, the space allotted forbids me to do more than indicate their effect. Each checks the moral and material progress of the race, and renders the individual less intelligent than he would otherwise be. The position assigned to woman is regarded by thoughtful Turks themselves as the most unfortunate part of the teaching of their religion. Polygamy is permitted. Repudiation of a wife, rather than formal divorce, is the common practice. The separation of the household is the inflexible rule. The common belief in Muhamedan countries—though such belief is declared by many competent authorities to be contrary to the true teaching of the Koran—is that woman has no soul. Family life or home life, as the term is understood in all Christian countries, is unknown. The Churches have rendered an inestimable service to the subject races of the Empire by the preservation of family life. Where woman is by law and custom degraded, the offspring, and in time the race itself, comes to be less intelligent and, using the word in a large sense,

less educated than in countries where children are brought up in the companionship of both parents. Being less intelligent, they are unable to become as prosperous as their neighbours of the Christian faith, whom they have been brought up to despise and speak of as cattle. The influence of fatalism prevents the Turk from providing for the future. Those who know the Turkish population best are the most deeply impressed with the hindrance to material progress and to mental development which arises from this belief. It operates upon every action in their lives. It has certainly helped to make the Osmanlis fearless soldiers; but the same belief destroys in the average Turk the desire to get on and the inducements to work. The answer of the poorer Turk, when asked why he does not do something by which he could profit, is, "What is written (in the Eternal Books) is written."

To sum up, Muhamedanism encourages and sanctions the conqueror's pride and contempt for unbelievers, and is thus a hindrance to the recognition that they have a right to even-handed justice. At the same time the current belief regarding the proper sphere and destiny of woman and the doctrine of fatalism prevent the dominant race from making as much progress as the Christian subjects of the Sultan are making.

It is from this pride and contempt, combined with the knowledge of the comparative prosperity of the subject Christians—and this in spite of

periodical massacres and constant oppression—that there arises a spirit of sullen dislike among the poorer Turks which is always ready to become active. When the Turkish soldier, imbued with this spirit, ill-fed, ill-clothed, and with his pay in arrears, is sent to repress a revolt of the Christians, it would be remarkable indeed if he showed any self-restraint. When the Turk of higher rank is asked by the representatives of foreign Governments to carry out reforms which would benefit Muslims as well as Christians, there exists always the belief that the attempt is being made to give equal rights to those who ought by divine law to be held in subjection. Hence all such proposals are resisted.

The resistance to reforms suggested by Europe which the Turk has so often displayed during the last century, has been, in fact, largely due to his religion. However enlightened a Sultan and a handful of reformers—like the famous Reshid, Fuad, and Aali of the Crimean War period—may have been, they have against them the *vis inertiae* of the bulk of the Muslim population. Any change proposed by Europeans appears to them an invasion of their sacred rights. To demand that Christian *rayahs* shall be placed on an equality with Muslims is to invoke the silent if not spoken retort that no treaty with infidels can be binding.

It would not be difficult to show that the various promises of reform made by Turkey

to the Christian Powers have never been executed except under compulsion. Even where, as in the case of the famous proclamations known as the Hatt-i-Sherif of 1839, and of the Hatt-i-Humayun of 1856, enlightened Sultans have recognized the necessity for fundamental reforms, the compact resistance of their Muslim subjects has defeated the express decrees of the Sovereign. When a demand is made for autonomy or cession of territory, the Powers making it are in face of the popular belief that for a Muhamedan to sacrifice territory or territorial rights to Christians except under compulsion is a sin against Allah and the Prophet. It is useless to speak of expediency, for expediency cannot prevail against a religious obligation.

It would be easier still to show that throughout the whole course of Turkish history, and especially previously to the nineteenth century, when for the first time the Powers began to use their influence in favour of the subject races, the concessions made to the Christian subjects of the Porte have been repeatedly violated. The heads of the Christian communities have had to keep up a constant struggle to maintain the privileges which they possessed *ab antiquo*, and the retention of which was solemnly promised; sometimes even to maintain the right of life itself for Christians, which was in danger unless they consented to abandon their faith. They have been robbed of the majority of their churches.

In Constantinople itself there remains only one small building which existed as a church before the Muslim conquest and is still used for Christian services; all the rest have been converted into mosques. In like manner the rich revenues devoted to Christian worship have been taken from the Christians, and the Churches have to depend upon the subscriptions of a poverty-stricken population. In short, what might have been foretold by an examination of their religious belief as to the treatment of Christians by the Turks, has been entirely confirmed by the whole course of their history. Whatever merits as a people they possess, they have always shown incapacity to rule Christian races with equity.

CHAPTER III

THE BALKAN STATES—THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION

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THE decline of the Ottoman power, which began after the retreat of the Turkish army from Vienna in 1683, was marked during the eighteenth century by increasing anarchy in the European and Asiatic provinces of the Empire. The Balkan lands were desolated by fierce bands of Janissaries and Krjalis, against whose ravages the Christian population found little other protection than such as was afforded them by the Klephts and Haiduks—the Greek or Slavonic counterparts to the insurgent bands of to-day. The disintegration of Turkey began with the establishment of practically independent pashaliks or fiefs, such as those of Skodra under Mehemet of Bushat, Iannina under Ali of Tepelen, and Vidin under Pasvanoglu. The nineteenth century witnessed the detachment of the outlying portions of the Empire. Servia obtained internal autonomy in 1820, complete independence with an increase of territory in 1878, and was proclaimed a kingdom in 1882. Greece became an independent kingdom

in 1832, and acquired Thessaly in 1881. The principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which had never been under direct Turkish administration, were united in 1861, obtained independence in 1878, acquiring the Dobruja at the same time, and became the kingdom of Rumania in 1881. Bosnia and the Herzegovina were practically annexed by Austria-Hungary in 1878, while a portion of Southern Herzegovina fell to the share of Montenegro. In the same year Northern Bulgaria became a tributary principality, and Southern Bulgaria, or "Eastern Rumelia," an autonomous province; the union of the two Bulgarias was effected in 1885. Lastly, Crete obtained complete autonomy in 1897. The natural process of disintegration has been artificially arrested by the action of Europe, the mutual jealousies and ambitions of the Great Powers preventing them from co-operating with a view to the only final and legitimate solution of the Eastern Question—the segregation, so far as is possible, of the various Christian nationalities now under Turkish rule, and their incorporation with the adjoining free and kindred communities.

This gradual dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in Europe is due to a variety of causes. A nomad Asiatic race, the Turks display the same incapacity for change and progress, the same indolence and conservatism, the same repugnance to the spirit of modern Europe, which characterises all Oriental peoples, with the brilliant exception

of Japan. Their religion, their social system, above all, the position assigned to women, form obstacles to advancement, enlightenment, and the assimilation of modern ideas. They have been content to let commerce, industry, and all the arts by which wealth is accumulated, remain in the hands of the subject peoples. The Muslim is a warrior, and owes his dominant position to the sword; as a conqueror, he exercises the *jus belli*, reserving for himself the privileges of government and military service, and leaving to the *giaour* the duty of providing ways and means for the maintenance of an alien authority. The Muslim drives the administrative engine, the Christian finds the fuel for stoking it. A State founded on such a system could never acquire solidity or develop into a homogeneous polity.

From the outset the Muslim conquerors showed an incapacity or an unwillingness to assimilate the Christian population. Had the invaders in the first instance imposed their religion on the vanquished races at the point of the sword, had they subsequently endeavoured to win them over by the bestowal of equal privileges, a complete amalgamation might have followed; even the indigenous languages which contained the germ of the various national revivals would to a large extent have disappeared, and the Balkan Peninsula of the present day, from the Danube to Cape Matapan, would have been Muhamedan and loyal to the Sultan. Such a policy, however, was

foreign to the spirit of the Turks, who treated the subject races with a contemptuous toleration. It was the duty of the *rayah* to till the ground and to make wealth for his master; so long as he was submissive and paid his taxes, he was free to retain his traditional customs, to worship as he pleased, and to settle his parochial and domestic affairs to his own liking.

The gulf fixed between the conqueror and the conquered was never bridged; in later times it has even widened. The interference of the Christian Powers, the spread of education among the subject races, bringing with it in each case an awakening of national consciousness, the gradual percolation of modern ideas, the doctrines of the French Revolution, and later the principle of nationalities, exemplified in the realization of Italian and German unity, have all tended to this increased estrangement. The movements which culminated in the liberation of Servia, of Greece, of the trans-Danubian principalities, and more recently of Bulgaria, were heralded in each case by a literary renaissance and an educational propaganda. The schoolmaster has gone hand in hand with the insurgent chief, and the same individual has often combined the two functions. The so-called Albanian movement is devoid of vitality, not only because the Albanians are divided in religion and, to a certain extent, in dialect, but because they possess no national literature, and no schools in which their language is taught; their demand

for schools has always been rejected by the Porte, which, warned by experience, apprehends that education would sap their loyalty.

The Bulgarian national revival, the last in order of time, has been attended by peculiar complications. In their efforts to obtain political freedom and the union of their race, the Bulgarians have found themselves confronted not only with the power of Islam, but with the hostility of sister Christian nations. Thus a new factor has been introduced which renders the struggle infinitely more arduous. In addition to the secular conflict between Christian and Turk, a state of civil war between Christians has been brought about in the unenfranchised portions of the Ottoman Empire. Servians and Greeks alike are bitterly opposed to Bulgarian expansion; in order to arrest its progress, Servia drew the sword in 1885, Greece in 1897. The sympathies of Christian Europe have been divided; not only the friends of Turkey, but Philhellenes and Philo-serbs, decry the upstart Bulgars and denounce their misdeeds. The crimes of Bulgarian revolutionaries have been catalogued in numerous publications, and have enjoyed a notoriety which was scarcely accorded to the aberrations of other antagonists to Turkish rule. The national movement has lost the support of Russia, which favoured its inception, and that of the Central Powers and England, which aided its further developments. The Bulgarians, indeed, have few friends, but they manifest no signs of

despair. In the short period of their political existence they have gone through so many vicissitudes that they have become inured to desperate situations. Their tenacity, their shrewdness, their dogged perseverance—the characteristics of an agricultural race—their cool-headed judgment and intuitive sagacity, and—shall we add?—the luck which has hitherto attended them, may once more stand them in good stead. In the following pages an attempt will be made to sketch the rise and progress of the youngest of European States, which, as Lord Salisbury once remarked, leaped into the world in all the panoply of mature political wisdom, like Athene from the head of Zeus.

(A) *The Development and Progress of Bulgaria*

A hundred years ago the existence of the Bulgarian race had been almost forgotten by Europe. A nation which, under its powerful Tsars Simeon (893-927) and Ivan Asên II. (1218-1241) had ruled over the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula, had been practically obliterated by four centuries of Turkish despotism and Greek ecclesiastical domination. The Bulgarians had suffered more severely from the Turkish conquest than any of the other Christian races of the Peninsula. Their geographical position in the heart of the Peninsula isolated them from

Christendom, and exposed them to the ravages of the Turkish armies which traversed their country during the campaigns against Austria and Russia — "Where a Turkish army passes," says the proverb, "the grass never grows." An industrious agricultural race, they became the serfs of the Muhamedan landowners or beys, some of whom were descended from Bulgarian noble families who renounced Christianity after the Turkish conquest. The proximity of the great centres of Turkish military power, Adrianople and Constantinople riveted their chains and precluded the possibility of an uprising.

It is therefore not surprising that the Greek and Servian movements in the earlier decades of the last century found no counterpart in a Bulgarian insurrection. The national spirit was extinct, and national consciousness had ceased to exist. But the Turkish temporal power was not the only factor in the effacement of Bulgarian nationality. From the earliest years of Ottoman supremacy all the Christian races, comprised under the designation *Rûm-milleti*, were placed under the spiritual domination of the Greek Patriarchate, which thus constituted an ecclesiastical *imperium in imperio*. The Patriarchate, though styled Œcumenical or Universal, has always been an essentially Greek institution, and the Greek clergy under its control have never failed to labour for the spread of Hellenism. Towards the middle of the eighteenth century, Greek ecclesiastical

ascendancy was at its zenith; the Slavonic Patriarchates of Ipek and Ochrida were suppressed, almost all the Bulgarian dioceses were filled by Phanariote prelates, and the schools, in which Greek alone was taught, were controlled by the Greek clergy. The Phanariote ecclesiastics, who, like the Moldavian and Wallachian hospodars and the Turkish governors, paid large sums for their appointments, recouped themselves by heavy dues levied on their flocks, and the peasantry suffered grievously from their rapacity and venality.

So effectually had the process of Hellenization been carried out that by the end of the eighteenth century Greek had become the language of the upper classes in the Bulgarian towns, while the ignorant peasants, though retaining their Bulgarian speech, declared themselves to be Greeks. Similar conditions prevail to-day with regard to the Bulgarian peasants in Macedonia who remain under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate—the so-called “Bulgarophone Greeks,” who number perhaps 300,000, and who, with the Patriarchist Vlachs and Serbs, are styled “Greeks” in statistics compiled at Constantinople and Athens. The resurrection of the Bulgarian nation is one of the wonders of the past century. Every trace of the former national existence, every record of the old Bulgarian dynasties, had vanished; “with the Ottoman conquest literature disappeared; the manuscripts became the food of moths and worms,

or fell a prey to the fanaticism of the Phanariote clergy." The library of the Patriarchs of Trnovo survived till 1825 when it was burnt by the Greek Metropolitan Hilarion. When writing was employed for commercial or other purposes, the Bulgarian language was written in Greek characters. The precursor of the literary revival was the monk Païsii of Mount Athos (1762), whose *Istoria Slaveno - Bolgarski*, a history of the Bulgarian tsars and saints, recalled the long-forgotten glories of the race. A number of Bulgarian refugees and merchants at Bucarest initiated the educational movement. The result of their activity was the appearance of a series of unpretending educational works—grammars, elementary treatises, etc.—written in the modern language. The opening of the first Bulgarian school at Gabrovo in 1835 marked an important era in the history of the national movement; within the next ten years some fifty Bulgarian schools were at work, and education had ceased to be a Greek monopoly. In the establishment of schools a leading part was played by Neophyt, a monk from Rilo monastery, where the Slavonic ritual and language had been maintained throughout the long dark ages of alien domination.

A revolt against the spiritual authority of the Greek hierarchy followed. The history of this remarkable struggle, which reveals the peculiar tenacity and perseverance of the Bulgarian character, has never been adequately written. The

conflict continued for forty years (1830-1870). The Bulgarians addressed incessant memorials and petitions to the Patriarchate, which sometimes appeared disposed to negotiate, but in general opposed a resolute *non possumus* to all their demands. The Greeks denounced the leaders of the movement as guilty of "phyletism," i.e. the introduction of racial questions into the government of the Church, and induced the Porte to banish some of them to Asia Minor. On their part the Bulgarians maintained a continual agitation in the districts which now constitute the Principality, and in Macedonia, and some of the Greek prelates were compelled to take to flight. At length the Bulgarian leaders, despairing of a compromise with the Patriarchate, determined to follow the example set by some of the former rulers of their nation and to transfer their allegiance to Rome. Their design was favoured by the Emperor Napoleon III., who saw an opportunity for the increase of French influence in the East; a deputation proceeded to Rome, and a priest named Sokolski was consecrated bishop of the Bulgarian Uniate Church (1861).

The threatened defection of the Bulgarians from the fold of the Orthodox Church excited alarm in Russia, where it was recognized that something must be done to prevent the "little brothers" from lapsing into error. The first step was the secret deportation of Mgr. Sokolski, who disappeared from the scene and was, it is stated,

immured in a Russian monastery. The principle of nationalities, at this time so much in vogue in Western Europe, found its counterpart in the Panslavist movement in Russia; a great "Slavophil" congress was convoked at Moscow in 1867, and General Ignatieff, a noted Panslavist, became Russian Ambassador at Constantinople.

Not only Russia, but France and England, now supported the Bulgarian cause, and the Grand Vizier in 1869 drew up a new scheme of ecclesiastical organization, which, however, was rejected by the Patriarchate. At last the Sultan, nothing loath to create a permanent barrier between his Christian subjects, issued a firman establishing the Bulgarian Church under an Exarch resident at Constantinople (February 28th, 1870). The Exarch was invested with the right of nomination to fifteen dioceses, of which twelve are within the limits of the present Bulgarian State, two (Nish and Pirot) are now comprised in the Servian kingdom, and one (Veles or Küprülü) is in Macedonia. The other dioceses in dispute might, under Article 10 of the firman, be included in the Exarch's jurisdiction should two-thirds of their Christian population so desire. In virtue of this provision Bulgarian prelates were appointed to Üsküb and Ochrida in 1872, but failed to obtain the Turkish *exsequatur*.

The creation of an autonomous Bulgarian Church possessed important political significance.

Not only was the existence of the Bulgarian nation recognized, but its geographical limits were to some extent defined, the right of appointment to dioceses (under Article 10) extending as far south as Florina. Undaunted by its defeat, the Patriarchate continued to resist, and contrived to delay the execution of the firman till 1872, when the first Bulgarian Exarch, Mgr. Antim, was elected. It then shot its last bolt by declaring the new Church schismatic and excommunicating all its adherents. No doctrinal apostasy could be alleged against the Bulgarians, whose aim was to reconstitute the old autocephalous national church formerly represented by the Patriarchates of Preslav, Trnovo, and Ochrida. But, while the ancient Patriarchates and the various non-Greek autocephalous Churches were established in independent States, the new Bulgarian Church was set up side by side with the Greek Patriarchate in the Ottoman Empire, the Principality of Bulgaria not being then in existence. The indignation of the Greeks may therefore be easily understood. The fulmination of the Patriarchate has exercised a deterrent influence over a certain portion of the Bulgarian population, which, fearing the reproach of schism and the consequences of excommunication in the world to come, has refrained from adhering to the new national Church.

The acquisition of ecclesiastical autonomy gave a fresh impulse to the educational activity which

has done so much for the consolidation of Bulgarian nationality. During the prolonged struggle with the Patriarchate, various revolutionary chiefs endeavoured to incite the people to revolt against the Turks, but without success. The Bulgarian movement, hitherto conducted by pacific means, now underwent the influence of the Panslavist propaganda, of which General Ignatieff was the leading spirit; a secret organization spread its ramifications throughout the Slavonic provinces of Turkey, and the population, already exasperated by the severities of Midhat Pasha, who administered the "vilayet of the Danube" from 1864 to 1868, were ripe for revolt when the insurrection in the Herzegovina and Bosnia (1875) precipitated the catastrophe.

The Bulgarian rising, which took place prematurely in the districts of the Sredna Gora and the neighbourhood of Philippopolis (May, 1876), was prompted by the fear of a general massacre, which was only too well founded. It is unnecessary to describe the horrors which followed. Shefket Pasha, the Turkish commandant, was apparently given a "free hand" by the Sultan, bashi-buzuks and Circassians were let loose upon the villages, and within a few weeks some 25,000 to 30,000 men, women, and children were massacred. For these exploits Shefket Pasha was rewarded with the governorship of Erzeroum, while Achmet Aga, a Pomak chieftain, who put 5000 peasants to the sword

at Batak, received the order of the Mejidieh. The world was confronted with the prospect of a similar dragonnade in Servia, which, with Montenegro, had declared war, but was easily defeated. The slumbering conscience of Europe was awakened by the protests of Mr Gladstone, and a conference of the Powers assembled at Constantinople in December.

Among the recommendations put forward by the Conference was the reorganization of the Bulgarian provinces in two vilayets, under Christian Governors - General, aided by popular assemblies. The eastern vilayet, with its capital at Trnovo, comprised all the sanjaks now incorporated in the Principality and Eastern Rumelia, together with the kazas of Kirk-kilisse, Mustafa-Pasha, and Kizil-Agatch in the vilayet of Adrianople. The western vilayet, of which Sofia was to be the seat of government, included the sanjaks of Vidin, Nish, Üsküb, Monastir (except the two southern kazas), the three northern kazas of Serres, and the kazas of Strumnitza, Tikvesh, Veles and Kastoria. The *Projet de règlement pour la Bulgarie*, though set aside by the Porte, still remains a document of the highest importance as recording the ethnographical delimitation of the Bulgarian element sanctioned by united Europe. It is still appealed to by the Bulgarian committees as the charter of their race. The rejection of the proposals of the Conference led to the armed intervention of Russia, "the

soldier of Europe," and the campaign of 1877-1878.

The treaty of San Stefano (3rd March 1878), dictated by the victorious Russians at the gates of Constantinople, enlarged the territorial basis adopted by the Conference of 1876, and practically realized the aspirations of the Bulgarian nation. The new autonomous Principality which it created extended from the Black Sea to the mountains of Albania, and from the Danube to the *Ægean*. It possessed an outlet to the Mediterranean at Kavala, included the districts of *Pirot* and *Vranja* subsequently attributed to *Servia*, and comprised all the regions of European Turkey in which the Bulgarian element predominates except the *Dobruja*, which Russia reserved as compensation to *Rumania* for her own annexation of *Bessarabia*. The great Powers, believing that this extensive territory would become a Russian dependency, intervened on the initiative of England. There can be no doubt that such a consummation was held in view by the liberating Power; but the dogged tenacity of character, which subsequently enabled the Bulgarians to maintain their independence against enormous odds, was at this time little suspected either by Russia or by the Powers which aimed at counteracting her designs. Had the "Big Bulgaria" of San Stefano been allowed to exist, the emancipation of Bulgaria from Russian influence would have been even more rapid. The

Bulgarians, once installed in their rightful heritage, would have had nothing more to expect from Russia.

It is especially true in politics that gratitude consists in a lively anticipation of favours to come. The Bulgarians possess in no small degree that healthy though somewhat unamiable characteristic which is styled egoism in the individual, but becomes patriotism in the nation, and such devotion as they have hitherto manifested towards Russia has been largely inspired by the expectation that the great protecting Power would, in her own good time, carry into effect the provisions of San Stefano. That expectation has long since proved to be a delusion, but it has none the less furnished the Russophil politicians in the Principality with a highly seductive argument: "without Russia we can do nothing"—*bes Rossia ne mozhem*—has always been the text of their discourses, and the moral they deduce is that the realization of the national aspirations depends on a policy of complete subserviency to the dictates of St Petersburg. With a port at Kavala, the "Big Bulgaria" of San Stefano would have been open to Western influences; in proportion to their increased strength the Bulgarians would have manifested in even a greater degree the stubborn spirit of independence which the little Principality, the outcome of the Berlin Treaty, displayed from the outset.

It is easy, in the light of events, to reproach

Lord Beaconsfield and those who helped him to destroy the San Stefano treaty, with political short-sightedness. The Russian statesmen who drew up the treaty were equally astray in their calculations; instead of facilitating the advance of Russia to the Mediterranean they were constructing a formidable barrier to her southward progress. The Treaty of Berlin followed (13th July 1878). The "Big Bulgaria" of San Stefano was divided into three sections. The region between the Danube and the Balkans with the districts of Sofia and Kiostendil became the tributary Principality of Bulgaria; the tract between the Balkans and Rhodope—the upper valleys of the Tunja and Maritza—with the maritime district of Burgas, constituted an autonomous Turkish province, described as "Eastern Rumelia," under a Christian Governor-General; the remaining territories, comprising the greater part of Macedonia and the Bulgarian sanjaks of the Adrianople vilayet, were left under Turkish administration.

The inhabitants of the Principality were allowed to frame their political constitution and to choose their Prince, his election being confirmed by the Porte with the assent of the Powers; the autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia received its organization at the hands of a European Commission; all that was done for the unhappy districts handed back to Turkish rule is recorded in the much-quoted Article 23

of the Treaty. They were to receive institutions analogous to the Cretan Organic Statute of 1868, which statute the Porte undertook to apply scrupulously, "*en y apportant les modifications qui seraient jugées équitables.*" The words quoted have a special importance, inasmuch as the Cretan Statute was shortly after modified, in pursuance of this provision, by the "Pact of Halepa," an arrangement embodied in the firman of November 1878, which, in addition to other important privileges, conferred on the Cretans a representative Assembly with a considerable majority of Christian deputies. Article 23 further engaged the Porte to appoint special commissions, in which the native element should be largely represented, for the purpose of elaborating the proposed reforms, and, before promulgating the project resulting from their labours, to take the opinion of the Commission for Eastern Rumelia. Characteristically enough, the Porte presented a project of its own, and the Commission, taking this as a basis, drew up the elaborate "Law of the Vilayets" (23rd August 1880), which never received the sanction of the Sultan and remains a dead letter to this day.

From the first hour of their liberation the Bulgarians of the newly created Principality manifested a strong democratic spirit, and a firm determination to secure for themselves a full measure of political freedom and complete national independence. The peasant deputies,

who formed the "Assembly of Notables" which met at Trnovo in 1879, adopted as their watch-word "Bulgaria for the Bulgarians"; they attached themselves for the most part to the radical and anti-foreign movement led by Tzankoff and Karaveloff, rejected every conservative feature in the Constitution drawn up by Prince Dondukoff-Korsakoff, the Russian Governor-General, and displayed an evident tendency to rebel against Russian tutelage. The young Prince Alexander of Battenberg, whom the Assembly on the proposal of Russia elected Prince of Bulgaria on April 29th, found himself from the outset in a position of the greatest difficulty. At the time of his arrival the whole civil and military authority was in Russian hands. Conscious of his obligations to Russia and devoted to his uncle, the Tsar Alexander II., he endeavoured to shape his policy in accordance with the wishes of the liberating Power, and selected his first ministry from a small group of "Conservative" and Russophil politicians; but he was soon compelled to give way before the radical and ultra-Bulgarian majority, which, once in power, passed an alien law, and proceeded to oust the Russians from the various lucrative posts in which they had installed themselves. The Russians made a stout resistance, and eventually the Prince, still under Russian influence, determined to solve the problem by a *coup d'état*, and with the consent of his uncle, the Tsar, assumed absolute power on May 9th, 1881.

Bulgaria now fell once more under Russian government. Two generals, Soboleff and Kaulbars, despatched from St Petersburg, concentrated all the administration in their hands, and the Prince became a mere spectator of their activity. At length, finding his position intolerable, he approached the Bulgarian leaders and brought about a coalition of all parties under Tzankoff on the basis of a restoration of the Constitution (September 1883). The generals, who had formed a plot to remove him by force, were compelled to beat a hasty retreat. "Swine, scoundrels, liars!" cried Kaulbars, as he quitted the Sobranye, derisively cheered by the triumphant Bulgarians. The breach with Russia was indeed complete, and it was soon destined to be widened. Bulgaria shortly became the theatre of a series of remarkable events which concentrated the attention of Europe, and resulted in the enlargement of the Principality and the consolidation of its independence.

On September 18th, 1885, took place the bloodless revolution of Philippopolis. The union of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria was proclaimed, and Prince Alexander entered Philippopolis amid the acclamations of the people. This bold stroke was effected without difficulty, inasmuch as Turkey had refrained from exercising her privilege of sending troops into the province. The situation was nevertheless precarious in the extreme. Europe was scandalized at the violation of the Berlin Treaty,

and England alone gave encouragement to the Bulgarians. Turkey, urged by Russia to reconquer the revolted province, massed her forces on the frontier, while Servia promptly declared war and invaded the Principality. At this critical moment the Tsar withdrew the Russian officers who occupied the higher posts in the Bulgarian army; but the troops proved equal to the emergency. Ill-equipped and commanded by young subalterns, they routed the invaders at Slivnitza (November 19th) and Tsaribrod, pursued them into Servian territory, captured Pirot, and were marching on Nish when Austrian intervention put an end to the campaign. Fortunately for Bulgaria, Turkey remained inactive at this juncture. The union of the two Bulgarias was practically achieved by the war, and was subsequently ratified by the Convention of Top-khané (April 5th, 1886), under which Prince Alexander was recognised as Governor-General of Eastern Rumelia. The ability of the Bulgarians to work out their political salvation had come as a revelation both to England and to Russia. So long as the Bulgarians maintain their independence, the union of their race would be incompatible with Russia's programme in the Balkans.

Prince Alexander's success in effecting the union proved the immediate cause of his downfall. He had already begun to associate himself with the Bulgarian cause in Macedonia. His removal became necessary to the ends of Russia, and was accomplished by means of a military

conspiracy. He was seized in his palace at night by a number of officers, forced to sign his abdication, and transported to Russian territory at Reni. The nation was not slow to condemn this disgraceful proceeding; a counter revolution was organized by Stamboloff, the provisional government established by the Russophil party fell, and the Prince returned to Bulgaria amid general enthusiasm. His position, however, had become untenable for various reasons, and with the consent of the national leaders he shortly afterwards announced his abdication and quitted Bulgaria (September 9th, 1886).

A prolonged interregnum followed. The country was administered by a Regency under the presidency of Stamboloff, who repressed with unsparing severity a series of revolutionary attempts organized by the adherents and emissaries of Russia. To this remarkable man is due the preservation of Bulgarian independence. "Ce barbare," writes M. Driault, "a bien mérité de la Bulgarie: il l'a arrachée au danger de la tutelle étrangère; il lui a donné la conscience de sa nationalité, de sa personnalité; il l'a fait vivre de ses propres forces . . . Il l'a jetée très vite et très résolument dans la voie de la civilisation, et par lui elle est devenue le plus prospère et le plus robuste des états balkaniques."

Great difficulties were encountered in finding a suitable candidate for the vacant throne, but at length, on the 7th of July, 1887, Prince Ferdinand of

Saxe-Coburg Gotha was elected by the Sobranye. He was denounced as a usurper by Russia, in deference to whose susceptibilities the Powers and the Sultan declined to recognise him. Fresh efforts were made by the partisans of Russia to bring about disorder, but were frustrated by the vigilant energy of Stamboloff, whose despotic methods, however, eventually produced a reaction in the country. Prince Ferdinand, apprehensive of a revolution, and finding his recognition still delayed by the Powers, determined to conciliate Russia; in 1894 Stamboloff resigned, and in the following year was barbarously murdered in the streets of Sofia. The reconciliation with Russia was sealed by the conversion of Prince Boris, the heir-apparent, to the Orthodox faith (1896), and shortly after Prince Ferdinand received investiture from the Sultan and recognition from the Powers.

Among the conditions which Russia sought to impose on Bulgaria at this time was the reconciliation of the Bulgarian Church with the Patriarchate, and the removal of the Exarch to Sofia. The proposal, which aimed at the final separation of the Macedonian Bulgars from their brethren of the Principality, provoked no little indignation in Bulgaria, and was resolutely and successfully opposed by the Exarch Joseph. In 1902 this eminent ecclesiastic, statesman, and patriot celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of his elevation to the headship of the national Church amid universal rejoicings in all the lands

inhabited by the Bulgarian race. He has filled a position of extraordinary difficulty with consummate tact, courage, and administrative ability, and his services to the Bulgarian cause rank second to those of Stamboloff alone.

The joint action of these two remarkable men placed the Bulgarian movement in Macedonia on a new footing. At first the Exarch, like the rest of the Bulgarian clergy, doubted the possibility of pursuing a policy independent of, or hostile to, that of Russia; but nothing succeeds like success, and he soon entered into hearty co-operation with the patriotic dictator at Sofia. The keynote of Stamboloff's policy was an interested friendship with Turkey; this object he pursued by a variety of methods, alternately caressing or bullying the Porte as circumstances required. Thus, in 1890, when his position had been rendered almost desperate by the intrigues of Russia and the machinations of his enemies, he addressed a menacing Note to Turkey, demanding the recognition of Prince Ferdinand, and the restitution of the rights of the national church in Macedonia; the demand was enforced by a deliberately fomented agitation in that country, and the Porte hastened to grant the *exsequatur* to Bulgarian prelates at Ochrida and Üsküb. All at once the most cordial relations were restored, the ferment in Macedonia disappeared, and presently Stamboloff visited Constantinople, where he was received with high honour by the Sultan. By a similar course of action he extracted further con-

cessions at different periods, including *berats* for bishops at Nevrokop and Veles in 1894. Thanks to the diplomatic triumphs of Stamboloff and the administrative skill of Mgr. Joseph, the Bulgarian propaganda in Macedonia, conducted entirely by peaceful methods, made astonishing progress between 1889 and 1894. But the advantages obtained tended to benefit a future generation rather than the present, and did little to assuage the grinding tyranny and oppression to which the population was subjected.

The restoration of Russian influence in Bulgaria led to a recrudescence of the Macedonian agitation which Stamboloff had kept well in hand. It was generally believed in the Principality that Russia would henceforth favour Bulgarian aspirations and revive the programme of San Stefano. The truth was that Russia had abandoned that programme some ten years before; nor is she likely to revert to it unless she succeeds in bringing the existing Principality into a state of complete tutelage; a strong, independent Bulgaria, extending from the Danube to the *Ægean*, would be a fatal obstacle to her cherished designs.

The situation in Bulgaria was "regularized" by the recognition of Prince Ferdinand, and since that event the history of the country has fortunately ceased to present a series of dramatic incidents. The independence of Bulgaria was not sacrificed, as may be gathered from the fact that since May 1903 a Stambolovist and anti-

Russian ministry has been in power. Prince Ferdinand incurred much obloquy at the time of the reconciliation with Russia, but few competent observers will maintain that any other course was open to him. The bulk of the nation unquestionably desired a solution of the protracted crisis and the restoration of normal conditions. The Bulgarians, however, have taught Russia a lesson, and since the reconciliation that Power has refrained, to all appearance at least, from undue interference with their internal affairs. Whether they will be able to maintain their liberty in the future depends in some degree on themselves, but mainly on the amount of support which Europe, and more especially the Western Powers, may see fit to accord them.

This virile, laborious, thrifty, and persevering race has displayed many qualities which entitle it to play an important part in the future history of South-Eastern Europe. During the twenty-six years of its troubled existence the young Bulgarian State has made almost phenomenal progress. Education has advanced rapidly; public works have been instituted on a large scale; the country has been covered with a network of railways; wealth has undoubtedly increased, and order has been maintained, often in circumstances of great difficulty. The military organization receives high praise from foreign experts. Notwithstanding the recent economic crisis, the financial situation compares

favourably with that of the sister States, inasmuch as the national debt is proportionately small. The Bulgarians indeed have worked wonders. "They have existed since the Treaty of Berlin in conditions anything but favourable to development. They have had no active friends, and they have had to contend with very active and unscrupulous foes. Assassins have been hired to murder their leading citizens; foreign emissaries have lived among them to stir up revolution by the basest means; they have had to fight the Servians, and they have lived in constant apprehension of invasion by a far more powerful foe. They have faced all these difficulties with a calm courage and perseverance of which any race might be proud, and have proved themselves the most solid and trustworthy of the claimants for the reversion of the Turk."¹

(B) *Greece, Rumania, Servia.*

The rise and progress of the other States of the Balkan Peninsula has been less intimately connected with the Macedonian Question than that of Bulgaria, and can only be dealt with in mere outline in these pages. The Bulgarians have always regarded the boundaries of San Stefano as more or less adequately defining the rightful limits of their race; beyond those boundaries there is no considerable Bulgarian element in any part of the Peninsula except

¹ *The Times*, leading article, 4th Oct. 1892.

the Dobruja, and the national energies have therefore been concentrated on Macedonia and the Adrianople vilayet. The great Macedonian immigration into Bulgaria—there has been no similar influx into Greece or Servia—has had a powerful influence on popular feeling and political developments in the Principality, and has considerably affected the economic situation. On the other hand, the national aspirations of Greece, Rumania, and Servia have tended in many other directions. Since the establishment of the Hellenic Kingdom the eyes of the Greeks have been fixed from time to time upon Thessaly, Epirus, the “Ionian Islands,” Crete, Cyprus, the islands of the Archipelago, and the large Greek settlements in Asia Minor, as well as upon Macedonia, all of which are comprised in the Μεγάλη Ἰδέα—the Great Idea. The dream of Rumanian unity can only be realised by the recovery of Bessarabia from Russia, and the absorption of the large Ruman population under Hungarian rule in Transylvania. The bulk of the Serbo-Croat nation is still under Austrian or Hungarian rule in Dalmatia, Bosnia, the Herzegovina, and Croatia, while a portion of it possesses a separate political organization in Montenegro. The Servian claim to Macedonia may be described as an afterthought. While the energies of their rivals have been largely dissipated by a variety of aims, the Bulgarians have given undivided attention to their

Macedonian programme, and concentration of purpose has lent strength to their activity.

The position of the Greeks with regard to Macedonia cannot, of course, be compared in any way with that of the Servians and Rumanians. Not only is there a considerable genuinely Greek population in Southern Macedonia (south of Kastoria), the Chalcidic peninsula, and generally in the maritime districts, but the superior civilization and intelligence of the Greeks, their commercial supremacy and educational activity, furnish them with claims which, if inadmissible on the principle of nationalities, are at least entitled in special cases to a certain consideration; that is to say, that in districts where there is no marked national preponderance the preference may be given to the more cultivated race in any future delimitation. Beyond this, the pretensions of the Greeks based on their racial superiority cannot be entertained. It is only natural that they should appeal to the past glories of Hellas, for the sympathies which these evoke have been of inestimable advantage to them in their struggle for liberty and at every subsequent stage of their history. At Athens one hears much of Alexander the Great and Aristotle, but these illustrious names possess no significance for the practical settlement of the Macedonian Question. We must take Macedonia as we find it at the present day, without considering what race or races ruled or occupied it in the past;

the racial distribution as it now exists furnishes the only basis for delimitation, and the only available criterion with regard to race is language.

In view of the present conflict between Panhellenism and Panslavism, it is interesting to note the connection of Russia with the earliest revolts of the Greeks against Turkish rule. The insurrection of the Morea in 1770 was supported at the beginning by Orloff's fleet; it was put down with hideous massacres by the Turks while the Russians annexed the Crimea. The outbreak of the Suliotes in 1790 was also countenanced by Russia. The famous *Hetaeria* which prepared the way for the great insurrection of 1820-1830 had one of its principal seats at Odessa, and was founded by Greek merchants resident at Moscow. The invasion of Moldavia in 1821 was carried out from the Russian frontier by Alexander Ypsilanti, aide-de-camp to the Tsar Alexander I.; that monarch first encouraged the attempt, and afterwards, at the suggestion of Metternich, disavowed it. The gallant chiefs of the Morea were again left to fight out the struggle unaided, and Europe witnessed the great massacres of Constantinople and Chios without stirring. The Divan discussed the proposal of a general massacre of Christians throughout the Empire, while Austria, who enjoyed an influence at Constantinople comparable to that of Germany at the present day, advised the Sultan to adopt rapid and energetic methods of repression. The conduct of the

Central Powers and Russia at this period presents an instructive counterpart to their policy in recent times; the secret sympathies of Russia with the struggling Christians were sacrificed to the principles of the Holy Alliance, which regarded all resistance to constituted authority with abhorrence, while all three Powers considered that their interests would be injuriously affected by the establishment of a strong Christian State in South-Eastern Europe.

When at last Russia, England, and France intervened to rescue the Greeks from extermination at the hands of Ibrahim and his Egyptians, the limits which they assigned to the newly-constituted Greek State (1832) were such as to condemn it to a prolonged struggle for existence. The three Powers, indeed, were intensely jealous of each other, and the future of Greece was not uppermost in their calculations. Owing to the successful campaigns of 1828 and 1829, Russia was in a position to obtain a better settlement for Greece; but this was not in accordance with her programme. "La Russie," wrote Nesselrode, "pouvait peut-être donner le dernier coup à la monarchie ottomane; mais cette monarchie, réduite à n'exister plus que sous la protection de la Russie, convenait mieux à ses intérêts politiques et commerciaux que toutes combinaisons qui l'auraient forcée, soit à trop s'étendre par des conquêtes, soit à substituer à l'empire ottoman des États qui n'auraient pas tardé à rivaliser avec

la Russie de puissance, de civilisation, d'industrie et de richesse." This confession of Russian policy is as true to-day as when it was written.

Accordingly, Greece received neither Epirus nor Thessaly, neither Crete nor Samos, and was started on her career under conditions which presaged trouble in the future. The earlier decades of her existence were marked by internal convulsions as in the case of the sister States; the intrigues of the three protecting Powers were represented by the Russian, French, and English parties at Athens; between 1832 and 1864 six Constitutions were successively applied. The last, the ultra-democratic Constitution of 1864, has been conscientiously observed by King George, who in 1863 occupied the throne vacated by the deposition of King Otho, the first Sovereign. Under King George the country has enjoyed relative internal tranquillity; but owing to the national craving for expansion a series of popular convulsions and costly military demonstrations have occurred at each successive crisis of the Eastern Question, ruining the finances of the State, and culminating in the disastrous war of 1897.

In 1854, Greek sympathy was on the side of Russia; an effort was made to acquire Epirus, and French troops occupied the Piræus. In 1866-1868 the Cretan insurrection led to renewed military efforts. In 1877-1878 the invasion of Thessaly was attempted. In 1881, when Turkey refused to grant the extension of frontier approved

by the Conference of ambassadors at Berlin, another mobilization took place. Thessaly was eventually ceded to Greece, but Turkey succeeded in retaining Epirus, which, up to the river Kalamas, had been accorded to Greece by the Conference. In 1886, after the revolution of Philippopolis, there was another mobilization, and the Powers blockaded the Greek ports. In 1897 the insurrection in Crete led to the despatch of a Greek army to the island, and the disastrous conflict with Turkey followed. The war of 1897, though arising out of the Cretan trouble, was in reality prompted by alarm at Bulgarian progress in Macedonia, and was undertaken in the hope that discord among the Powers would facilitate the acquisition of that country and Epirus by Greece. Some six weeks before the outbreak of hostilities the Powers had announced the definite withdrawal of Crete from Turkish rule, but the *Ethniké Hetaeria*, the secret society which at that time practically controlled the policy of the country, decided on war, and sent its bands over the frontier.

The failure of the Greek enterprise involved no loss of territory beyond a few strategical points on the Thessalian border, but its consequences to the national cause in Macedonia were serious enough. During and after the war the Turks persecuted the adherents of the Greek Patriarchate, as they now persecute the Bulgarians, with the result that a large number of Patriarchist Bulgarian villages went over to the Exarchate. The prestige

of the Greek Kingdom was considerably diminished in Macedonia. It was never, indeed, as great as was supposed by the authors of the war, who expected that a general insurrection would follow the outbreak of hostilities. Had the army gained some initial successes, the genuinely Greek population in the Chalcidic peninsula and the Bistritza valley would probably have revolted; as it happened, there was no rising at all. The anticipation, strangely enough, was founded, not on a well-matured insurrectionary scheme based on a wide-spread organization, but on the belief, which has grown into a creed, that the vast majority of the Macedonian population is Hellenic both in race and sympathies. This doctrine is inculcated in school text-books and in maps, which draw the Greek frontier at the line of the Balkans, or at least at that of Rhodope, and is accepted with implicit faith by every Greek; it is defended with great literary ability in countless books and pamphlets written in Greek, English, or French; but no effort has been made to put it to a practical test, such as would be afforded by an organization of the Macedonian peasantry.

The misfortunes of 1897 conveyed a lesson which, there is reason to fear, has not yet been learned by the Greek nation. The most ardent patriotism, the loftiest spirit of self-sacrifice, the most brilliant advocacy of Hellenic claims, can avail little without the laborious, patient, disciplined process of preparation and organization which alone

can bring a national movement to a successful issue. Within and without the Greek Kingdom little has been done in the seven years since the war to build up the national future. Even the reorganization of the army has not yet been taken in hand. The legitimate field for Greek expansion is wide indeed. Epirus, perhaps all southern Albania, southern Macedonia, the islands of the Levant, and possibly some portions of Asia Minor, may yet be united under the Greek crown. But northern and central Macedonia will not fall within the limits of the future Hellenic State. A hundred years ago the restoration of the Byzantine empire might have seemed possible, for the Christians of the Peninsula, for the most part, knew no other civilization than the Greek; but the national revival of the Balkan races within the past century has forbidden the realization of such a dream.

The growth and progress of Rumania and Servia need not detain us long, for the Macedonian Question has had no important bearing on the history of either of these States. Under the sagacious rule of King Charles (Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen—elected Prince of the united principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, 1866, proclaimed King of Rumania, 1881) Rumania has made remarkable progress, and now holds the first place among the Christian States of South-Eastern Europe in regard to administrative organization and commercial importance. Unfortunately the disabilities imposed on the Jewish population,

and the neglected condition of the peasantry, still remain blots on the national escutcheon. During the thirty-eight years of his rule, King Charles has had to confront innumerable difficulties and dangers, internal and external; among the latter are the strained relations with Russia owing to her appropriation of Bessarabia in 1878, and the tension with Austria-Hungary resulting from the oppression of the large Rumanian population of Transylvania and the Banat by the Hungarians. The sympathies of the people have been so much attracted to the *Romania irredenta* on their eastern and western borders—in 1899 the powerful Minister, Dimitri Sturdza, fell from office on a question relating to the Rumanian schools at Kronstadt—that comparatively little attention has been paid to the Vlachs, or Macedo-Rumans, as they are sometimes called, under Turkish rule. Their remoteness, which renders their incorporation with the Rumanian Kingdom an impossibility, their insignificant numbers¹ and their declared Hellenic sympathies alike weaken the bonds which connect them with their kinsfolk north of the Danube. As they dwell in detached groups, and to a large extent pursue a nomad pastoral life, they

¹ Weigand, a high authority, who has made an exhaustive study of this interesting people, estimates the Vlachs or Aromâni (as they call themselves) of Macedonia at only 70,000. He reckons the Slavs at 1,200,000 (800,000 Exarchist Bulgarians, 100,000 Pomaks or Muhamedan Bulgarians, 300,000 Patriarchists, either Greek or Servian in their sympathies), the Greeks at 220,000, and the Spanish Jews at 90,000.

can never form a compact community or become a unit in the future political system of Macedonia.

Nevertheless the principle of maintaining the Rumanian element, wherever it may be found, and of fostering its national consciousness, has long been accepted at Bucarest. It is held that the nation may derive moral and material advantage from its detached fragments, although their political incorporation cannot be hoped for. The Vlachs of Macedonia possess considerable commercial aptitude; many of their wealthy merchants have been great benefactors of Greece, and Athens owes some of its finest buildings and institutions to their liberality. It is hoped that the stream of munificence may eventually be directed to Bucarest, while it is foreseen that Rumania will have a claim to compensation elsewhere should a demonstrably Ruman population in Macedonia eventually be adjudged to some other Power. The Rumanian Government aids the movement in Macedonia with a considerable subsidy, but it seems doubtful whether any commensurate political advantage will repay the outlay. All the Vlachs have been more or less Hellenized; many of them migrate every winter to Greece, and their principal summer habitats—the highlands of Pindus and Grammos—would naturally fall to the Greek Kingdom.

The progress of Servia has been disappointing. The other newly-constituted States of the Peninsula have escaped the misfortune of a native

dynasty, but Servia has been afflicted with two, and the feud between the houses of Karageorgevich and Obrenovich has distracted the country throughout the whole period of its revived national existence. The perpetual conflict between Austrian and Russian influence, the deadly animosities of political groups, and the unfortunate domestic history of the Obrenovichs have been other factors of confusion, while the absence of a sea-board, the fiscal tyranny of Austria-Hungary, and thriftless financial management have hindered economic and commercial development. The wars of 1876 and 1877 with Turkey, and of 1885 with Bulgaria, also tended to the exhaustion of the country. Constitutional changes have been frequent, and three Servian rulers—Karageorge, Prince Michael, and King Alexander—have been assassinated. Amid all these drawbacks, Servia has lagged in the race of civilization with her neighbours, Rumania and Bulgaria.

The most favourable feature in the condition of Servia is the prosperous condition of the peasantry; almost all are small landowners, almost all are well-to-do, if not rich, and poverty is almost unknown. The bulk of the peasants are attached to the Radical and Russophil party, with which King Milan was in perpetual conflict during the last ten years of his reign. Finding the claims of Servia ignored by the treaty of San Stefano and at Berlin, King Milan sought the friendship of Austria, and thus incurred the deter-

mined hostility of Russia and her peasant partisans. His unfortunate attack on Bulgaria in 1885 was possibly prompted by Austria, by whom he was saved from the consequences of defeat. The Servians aimed at compensation for the aggrandisement of Bulgaria resulting from the revolution of Philippopolis; they claimed Sofia, Vidin, and western Bulgaria in general. It was not till after the failure of their ill-starred enterprise that they turned their attention to Macedonia. Until 1878 they had hoped to annex Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and to acquire a port on the Adriatic, but the Austrian occupation of these regions, the legitimate goal of Servian ambition, had blighted the national hopes; Bulgaria had now proved capable of defending its integrity, and no other field for expansion remained but Macedonia. Access to the Adriatic had been denied to them, but they might at least find an outlet on the *Ægean*. The rupture between Russia and Bulgaria encouraged their new ambitions, while Austria was nothing loath to see their attention distracted from the occupied provinces.

Accordingly, in the period immediately following the war with Bulgaria (1887-1900), the Servian propaganda was launched in Macedonia, and a goodly army of professors, priests, and schoolmasters entered the promised land. The inception of the movement coincided with the reversion of Russian policy from Panslavism to Panorthodoxy under the growing influence of M. Pobiedonostzeff.

The Bulgarian schism, largely the creation of Russia, was disavowed, and the Servian propaganda, at once Slavonic and Orthodox, was alone regarded as worthy of her support. Thanks to Russian aid, Mgr. Firmilian, a Serb, received the *berat*, or exequatur, as Archbishop of Üsküb in 1902, after prolonged opposition on the part of the Bulgarians and Greeks, and Russia has recently exerted herself to obtain the nomination of another Serb as his successor. The Servian propaganda, which is liberally financed from Belgrad, finds its field among the Slavs of Macedonia, whom it teaches to describe themselves as "Serbs" instead of "Bulgars," as they have hitherto done. It might therefore be supposed to come into conflict with the Bulgarians only. But as a considerable proportion of the Slavonic population adheres to the Patriarchate, Servian activity is also obnoxious to the Greeks, who consider allegiance to the Patriarchate as implying Greek nationality, and describe the Slavonic Patriarchists as "Bulgarophone" (not "Serbo-phone") Greeks. The arguments for the Servian claim to Macedonia are given at length by Gopchevich,¹ but his work is not taken seriously by the scientific world. The claim, indeed, is described by Weigand as an impudent imposture (*ein freches Schwindel*). However this may be, the argument from history, on which the Servians dwell so much, cannot be entertained. The

¹ *Makedonien und Alt Serbien*, Vienna, 1889.

fact that Tsar Dushan ruled over all Macedonia in 1346 possesses no significance to-day. That potentate, as well as Alexander the Great, Tsar Simeon, and the rest, must be relegated to their place in history; they have nothing to do with contemporary Macedonia. The Christian population of Old Servia (Ipek, Prizren, Prishtina, Mitrovitza) is undoubtedly Servian, but south of the Shar range the Servians have no footing, even though Tsar Dushan's palace is still visible at Üsküb.

(C) *The Attitude of the Balkan States towards the Macedonian Question.*

The attitude of each of the Balkan States towards the Macedonian Question has largely depended on the influence which Austria or Russia have from time to time exercised over the various Governments. The two great Powers have usually succeeded in manipulating the policy of the little States, which have served as pawns in the game of their mighty neighbours. Disappointment at the results arrived at by the Congress of Berlin led both Rumania and Servia to estrange themselves from Russia. Up to the present day Rumania has continued to revolve in the orbit of the Triple Alliance, and her policy has been shaped in accordance with the exigencies of Vienna and Berlin. When in 1886 Bulgaria broke loose from Russian tutelage, she enjoyed the warm support of Rumania; the policy of Bratiano was in fact identical with that of Stamboloff, and for

many years an almost ideal friendship, without parallel in the history of the Balkans, united the two States, which were drawn together by the fear of a common danger. Stamboloff, who had spent some of the earlier years of his stormy career in Rumania, never wavered in his friendship towards the land which had welcomed him in the days of his exile; he was even ready to favour the Rumanian propaganda in Macedonia, inasmuch as its progress was only to the detriment of the Greek nationality.

The good understanding between Rumania and Bulgaria came to an end with the revival of Russian influence in the Principality. The Russophil ministry of M. Stoiloff adopted an irritating policy towards the neighbouring State and encouraged a Bulgarian propaganda in the Dobruja. There can be little doubt that this policy was adopted at the suggestion of Russia, who has always aimed at weakening the non-Slavonic State which forms the first obstacle to her advance into the Peninsula. A close alliance between Bulgaria and Rumania would infinitely strengthen the barrier. Some years later the estrangement between the two countries was widened by the crimes perpetrated by the Macedonian committees on Rumanian subjects; and in the autumn of 1900 they were on the brink of war. Happily, better relations have latterly been established, and in November 1902 King Charles and Prince Ferdinand made a joint

excursion to the battlefield of Plevna, where cordial expressions of friendship were exchanged. The present Bulgarian ministry is most anxious to arrive at a close understanding with Rumania; such an understanding would accord with the patriotic policy of M. Sturdza, and would offer a valuable security for the future independence of the two Danubian States.

Meanwhile another combination has been set on foot under the auspices of Austria. Observing that Russia, having re-established her influence in Servia after the marriage of King Alexander, was endeavouring to bring about a *rapprochement* between Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro, and to secure the direction of their common policy, Count Goluchowsky hit upon the idea of uniting Greece and Rumania in opposition to the new Slavonic league. Accordingly, on the invitation of the Emperor Francis Joseph, a meeting took place between King George and King Charles at Abbazia, in May 1901. A friendly interchange of views took place on the basis of the maintenance of the *status quo* in Macedonia, which both States are anxious to preserve — Greece, because she dreads Bulgarian encroachment; Rumania, because she knows that the Vlach element would be absorbed under any other than Turkish rule. No definite compact was arrived at, but it was agreed that mutual tolerance should be practised in regard to the respective propagandas in Macedonia. Herein, however, lay the insuperable

difficulty, inasmuch as the two propagandas are essentially irreconcilable, the Rumanian being conducted at the expense of the Greek. The Rumanians still pursue their object of obtaining the recognition of a Rumanian *millet*, or nation, and the appointment of a Rumanian bishop at Monastir, while the Patriarchate meets their demands with its usual *non possumus*. Already a certain coldness has arisen between Athens and Bucarest, nor was any other result to be expected.

The idea of a compromise between the Bulgarians and Greeks, the two serious factors in the Christian element, seems unhappily incapable of realization. A little before the outbreak of the war of 1897 the Bulgarian Government made overtures at Athens with a view to joint action for the purpose of obtaining the reforms indicated by Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty. At this time public feeling at Athens was hostile to the idea of reforms—the reform project of the Powers had just failed in Crete—and the popular voice impatiently demanded the annexation of Crete and Macedonia. The Bulgarians were asked to define their sphere of influence—in other words, their future frontier—and on their refusing to do this the negotiations broke down. The Bulgarian demand for reforms has always been suspected at Athens as covering a secret project of annexation. This, no doubt, is in some degree true, as the Bulgarians are confident that under any

scheme of autonomy their numerical superiority would assert itself, and pave the way for national union.

The only other suggestion for Greco-Bulgarian co-operation formed part of a scheme for a Balkan Confederation propounded in 1891 by M. Tricoupis. That eminent man was no more in favour of autonomous institutions in Turkey than are his fellow-countrymen in general, and he boldly proposed that Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria should form an alliance for the partition of Macedonia, having previously come to an arrangement with regard to their respective shares. He believed the great Powers would not interfere should the Balkan States take up arms together for the purpose of expelling the Turks. The scheme found some favour at Belgrad, but was rejected at Sofia; Stamboloff indeed, possibly prompted by some of the great Powers, went so far as to denounce it to the Sultan, and bargained for concessions in Macedonia as his reward.

Unhappily the Balkan States are not yet ripe for an amicable arrangement, and their discords seem likely as heretofore to offer a new lease of life to Turkey, and to serve the selfish purposes of their great neighbours. The young turbulent democracies have not yet reached that stage of political maturity at which compromises become possible, and the principle of *do ut des* is accepted. They must still remain under the tutelage of

Europe. Let us hope that Europe will awake to her responsibilities towards these wayward children; her part should be that of the kind parent, not that of Saturn who devoured his own offspring.

CHAPTER IV

A HISTORY OF TURKISH REFORMS SINCE THE TREATY OF BERLIN

BY MISS VICTORIA BUXTON

To those of us who still cling to the hope that Macedonia is to be regenerated by an Austro-Russian reform scheme, a glance at the history of these schemes in Turkey for the last twenty-five years may not be without its uses. It is a history of reform schemes, not of reforms. Reforms have indeed been introduced under the suzerainty of the Porte, but never under its direct internal administration. The two things have been invariably proved incompatible.

Previous to the Treaty of Berlin, in 1878 various firmans of reforms had been promulgated in Turkey. The Hatt-i-Sherif of 1839, the Hatt-i-Humayun of 1856, and the Constitution of Midhat Pasha in 1875, would all, if they had been put into force, have been adequate guarantees for the security and good government of the Christian subjects of the Sultan. But the events which led up to the Treaty of Berlin had their origin in every case in a struggle for ungranted reforms.

In 1875 the unrest in European Turkey

culminated in a general revolt. The flame burst out first in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Servia rebelled next, then Bulgaria. Each rising was repressed with massacre. Save in the Armenian carnage of 1895-96, the fields of Turkey have never run so red with blood. Europe was bound to interfere, and at the Conference of Constantinople in 1877 a virtual autonomy for the Slav States was demanded. Had Turkey accepted these demands, consequences of a nature far more injurious to her integrity would have been averted. She rejected them *en masse*, and war was declared between Russia and Turkey. The prostration of Turkey alarmed England, who sent her fleet to the Dardanelles. Russia retired from the gates of Constantinople, and concluded with Turkey the Treaty of San Stefano. Had that treaty been allowed to stand, there would have been no Macedonian Question to-day. Macedonia would have formed part of a "Greater Bulgaria." But the Powers declared in unison that what Europe had laid down at the Treaty of Paris in 1856, Europe alone could alter, and a European Congress was summoned at Berlin. Here the famous Treaty of Berlin was concluded in July, 1878.

The territorial changes effected by that Treaty do not concern us here, except in so far as they narrow the sphere to which the reforms promised in the Treaty were to apply. It is enough to note that Bosnia and the Herzegovina, Bulgaria,

Eastern Rumelia, and Montenegro were then finally severed from the direct rule of the Sultan. Two principles, already laid down by the Treaty of Paris, were finally established by the Treaty of Berlin. In the first place, the authority of the Concert of Europe to control the Near Eastern Question, in its collective capacity, is definitely assumed. In the second place, the right and the obligation of the Powers to secure reforms for all the Christian subjects of the Porte is recognized.

On the very day on which Great Britain consented to enter the Berlin Congress, she concluded with Turkey another and a secret agreement, by which she undertook, in her individual capacity, the same obligations with regard to the Christians of the Asiatic provinces. This was the Cyprus Convention. In return for the pledge of English assistance against Russian advance in Asia, "His Imperial Majesty the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later by the two Powers, into the government and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these territories; and in order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her engagements, H.I.M. further consents to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England."

By this document England possesses a separate treaty right, over and above her collective right with the Concert, to insist on the Porte's execution of her engagements. Europe is aware of the fact.

In a despatch from M. Waddington, the French Government admitted that "England had acquired a right to intervene henceforth actively in the administration of all the territories of Asia subject to Ottoman jurisdiction."

To return to the Treaty of Berlin. What were the engagements to reform to which the Porte pledged itself in that Treaty?

The Articles which contain these pledges are three—Nos. 23, 61, and 62. The reforms they promise, if carried out, are a sufficient basis for solving the problem of the Muhamedan government of Christians in Turkey. They are short, but they provide an outline of reforms, adequately defined. England at that day sincerely believed in the desire and the capacity of Turkey to reform. Sir A. H. Layard, then Ambassador to the Porte, an ardent believer in the possibilities of the Turk, strained every nerve to secure their fulfilment. The result of his efforts is apparent in the subsequent history of the three provinces to which the Articles were to apply. Crete, seven years ago, won her blood-bought freedom. Armenia, stricken, still drags out a hopeless existence. Macedonia struggles to-day in the birth-throes of liberty. In each case a reform scheme, itself produced by revolution, brought the struggle to a head. For that reason, and that alone, the paper schemes which Europe periodically presents to Turkey, acquire significance. As all the world knows, Abdul Hamid, unlike some of his prede-

cessors, has been uncompromising in his hostility to European interference in the government of his Christian subjects. He is strengthened in this hostility by the success with which he has pursued the two supreme objects of his life. Those objects are the establishment of his Khalifate, and the complete centralization of his government.

Article 62 of the Treaty provides for the religious freedom and security of all the Christians of the Empire. Its provisions are merely declaratory of what was already law in Turkey. The history of the defiant repudiation of the stipulations of this Article is a pregnant one. It is the religious problem which lies at the root of the whole Near Eastern Question. Once that problem is solved, there will be no more need of firmans and Hatts and *règlements* for the Christians. They will take care of themselves. The position of Christians in Turkey to-day remains exactly where it was in 1878. Whatever the law may provide, it is a matter of elementary knowledge in Turkey that practically no Christians are admitted to the army, the magistracy, nor to any official position save of inferior authority. If they are, it is at the expense of their faith.¹ Forbidden to carry arms,

¹ In Constantinople there are a certain number of Christian officials, some of them in high positions. But in the provinces, where the greatest abuses occur, practically none but Muslims are appointed. The chief if not the only exceptions are the Muavins or Christian vice-governors of the vilayets. But they have been given no authority whatever except on paper, and are often little more than Palace spies.

their evidence unheard against that of a Musulman in the law-courts, the special prey of the tax-gatherer, and the victims of an unpaid and hungry army—these things are the universal testimony of every Consular despatch from Turkey.

Articles 61 and 23 refer to special provinces.

(A) *Armenia.*

Article 61 replaces Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano: "The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the Powers, who will superintend their application."

The Porte here makes four separate engagements.

(a) It is to introduce reforms into Armenia.

In response to this, the Sultan has "accepted" at least three elaborate reform schemes.

(b) "Local requirements" are to be considered in the reforms.

These refer to the scattered communities of Armenian Christians, and their sedentary character compared to the nomadic habits of the Kurds. Both have been studiously ignored.

(c) The security of the Armenians is guaranteed against the Circassians and Kurds.

In reply to this, the Sultan has organised the Hamidzyeh, a body of irregular Kurdish cavalry.

(*d*) The Powers are to superintend the application of reforms.

Yet Government despatches tell us that this is the one concession we must never expect from the Porte.

Was Article 61 anything more than a vague and shadowy promise given to appease for a time the discontent of Armenia?

Lord Salisbury, in a despatch to Sir A. H. Layard, the Ambassador, after the conclusion of the Treaty, tells us what it implied to the British Government of the day. After stating his opinion that the time had not yet come for the introduction of representative government into Armenia as in Macedonia, he gives us the obvious interpretation of Article 61.

It implies "the simplest form of order and good government; such security from rapine, whether lawless or legal, that industry may flourish, and population may cease to decline." To secure this, he says, four immediate reforms are necessary: (*a*) the reorganization of the Gendarmerie under European officers; (*b*) the establishment of Courts of Appeal in all the chief towns, each of which is to contain at least one European lawyer; (*c*) the abolition of tithe-farming; (*d*) a fixed tenure of office for the Valis and high officials.

There is no doubt that Article 61 was intended to be seriously applied. On August 21st, 1878, the

substance of Lord Salisbury's outline of reforms was embodied in a Verbal Note to the Porte, and with this Note begins the long and tedious history of the abortive reform schemes of the last twenty-five years.

The Verbal Note was unacknowledged by the Sultan, and on June 11th, 1880, an Identical Note was presented to the Porte, calling upon it to execute immediately the provisions of Article 61. The Porte replied with the promise of an elaborate scheme of village communes and mayors for Armenia.

Colonel Chermside,¹ H.M. Consul at Sivas, comments thus upon the scheme: "The document in question, while containing numerous admirable if vague statements, appears to me to be characterized by the great fault of almost all the Ottoman propositions for reform in Asiatic Turkey—*i.e.*, that, while giving . . . undue prominence to minor questions, it completely fails to recognize . . . the rudimentary and radical nature of the reforms most needed." He adds: "The immediate concession of constitutional privileges, communal organization, and education, . . . are, I opine, of secondary importance to security, destruction of local influence, cheap and prompt justice, and the taxation of individuals."

On September 11th the Porte received a Collective Note from all the six signatory Powers of the Berlin Treaty. This Note is a criticism of

¹ Now Major-General Sir Herbert Chermside, G.C.M.G., C.B.

the proposals of the Porte. It severely condemns the maintenance of the principle of centralization. It demands a clearer elaboration of the constitution of the Court of Assize, and of the methods of taxation to be adopted. It requires radical changes in the position of the Valis, and the immediate taking of a census of the population. The Sultan, to still a troublesome outcry, accepts all the demands of the Powers ; but Earl Granville, then Foreign Secretary, wiser than his colleagues, remarks that "without European supervision it is greatly to be feared that all attempts at reform will prove abortive."

Early in 1881, England again urges upon the Powers the duty of making further representations to the Porte with regard to the non-fulfilment of Article 61. But the Powers are at variance on the matter, and England, in deference to the Governments of France and Germany, finally agrees to waive her proposals.

For the next ten years the matter of Armenian reforms was given up in despair. Prince Bismarck had repudiated Germany's responsibility for the affairs of Asiatic Turkey. Russia's attitude had changed, and all the Powers were tired of rebuffs over their scheme. In the Armenian provinces things went from bad to worse. The Christians had long ago ceased to look for justice or redress from the tribunals. The tax-gatherer extorted his spoils with the aid of the regular soldier. What he left was the property of the Kurd and the

irregular. Kurdish chieftains, of the type of the famous Mussa Bey, were decorated and promoted red-handed from murder, and in defiance of the expostulations of the great Powers. Anarchy had begun the work of extermination. A race of intelligent free men was rapidly degenerating into a race of demoralized slaves. There was a speedy, though not a widespread, growth of secret revolutionary societies. In 1893 Abdul Hamid, reckless from his long immunity from Europe's correction, organized the Hamidiyeh cavalry from among the Kurdish tribes. Our Consuls protested vigorously against this flagrant defiance of Article 61, but the Powers merely "gave the other cheek also."

In the same year, the placarding of a mission-house with revolutionary literature by some professional agitators was the signal for the outbreak. Vengeance began with arrest, torture, and the burning of mission-houses. In the Sassun district, a body of irregulars, illegally sent to levy the taxes, having been repulsed, Zeki Pasha of Erzinghian was despatched to lay waste the *nahié* (district) with regular troops. Sassun was almost depopulated, and the Sultan issued a firman calling upon "all loyal subjects to arise and suppress the revolt." Asia Minor was on fire.

In November 1894 a mock inquiry was held by the Turks into the case of the "Armenian brigands." England, France, and Russia so far humiliated themselves as to allow their repre-

sentatives to sit upon the Commission. At the close of the "inquiry," the Sultan was so startled at the results of his own magnanimity that he ventured to remark to the British Ambassador that "*the continued existence of the Armenians was the clearest proof that they enjoy security.*" During the winter 1894-95, the British Government, under Lord Rosebery, with the lukewarm support of France and Russia, pressed the Porte for reforms. They were met by counter-proposals.

Finally, on May 11th, 1895, a Memorandum and Project of reforms was presented to the Porte by the three Powers. It was the only scheme to which Russia would agree, and in some ways was calculated, by its inadequacy, to increase the danger; but it was the most serious attempt yet made to enforce on the Sultan the execution of his engagements.

The scheme applied to the six vilayets of Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, Sivas, Mamuret-ul-Aziz, and Diarbekr. Chief among its measures are the guarantees in connection with the appointments and tenure of office of the Valis and superior officials, the appointment of a High Commissioner to superintend the carrying out of reforms, the creation of a permanent Commission of control at Constantinople, to which the High Commissioner is responsible, a general amnesty for political offenders, and compensation for those injured in the recent outbreak.

The "Project" was accompanied by a Joint

Communication which further elaborated the scheme. Christian *Muavins* or Assessors, and general mixed Councils of Christians and Musulmans, were to be associated with each grade of governor — Vali, Mutassarif, and Kaimakam; the Provinces to be divided into communes administered by elected councils; the gendarmerie to be organized under special regulations; the Kurds to have a separate administration; the farming of taxes to be abolished; movable Courts of Assize to be created.

The scheme, it will readily be seen, contains everything except the one thing needful. There is no provision for European control.

But Russia had disarmed the scheme before it was presented. "In no case," she had declared, "would she associate herself with measures of constraint." The Sultan, well aware of the act, boldly rejected all the proposals on June 3rd, and as a proof of his contempt for the remonstrances of the Powers, massacred in September several thousand Armenians in the streets of Constantinople.

Finally, in return for the abandonment of the Mixed Commission and of every effective measure in the scheme, it suited the Sultan's game to accept a maimed and futile "Project" on October 7th. He forestalled his "acceptance" by the massacre at Trebizond on the 9th, and his refusal to publish the reforms began to turn the wheel once more. Massacre succeeded massacre at Ak-Hissar, Sivas, Kharput, Bitlis, Zeitun,

Marash, Urfa, Aintab, Mush, and countless other places. Violation was considered an even more effective method of exterminating a people than massacre, and "by an organized system of outrage it was determined that no Armenian woman should become the mother of an Armenian child." "It may be roughly stated," writes Sir Philip Currie, the British Ambassador, on December 13th, "that the recent disturbances have devastated, as far as the Armenians are concerned, the whole of the provinces to which the scheme of reforms was intended to apply."

Vice-Consul Fitzmaurice, sent to enquire into the question of forced conversions to Islam, sums up his damning indictment of the Turkish Government in these words: "Both Musulmans and non-Musulmans assert that *the Government wished these massacres to take place, and that if it had not so wished, they could not have taken place.*"

The British Ambassador is loud meanwhile in his protests at Yildiz, but Russia blocks him at every point. In 1896 the streets of Constantinople run once more with the blood of 7000 Armenians. Massacre breaks out again in the provinces, and Egin, Sivas, and Kharput reel before the second blow. Urfa will not raise her head again. Women violated, children maimed—nowhere was carnage more systematic.

On October 20th, 1896, Lord Salisbury makes one last effort to procure the assent of all six Powers to another scheme of reforms. He handi-

caps his own proposals by this preface—"As long as any of the Powers is not satisfied with the expediency of the recommendations put forward, *no action in respect of them can be taken.*"

Russia is ready to jump at this loop-hole of escape, France follows Russia's lead, no action is taken, and the history of reform-schemes for Armenia is at an end.

(B) *Crete.*

By Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, "The Porte undertakes scrupulously to apply in the Island of Crete the Organic Law of 1868, with such modifications as may be considered equitable."

The Cretans were greatly disappointed with the provisions made for them in the Berlin Treaty. They solicited the intervention of England, declaring that the Organic Law was inadequate, and that a new form of government was necessary.

The Organic Statute of 1868 had been granted to Crete in response to the representations of the Powers, and to allay the alarming unrest and anarchy that existed in the island.

It forms the basis of all subsequent reforms. Its main provision was the establishment of Administrative Councils in all the administrative districts, vilayets, sanjaks and kazas. The most important Council, that of the Vilayet, was to include the President of the Legal Tribunals,

the Greek Metropolitan, three Musulman and three Christian representatives. All the Councils were to be mixed as regards religion. A General Assembly was to be held every year. The island was to be divided into twenty-two communes, each returning two Christian and two Musulman deputies. All cases between Christians and Muhamedans were to be decided by mixed tribunals. The Statute was, however, a paper concession, stultified by the usual methods.

The Porte spent the next ten years in evading its application, and the Cretans in ever-increasing discontent and agitation.

In February, 1878, the Assembly referred the case to the Powers, and as a result the provision of Article 23 was made in the Treaty of July. The Organic Law of 1868 was to be "scrupulously applied."

By October of the same year things had reached such an acute stage in Crete, that a High Commissioner was sent to the island, charged with the duty of making a settlement. The "Pact of Halepa" was signed, and on November 28th, 1878, was confirmed by Imperial decree.

Its main purpose was a solemn ratification of the Organic Statute of 1868, with the insertion of a few minor modifications. Among these are provisions for the separation of the judicial from the executive power, for the creation of *Muavins* or assessors to the Governor-General of a creed different from his, for the reorganization of the

gendarmerie and the introduction of Christians into its ranks, and for the inauguration of Greek as the language of the Assembly.

The Christian Governor-General, Karatheodori Pasha, was succeeded in three weeks' time by Photiades Pasha, an official of exceptionally enlightened views. The duties and rights of the Assembly are best expressed in his own words:

"One of your first duties is the elaboration of a code of civil and criminal procedure, and of a municipal law, the organization of the legal tribunals, the introduction of a better system of taxes, and the administration and regulation of the finances." There is much more in the same strain.

The Halepa Pact, if it had been applied, would have destroyed the last vestige of the tyranny and oppression of the Turkish Beys in Crete. But the Sultan, too weak to offend the Beys, turned all his energies towards the nullification of the new scheme.

Increasing agitation fermented in the island until, in 1885, Crete, encouraged by the union of Bulgaria with Eastern Rumelia, demanded union with Greece, or at least a reform of its own Constitution.

The refusal of both led to the outbreak of 1889. The rebellion, as usual, was suppressed with massacre, and the Sultan, angered, issued a firman which abrogated the Halepa Pact. At the same time he sent a military governor to the island, and proclaimed martial law. This firman

violated a convention which possessed international sanction, having been concluded "in pursuance of Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin."

The Christians were unable to resist, the Powers refused to interfere, and for the next five years Crete was governed absolutely by Muhamedan Valis.

The general insurrection of 1896-97 was begun by a mere handful of desperate politicians, but it gained ground every day, and civil war broke out. The Sultan's suppression of the revolt with massacre was once more the signal for intervention. At the instigation of the Powers he was obliged to restore the Pact of Halepa, to appoint a Christian Governor-General, and to summon the Assembly. He further gave his sanction to a moderate reform scheme, prepared by the insurgents themselves, and approved by the Ambassadors of the Powers. The Assembly formally accepted the newly-restored Constitution, and thanked the Powers for their intervention.

This Convention of 1896 was the third measure of autonomy granted to Crete under Turkish rule. It was to prove as illusory as the others.

It provided for the appointment of a Christian Governor-General, with a five years' tenure of office, the reorganization of the police, autonomy for the island, except in regard to the annual tribute to the Porte, and it stated that two-thirds of the public appointments should be given to Christians and one-third to Musulmans.

But the Sultan had no more intention of granting autonomy to Crete than he had of granting elementary reforms to Armenia. He was soon at his old task of obstructing the scheme, of instigating intrigues against the Governor-General, and of rendering the Constitution unworkable. Matters were complicated by the intervention of Greece, and on February 15th, 1897, naval detachments from the foreign warships occupied Canea. The position of the insurgents was bombarded by an international fleet on February 21st, and shortly afterwards the forces of the Powers occupied Candia.

A collective Note was presented by the Powers to both the Greek and Turkish Governments, in which it was laid down (1) that Crete should in no case be annexed by Greece; (2) that Crete should be endowed with an autonomous administration under the suzerainty of the Sultan. This was an end of direct Turkish rule in Crete. Germany and Austria having withdrawn from the Concert, the remaining four great Powers divided the island between them for the purposes of immediate administration. Prince George of Greece was appointed High Commissioner for the Powers, an appointment renewed in 1901.

In April, 1899, the Assembly voted a new Autonomous Constitution, and the local administration was, by international authority, put into native hands.

In examining the affairs of Crete for the last

twenty-five years, two conclusions force themselves upon one's mind.

In the first place, the intervention of the Powers, unbacked by their continued coercion and control, has had one invariable result—it has reimposed the Turkish yoke with redoubled severity. In the second place, the three measures of autonomy granted under Turkish rule, viz., the Organic Law of 1868, the Halepa Pact of 1878, and the Convention of 1896, have carried with them their own condemnation. They omitted the principle of European control.

(C) Macedonia.

More elaborate provision was made for the European provinces at the Treaty of Berlin than either for Armenia or Crete. The latter part of Article 23 refers to Macedonia. The first clause had provided for Crete.

“Similar laws adapted to local requirements, excepting as regards the exemption from taxation granted to Crete, shall also be introduced into the other parts of Turkey in Europe for which no special organization has been provided by the present Treaty.

“The Sublime Porte shall depute special Commissions, in which the native element shall be largely represented, to settle the details of the new laws in each province.

“The schemes of organization resulting from these labours shall be submitted for examination to the Sublime Porte, which, before promulgating the Acts for putting them into force, shall consult the European Commission instituted for Eastern Rumelia.”

What these similar laws were intended to be we have seen from our study of the Organic Statute of Crete. That Statute is a Constitution; it establishes the principle of self-government in internal affairs. The “similar laws” were to be of a democratic nature. Their appropriateness to local requirements was assured by the promise that Special Commissions, largely composed of natives of the country, should draw up the laws. Their effectiveness was guaranteed by the provision that the schemes drawn up by these Commissions should be submitted to a European Commission.

After a delay of two years, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, who had served on the European Commission, reported to Earl Granville that the schemes had been prepared, and in June 1880 the Porte invited the Powers to re-assemble the Commission in order to consider them. Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice was appointed to succeed Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, and the Commission met once more. Before beginning his work Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, in a despatch to Earl Granville, foretold that the differences between the provisions applying to Eastern Rumelia and to the remaining provinces re-

spectively, would constitute a grave obstacle to their adequate execution.

In Eastern Rumelia the Commission had been supreme; in Macedonia it was only to be consulted. In Eastern Rumelia the reforms were protected by the ægis of the Commission; in Macedonia their application was left to the Porte alone.

The European Commission nevertheless approved the new *Projet de loi*, with a few minor modifications, and adjourned.

The *Projet de loi* follows the lines of the Cretan Statute. Notwithstanding its shortcomings, it contained the elements of a vast improvement in the condition of the provinces, and gave them what Lord Salisbury described as tantamount to "autonomie intérieure."

Needless to say, no attempt has ever been made to apply it in the provinces. Sir Henry Drummond Wolff considers it not yet too late to insist on its execution. But the Macedonians would be guilty of too infantile a credulity if they reposed confidence to-day in the promises of 1878.

Europe's approval of the Turkish *Projet de loi* was followed by a long period of increasing misery, secret rebellion, and anarchy. The Turk continued to misgovern and extort, the Albanian to plunder and raid, Europe to turn a deaf ear.

The problem became increasingly complicated by two facts. One was the ever-growing conscious-

ness of the Bulgarian nationality; the other the hostility of the Greeks to the Bulgarians.

In 1896 the Sultan, fearing that Europe might begin to wake up again to her obligations, issued one of his periodical firmans of reform. The clauses sound a little stale. The Christians are granted a share in the administration and the gendarmerie; each governor is to have as his assistant a Christian assessor or *Muavin*; specially appointed inspectors are to supervise and to report upon the execution of justice, the collection of the taxes, and the "misdeeds of the officials."

The result was the invariable one. The Christians who entered the gendarmerie were killed, or, for variety, stoned; the Christians who reported injustices to the inspectors were imprisoned; and the assessors received no powers. The Macedonian revolutionary Committees retaliated with violence, and Europe left her consular reports unread.

In July, 1901, the negotiations respecting the present reform scheme began. The Sultan informed the Russian Ambassador, M. Zinovieff, that he was shaping a new reform scheme for Macedonia. A permanent Commission of control, under Ferid Pasha of Konia, was to sit in Constantinople, and to supervise the reforms. Hussein Hilmi Pasha, ex-Vali of the Yemen, was to be appointed Inspector-General of reforms in Macedonia, and to furnish reports to the Commission.

A year later the Turkish reform-scheme is

received by the Ambassadors, and Sir Nicholas O'Connor comments upon it to the Marquis of Lansdowne: "No change is apparent except the drawing tighter still of the wires to Constantinople." The Valis are to have no power in appointing or dismissing subordinate officials, and they are to receive every order for even the minutest detail direct from Yildiz. The Powers are conciliated by assurances that the tribunals will be free and independent of interference; that *Nizamieh* or Military Courts will be established where none exist, and that "compulsory labour on the roads will be maintained."

Sir Nicholas O'Connor regards the scheme as "palpably insufficient to meet the requirements of the situation," but hopes it may open the way to more effective reforms.

Europe seems convinced at last that Turkey is powerless to reform herself. She does not yet realize that something more than "supervision" is required. Her last move has been to relegate to two Powers this duty of supervision. Austria-Hungary and Russia have been constituted, so our Prime Minister informs us, the "mandatories" of Europe in the task. The two Powers themselves, to judge from recent remarks from Count Goluchowski, seem to put a rather different interpretation upon Europe's behest, but Lord Lansdowne seems determined, by the good advice he has given, to enforce the view of Mr Balfour.

To what extent has this alliance of Austria-Hungary and Russia been effectual in reforming Macedonia? The Ambassadors of the two Powers formulated their scheme on February 21st of last year, 1903. The scheme was prefaced by an amiable recognition of the "favourable disposition of the Porte," and its main object was that the willing Turk might be the better enabled to carry out his own scheme of the previous year. The Inspector-General cannot be recalled without the permission of the Powers; foreign experts are to assist in reorganizing the gendarmerie; the gendarmerie is to include Christians; the Government is to put an end to the immunity from punishment of the lawless Albanians; an amnesty for political prisoners is to be proclaimed. The Porte accepted these measures without pressure—the best guarantee of their futility.

No one was surprised to hear in March that most of the new Christian gendarmes had been killed, and the subsequent murder of two Russian Consuls increased the recklessness of both Turks and *komittadjis*. The insurgents inaugurated an era of bombs and train-wrecking, and the Turks responded with massacre. In August a general revolt was proclaimed, and Macedonia and Adrianople were soon ablaze with burning villages.

The strong representations of Lord Lansdowne, confirmed, if not inspired, by an outcry of indignation in Western Europe, were effectual in

securing an important extension of the February scheme.

The new proposals issued from Vienna on October 24th. Lord Lansdowne's most practical proposal, that of a Christian Governor-General, was rejected for his much less efficacious alternative, the appointment of Austrian and Russian assessors to accompany the Inspector-General. The gendarmerie is to be entrusted to a General of foreign nationality, in the pay of the Porte, to whom officers of the great Powers will be attached. The Government is ultimately to alter the divisions of the administrative districts with a view to a more regular grouping of the various nationalities. The development of local autonomies is to be favoured. Mixed Commissions of Christians and Muhamedans are to investigate crimes committed during the disturbances.

This, the latest scheme, is no doubt a step in the right direction. It introduces a certain measure of publicity, and if conscientiously applied, it will inevitably reveal a state of things for which there will be only one remedy. Only one remedy, however, can secure to Macedonia the satisfaction of her legal rights. That remedy, as Turk and Christian, soldier and *komittadji* equally know, is the severance of Macedonia from the direct rule of the Sultan.¹ The wires to Constantinople must be cut. Crete and the Lebanon have shown the way.

¹ Macedonian reform is dealt with in greater detail elsewhere in this volume.

We have very hastily reviewed the history of abortive reform schemes in Turkey since 1878. What conclusions may we draw from that history?

1. Reform in Turkey is impossible without foreign pressure. That pressure must be applied both for insisting on the acceptance, and for controlling the execution of reforms.

What is it that prevents Turkey from carrying out her treaty engagements independently of European control? Why is this coercion and this control the absolutely essential guarantee of reform? The two most obvious reasons will suffice us here.

(a.) The government of Turkey is a theocracy. Its civil law is based on the religious law. That law is founded upon the Koran and on the Sunna (Tradition).

There is no distinction in Islam between the Church and the State. The Sultan is Pope and Emperor in one, although his religious authority is represented for practical purposes by the Sheikh-ul-Islam, or head of the religion, and his secular authority by the Grand Vizir. By the very nature of the religion he represents, the Sultan can sanction no law which is hostile to that religion. Now every law which aims at the political and religious equality of Musulman and non-Musulman is a direct violation of the Koran and of the Sunna. The Khalif is invested with all administrative powers *except* the power of

violating the Sacred Law. Neither he himself nor the Sheikh-ul-Islam may deviate by one hair's-breadth from the precepts of that Sacred Law.

Now every scheme which Europe has urged Turkey to put into force has violated those precepts which absolutely forbid the equality of the Musulman and the non-Musulman. As a "Turkish Patriot" points out in an article in the *Fortnightly Review* of May, 1897, "the inferior situation assigned to non-Muslims in the Muslim world is a question not of ethics but of law." The Sultan, urged by Christian Powers, may *forbid* "true believers" to "practise" their religion, "but the legal theory is not thus altered by one iota." The only result of reforms asserting equality is, therefore, to rouse violent religious fanaticism.

(b.) The financial condition of Turkey is a desperate one. Sir A. H. Layard, who believed in the Turks' willingness, realized their impotence to reform, until this financial problem was solved.

"In the present impoverished state of the Turkish treasury, when a large number of public employées, officers of the army and navy, and other persons who depend upon the State for their bread, are literally reduced to beggary, . . . where can the Porte find, out of its own resources, the money necessary to effect great and important reforms?" Since these days Europe has attempted to restore the credit of Turkey by establishing the Imperial Ottoman Bank and the Dette

Publique. Yet "Odysseus," writing in 1900, remarks that it is "annually proved that the machinery of Government is collapsing." The existing system is maintained somehow, but there is scant margin for inaugurating reforms.

History is the irrefutable witness of the hopeless failure of reforming Turkey from Constantinople. For the Lebanon, in response to Lord Palmerston's warning in 1841, the Porte promised extensive reforms, and granted a system of separate Kaimakams for the Druses and Maronites. The only result was the anarchy of the next twenty years, and the massacres of 1860. "The reforms," write our Consuls after the Armenian carnage, "are so much waste-paper." If Turkey could point to one single province of her Empire which she has "reformed" independently of the Powers, she might yet be given another chance. This she is unable to do.

2. Reform in Turkey is possible under European pressure.

(a.) The reason for this, again, is mainly a religious one. The very law which binds the Musulman not to carry out reforms and to resist mere exhortation, obliges him also to yield when confronted by superior force. The Sunna, in that emergency, bids him give in. He is to submit "lest damage ensue to Islam." History bears ample testimony that the Musulman has obeyed this precept.

(b.) The further question arises:—Granted European coercion is successful in inaugurating reforms, is European control successful in carrying them out? The proof of the pudding is in the eating. What are the facts? All the provinces which have been severed from the direct administration of the Porte are prosperous and thriving communities.

Take only those provinces which still remain under the suzerainty of the Porte, while exercising autonomy in their internal administration. Every Cook's tourist will confirm me in stating that to cross over from Palestine into the Lebanon, where the Governor is ultimately responsible to the Powers, is to cross over to security for native and European, to thriving and cleanly villages, to good carriage roads, to abundant and developing cultivation. Eastern Rumelia, under the control of the European Commission, made rapid progress in civilization and order. Crete, we are informed by the latest Blue Books, is fast developing its institutions and its commerce.

The Turks themselves, even the officials, are by no means devoid of the capacity for good and faithful service. There are, indeed, a few really honest Turkish officials who try to do their duty and govern their subjects of all religions humanely, such as, for instance, Hassan Fehmi Pasha, the Vali of Salonica; but their task is infinitely hard, and in the existing system of government practically an impossibility. Super-

vised, however, by a diligent superior authority, well and regularly paid, and secure in their positions, they have already done excellent work. This is amply demonstrated, even in Turkey itself, by the successful administration of the Dette Publique. Under European control, and by officials not responsible to the Porte, Turkey can be successfully reformed and successfully administered. What the exact nature of that control should be, the reader will find discussed in a subsequent chapter.

CHAPTER V

RACES, RELIGIONS, AND PROPAGANDAS

By LUIGI VILLARI

HAD the population of Macedonia been homogeneous, the problem would have been settled long ago, but the mixture of races has ever been a marked characteristic of the Balkan peninsula, and of no part of it more so than of Macedonia.

It is necessary to begin by explaining what is meant by the term Macedonia. The country forms neither a racial, a linguistic, nor a political unit. Geographically it is a unit, being bounded by the Shar Dagh on the north, the Albanian mountains on the west, the river Bistritza and the Ægean Sea on the south, and the Rhodope mountains on the east, and at a remote period of its history it formed a kingdom. The country which we now call Macedonia consists of the three vilayets of Salonica, Monastir, and Kossovo, and the Macedonian Question refers to the conditions of those provinces.¹ It must be remembered

¹ The expression, however, is often extended to the Adrianople vilayet as well, where the conditions are somewhat similar. But geographically it is quite separate from Macedonia. It will be dealt with at the end of this chapter.

that the Turkish division of the Empire into vilayets was not made with any regard to natural or ethnographic lines of demarcation, but rather with a view to including as many conflicting elements as possible in the same territory, so as to simplify the task of government. This confusion of tongues and creeds makes the problem of Macedonian reform or autonomy more difficult than it was in the case of Greece, Crete, Bulgaria, or Servia.

But it is not only the Turkish Government which is to blame for this mixture of races. Macedonia has for two thousand years been the "dumping ground" of different peoples and forms, indeed, a perfect ethnographic museum. The mountainous nature of the interior made it a difficult country to conquer, and the various invaders were never able completely to absorb the different peoples whom they found in it. While the greater part of a district was occupied by the invader, the aboriginal inhabitants retired into the mountain fastnesses and there maintained their existence; one race established itself on the sea-coast, and another held the interior. At the same time, certain centres—large towns, sea-ports, fertile plains—attracted men of all the races for purposes of business or convenience. Thus in some parts of Macedonia we find one population predominant, in others another, and in others again two or more races exist side by side.

The division of races in Macedonia is not

based wholly on differences of origin or of anthropological type. We may find characteristically Greek types, Bulgarian types, or Turkish types, but among those who call themselves Greeks are many whose type and whose origin is not Greek; and so it is with the others. In certain districts we find members of three distinct races speaking their respective languages, but all very similar in type. Language is a more reliable means of classification, as the bulk of the Greeks speak Greek, of the Bulgarians, Bulgarian. But religion makes another distinction, and the Turkish method of classifying peoples according to their creeds, cuts across the division according to race or language; for Bulgarians who are members of the Patriarchist Church are called Greeks, and any Turkish subject who is a Muhamedan is called a Turk.

For the Christians, the most important classification, from a political point of view, is that by propaganda. There is a Greek propaganda, a Bulgarian, a Servian, a Rumanian propaganda, each with its own ideals and aspirations; and as nationality is by no means immutable in South-Eastern Europe, but changes according to conviction, it is the object of each party to make as many converts as possible. Thus individuals, and even whole communities, which were Greek yesterday may become Bulgarian to-day, and perhaps Servian to-morrow. As "Odysseus" says: "In one sense a race in Macedonia is merely a

political party, but it may perhaps be better defined as a body of people with a common language and customs, and generally with a common religion.”¹

Most Macedonians are bilingual, when they do not speak three or four or five or ten languages, so that the change of party is easily accompanied by a change of language. We may say that, for the Muhamedans, religion is the line of division, as all Muslims (except the Albanians) may not inaccurately be described as Turks; for the Bulgarians it is the national Church, as practically every member of the Bulgarian party is a member of the Exarchist Church, although, of course, propaganda is the basis of the division, as the Church is primarily a political institution; for the Greeks it is more a question of party, based on adherence to the Greek idea of civilization, and the Greek party contains many members of the other races; for the Servians and Rumanians it is chiefly nationality, for they have no separate Church like the Bulgarians, and many who are Servians or Rumanians by race do not belong to the Servian or Rumanian parties.

The original inhabitants of Macedonia probably belonged to the great race which we call Thracians, of whom very little is known, while the western part of the peninsula was peopled by Illyrians. Descendants of the former are said to be the Kutzo-Vlachs, or Rumans, while

¹ *Turkey in Europe*, by “Odysseus,” p. 298.

the latter are represented by the Albanians. The Greeks never succeeded in wholly Hellenizing Macedonia, their settlements being limited to the coast-towns. Then came the Roman conquest. Roads were built, towns were founded in all parts of the country, and military colonies established. The Thracians soon adopted the manners and the language of the Romans, who were the first civilized people with whom they had come in contact, and Greek influence survived on the coast alone. During the early days of the Eastern Roman Empire, with its mixed Græco-Latin civilization, the two languages continued to coexist, as well as some of the local dialects.

The first barbarians to settle permanently in the Balkan peninsula coming from the north-east were the Bulgars, a Finnish people whose home was the middle Volga districts; they now occupied the southern banks of the Danube. The Slavs are said to have begun to pour into this region as early as the third century, but they were not established until after the Bulgarian invasion. Their position in the East of Europe bears certain analogies to that of the Teutons in the West. They soon amalgamated with the Bulgars and gave them their language; the result of this union is the modern Bulgarian people, who may be described as Slavicized Finns. No traces of the original Bulgars remain, although some of the Macedonians have Finnish

features, and the Bulgarians of to-day speak a purely Slavonic language. The Slavs and Bulgarians drove other races of the interior before them, and Slavonic displaced all the others, save the Latin spoken by isolated settlements of Vlachs who retired into the mountains, and the dialect of the Illyrians, who were confined in the west region known as Albania. When the invaders reached the Ægean Sea they came in contact with the Hellenes, and then commenced that struggle betwixt Greek and Slav which has lasted with varying success for over a thousand years. Bulgarian armies threatened the gates of Constantinople, and an East Roman Emperor earned the terrible name of "*Bulgaroktonos*," or "Slayer of the Bulgarians."

Thus, as early as the ninth century, we have in Macedonia most of the elements which now make up the population of that country—Greeks on the coast and in the large towns; Slavs in the interior; Illyrians or Albanians in the west, and isolated settlements of Latinized Thracians or Vlachs in the mountains; the Slavs themselves soon divide into two groups, the Slavicized Bulgars and the Serbs.

These various elements were partly under the dominion of the Eastern Empire, which was not, however, strong enough to Hellenize them, and partly under that of Slavonic princes. In time they might have amalgamated, although, owing to the peculiar conditions of the Balkan peninsula,

the process was bound to be slow. But the Turkish conquest supervened, and crystallized the different races, so that each preserved its nationality and its individuality. The Turks were never numerous enough to absorb the subject peoples, but they were strong enough to prevent any one of them from becoming predominant. Unlike other conquerors, they did not attempt to impose their language or customs on the conquered, but they did try to convert them to Islam, by maintaining those who refused to be converted in a position of inferiority. A number of Greeks, Slavs, Albanians, and Vlachs did become Muslims, but those who did not, and were prepared to face persecution and occasional outbursts of savage fanaticism, were able to preserve their nationality. Thus these conflicting elements survived until the present day.

Down to the middle of the nineteenth century the Christian races of Turkey were, in respect of their allegiance to the Orthodox Church, all more or less identified with the Hellenes. He who was not a Muhamedan was a Greek. When the spirit of nationality spread from Western Europe to the Balkans, the Greeks were the first to be affected by it, and to claim their right of freedom as a nation. But the other races soon began to disentangle themselves from Hellenism and to struggle for independence on their own account.

The outcome of these various movements was the creation of a number of more or less independent States, carved out of the European provinces of Turkey—Greece, Servia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. In these countries, in spite of serious difficulties and internal troubles, much progress has been achieved, and all of them are far more prosperous than the neighbouring provinces under Turkey. But other parts of the Empire, owing to the mutual jealousies of the Powers and the quarrels of the inhabitants, were left under Ottoman rule, and it is with them that we have now to deal. The population of the countries which have achieved their independence was more or less homogeneous and united. But in Macedonia all the races of the Balkans are represented in numbers sufficient to preserve their nationality and to hope for predominance in the land.

There is often a bitter rivalry between them, which has been greatly enhanced by the existence of neighbouring independent States, for Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria all lay claim to a part or to the whole of Macedonia, or at least each regards that country as being within its "sphere of influence."

This rivalry between the different Christian races should have made the task of ruling Macedonia a fairly easy one. The Turks availed themselves of these differences to the full; but the constant oppression and persecution has ended

by making all the Christians discontented, and the anarchy of maladministration and civil war has reached such a pitch that some change of *régime* is felt by all to be an absolute necessity.

I shall now deal separately with each of the various nationalities and their aspirations and propagandas. The Muhamedans, with the exception of the Albanians, I shall deal with as one body, for the reasons given above.

(A) *The Muhamedans.*

Macedonia was the first country in Europe to be subjected to Ottoman rule, and long before the capture of Constantinople the Turks subjugated it, and studded it with numerous Turkish colonies. Even before the real Osmanlis crossed over from Asia Minor, smaller settlements of Patzinaks, Chazars, Kumans, and other tribes, all more or less of Turkish origin, were established in Thrace by the Greek Emperors themselves; but they were soon converted to Christianity and absorbed by the other races of the peninsula.

The first Osmanli colony dates from 1331, and throughout the fourteenth century the stream of Turkish freebooters and soldiers poured into Macedonia almost without interruption; by the time the Sultans had transferred their capital from Brusa to Adrianople, the country was full of Turks. At the battle of Kossovo (1389) it was completely subdued, although islands of independence survived

here and there, and Albania remained unconquered for nearly two centuries more. Macedonia was then a borderland, and the Turkish Sultans made every effort to convert it into a powerful bulwark of Islam. To do this they settled a number of beys, or feudal lordlings, as land-owners in the conquered territory, exacting from them military service and a number of followers and horses in proportion to the size of their estates. The descendants of these wardens of the march are the chief landlords in Macedonia to this day. This system of *timars* and *ziamets* (large and small feudal estates) provided the Sultans with a ready-made army whenever they contemplated an invasion of Europe.

After the conquest of Greece, Bosnia, and Albania, Macedonia ceased to be a frontier province, but now that the first two countries are no longer under the Turkish yoke, and Albania is always in more or less open revolt, Macedonia is once more a borderland, and once more the Turkish Government is trying to strengthen its hold on it by establishing fresh colonies of Muhamedans, chiefly *mohajirs*, or emigrants, from countries now under Christian rulers.

Soon after the conquest, numbers of the conquered went over to Islam, preferring to renounce their religion rather than endure the oppression which fell to the lot of the *rayahs*, as the Christian inhabitants were called. The majority of the conversions were made among the Bosnians and

Albanians, but a number of Greeks and Bulgarians followed suit. They were at once absorbed in the Turks, and became the most barbarous persecutors of the Christians. In spite of this addition to their numbers, the Muhamedans were never in a majority in Macedonia, nor even in any large district of it. They are found in all parts of the country, especially in the large towns, but always outnumbered by the Christians. They constitute the Government, the army, the privileged caste. For them all advantages are reserved. They are not, however, the wealthiest class, for while they are the chief landowners, they are not addicted to trade or any of the money-making professions, which are left to the Christians and the Jews.

The districts of Macedonia where the Turks are most numerous are the plain of Yenidje-Vardar, limited by the rivers Vardar, Karasmak, and Moglenitza, and the Pajik mountain; and a district round Servia and Vodena, enclosed by a line touching Vodena, Labanitza, Domenitza, and Banitza, with extensions to Monastir, Ellassona, and Tirnovo. Even here the Turks by no means constitute the whole population. They are centred in the towns and in a number of villages in the plain. The mountainous parts of these same districts are usually inhabited by Christians, the conqueror naturally choosing the more fertile lands. There are other groups of Turks round Üsküb, Veles (Kyöprülü), and Kumanova;

at Prishtina, Ipek, Prizren; at Ochrida, Struga, Kastoria, Prilip, Serres; and in general in all the large towns. Many villages have a mixed population of Turks and Christians. The country between Serres and the Bulgarian frontier contains a large proportion of Pomaks, or Bulgarian Muhamedans. In the northern part of the Kossovo vilayet there are some Servian and Bosnian Muhamedans, while Greek and Vlach adherents of Islam are scattered about in the centre of the country. At Salonica there is a small settlement of Jewish converts to Muhamedanism, who, however, are not regarded by their co-religionists as genuine Musulmans. There are also wandering colonies of Muhamedan gipsies, whose looting proclivities are peculiarly conspicuous.

All travellers who know Turkey bear witness to the many good qualities of the individual Muhamedan, especially of the genuine Osmanli Turk—he is sober, patient, religious, cleanly in his habits, dignified in bearing. But there is also no doubt as to his utter inability to make a good ruler, especially when he has to rule over Christians; the Turkish peasant, when living among Christians whom he is taught to despise, who are unarmed while he is armed, who can obtain no justice for any violence committed by him against them, naturally becomes arrogant and cruel. In a mainly agricultural community quarrels as to the ownership of land

are bound to arise, and in these cases it is always the Turk who obtains the advantage. The Muhamedans suffer from the utter chaos and corruption of the Turkish Government, and while in theory they are the privileged class, their privileges are given them in the form of licence to pillage, and on occasion to murder, their Christian neighbours. All Turks are obliged to serve in the army for a certain period of years, and even when not actually in the army they are allowed to carry arms, and are frequently formed into corps of irregulars or bashi-buzuks. For a Christian to be found with arms is a serious crime.

The Turks are essentially nomads, and, at all events in Europe, they are little more than an army of occupation holding the country by a military tenure. The idea of abandoning Rumelia¹ is regarded by them as a possibility to be contemplated, although naturally enough they do not wish to see it realized. If the country were to be placed under a Christian Government, the majority of them would probably return to Asia Minor in a short time. Before the independence of Bulgaria and Servia, both those countries contained a numerous Turkish population, which has slowly but steadily decreased since they were separated from Turkey. Another characteristic is their tendency to congregate in the towns. More important is the decline of

¹ By Rumelia the Turks mean European Turkey generally.

their numbers. The Turkish race shows a steady tendency to decrease, and it is said by some competent authorities that syphilitic diseases are largely responsible for this. In Macedonia, however, their numbers are kept up by artificial means. In the first place, the civil and military establishments maintain a quantity of officials and soldiers in the country; but the most numerous contingent is furnished by the *mohajirs*, or emigrants from the emancipated provinces. From Thessaly, Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Crete there has been a constant stream of Muhamedans to the dominions still under the rule of the Padishah, and the majority of them have been given lands in Macedonia, partly because there were more estates available, and partly because it is now a frontier province once more. During the recent rising the Ottoman authorities placed these *mohajirs* on the lands whose Christian owners had been murdered or had fled. This added a new disturbing element to the situation, as the emigrants are particularly bitter against their Christian neighbours.

With regard to the actual numbers of the Turks of the three vilayets, it is impossible to get reliable statistics. According to the most reliable calculations, the Muhamedan population does not amount to more than 700,000, of whom, perhaps, one-third are Osmanli Turks. The Christians are about 1,300,000 to 1,500,000; so that it is clear that the country cannot be

regarded as a Muhamedan land, much less as a Turkish land.

With regard to the political aspirations of the Turks, their only ideal is the maintenance of their own supremacy. The Young Turkish party, of whom we sometimes hear so much, has in fact but very small importance, and in Macedonia may be said to be non-existent. The Turks themselves certainly suffer from the misgovernment of the country almost as much as the Christians, although they are not subject to massacres nor to wholesale plundering. The anarchy and the corruption of the authorities, as well as their own stupidity and laziness, have ruined the large landed proprietors, and reduced the peasantry to the most abject poverty. There is no doubt that a reformed administration would benefit them too, and I have been assured by some of the *komittadji* leaders that during the recent insurrection the bands received encouragement, and even voluntary material assistance, from various prominent Beys; the latter wished the rebels to act vigorously so that the reforms which they themselves needed should be carried out. That this represents the feelings of the majority of the Muhamedan population I cannot believe, for the Turk is essentially a hater of reforms, especially when they are executed by a Christian Government, and he acquiesces in the existing order of things as the only one under which he can maintain his supremacy.

That a civilized people, even if in a minority, should rule over barbarians may be both natural and desirable; but that a race of barbarians incapable of progress should hold the hegemony over a majority of people who, if not civilized according to Western standards, are infinitely more so than the Turks, and who have proved themselves, when given the chance, capable of extraordinary progress, seems contrary to all the most elementary principles of justice.

(B) *The Christians.*

The Christians of Macedonia are not united by language, by racial ties, nor by political aspirations. It is this which hitherto impeded the emancipation of the country. There are in Macedonia four Christian communities—Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, and Rumans or Kutzo-Vlachs; each of these nationalities is connected by ties of language and political aspirations with one or other of the free Balkan States.

The Christians of Macedonia all belong to the Eastern or Orthodox Church, with the exception of some Catholic Albanians in the north, and a few converts of the various foreign missions. But ecclesiastically they are divided into two main Churches, the Greek or Œcumenical Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate. To the former belong all the Greeks, Serbs, Vlachs, Orthodox Albanians, and a proportion of the Bulgarians;

to the latter the majority of the Bulgarians. This division is one of the chief causes of hatred between Greek and Bulgar.

THE GREEKS.

After the capture of Constantinople by the Turks, the Greeks, although subject to periodical persecutions and massacres, and frequent pillaging by their masters, were granted certain privileges, and eventually obtained a position of considerable influence in the Turkish Empire. By the term Greeks were meant not the Hellenes only, but all the ex-subjects of the East Roman Empire who adhered to the Orthodox Church. They were constituted into a *millet* or community, consisting of a lay and an ecclesiastical council, which dealt with the internal affairs of the people, and many important offices were habitually conferred on Greeks. The Greeks came to be the brain of Turkey and the representatives of civilization in the Levant. The Greek language was the language of culture, even among non-Hellenic Christians, and the Greek Church a powerful agency for the promotion of Greek ideas. In the eighteenth century Greek influence declined, and the insurrectionary movements in what is now the Kingdom of Greece made the Turks look upon the Hellenes with suspicion and hatred. When Greece became free, the inhabitants of that country considered that the work of emancipation

was but half completed, and aspired to the annexation of a much larger portion of Turkish territory. Some even dreamed of the revival of the Greek Empire, with the capital at Constantinople, but the majority limited their aspirations to Thessaly, Macedonia, and some of the islands, while still adhering to what was called the "Grand Idea," viz., that all civilization in the Levant should continue to be Greek.

As regards Macedonia, the original Greek claim comprised the whole of the country as far as a line from Struga by Kachanlik on the Vardar, to Kiostendil, all Eastern Rumelia, and the Adrianople vilayet. Since the annexation of Eastern Rumelia to Bulgaria, in 1885, these pretensions have been reduced to Macedonia south of Üsküb and the Adrianople vilayet. Naturally the Greeks regarded all nationalist movements in the Balkans on other than Hellenic lines as anathema, above all, those that took place in Macedonia, and it is there that their efforts at propaganda have been chiefly directed. If we try to make even an approximate estimate of the number of Greeks in that country, we are confronted with the most contradictory statistics; but it is certain that they are far less numerous than their patriotic maps and Hellenic enthusiasts would have us believe. In a Greek ethnographic map of Macedonia many districts are coloured in blue (the Greek colour) where not a Greek is to be found. If we look for real Greeks we find them in a majority only in

the south-western part of the vilayat of Monastir, in the south of that of Salonica, especially in the Chalidice, and in a few isolated settlements. In most of the towns the Greek element is the most conspicuous, and in some the wealthiest; trade and banking are to a great extent in their hands — although the Rumans and the Jews are keen competitors—and the shops and the inns all bear Greek inscriptions. In the cafés and public places one hears much Greek spoken, and most of the people with whom the traveller comes into contact are Greeks or Greek-speaking; but in point of actual numbers they are far inferior to the Slavs, and in places like Kastoria, where the town is thoroughly Greek, the surrounding country is inhabited by an almost wholly Bulgarian population. But the Greek patriots do not count only the real Greeks as members of their party. They claim the Vlachs, the Orthodox Albanians, and the Bulgarians who do not adhere to the Bulgarian Church as Greeks, and call them “Vlachophone,” “Albanophone,” and “Bulgarophone” Greeks. In a word, they consider that all the Macedonians who have not joined the “Schismatic” Bulgarian Church, except the Servians in the extreme north, are adherents of the Greek party and of the “Grand Idea.” So that, apart from all thought of conquest, they wish to prove that the greater part of Macedonia is a Greek land.

The Greek propaganda is carried on mainly

by three agencies—the Œcumenical Patriarchate, the schools, and the influence of the Hellenic kingdom. The Greek Patriarch was, until 1870, undisputed head of the Orthodox Church in the Turkish Empire,¹ and although his authority did not extend beyond the territorial limits of Turkey, he was *primus inter pares* with regard to the other Orthodox Churches of Russia, Austria, etc. Whenever a province was detached from Turkey and erected into an autonomous State, or annexed by a neighbouring Power, it ceased *ipso facto* to be under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch, and fell under that of the chief Orthodox authority in the country to which it belonged. But the Greek Patriarchate had to deal in Turkey not only with Greeks but with many other races. Its character, nevertheless, remained thoroughly Greek, all the bishoprics were conferred on Greeks, education was in Greek hands and on Greek lines. The Greek clergy was extortionate and corrupt, and caused much disaffection among the non-Hellenic communities. When these began to awaken to a sense of nationality, their first demand was for an autocephalous Church. After a long agitation the Bulgarians, with the help of Russia, obtained their desire, and in 1870 the Bulgarian Exarchate

¹ The Servian Patriarchate of Ipek had had but little authority since 1679, and was formally suppressed in 1766, while the Bulgarian Patriarchate of Ochrida, which had long been Hellenised, was abolished the following year.

was created. This aroused great indignation among the Greeks, who saw in it a diminution of their influence and importance, and the Patriarchate anathematized the adherents of the new Church as schismatics, and doubtless, from a strictly ecclesiastical point of view, they were right. But as "Odysseus" says: "The Phanar has only its own policy to thank for the birth of a rival Church. That policy . . . did not rise impartially above distinctions of race and language, but by its attempts to Hellenize all ecclesiastical institutions and to destroy all non-Hellenic elements it drove the latter into rebellion."¹ Since the creation of the Exarchate, the great majority of the Bulgarians have joined it, for it has come to symbolize their national idea, and the war of propagandas is being constantly waged between the Patriarchate and the Exarchate in European Turkey. Individuals, families, and even whole villages frequently go over from the one to the other, and with their Church they change their nationality as well. But with all its weaknesses and faults, the Patriarchate is still a force to be reckoned with, owing to its wealth and its venerable traditions, and it remains the strongest bulwark of the "Grand Idea" and of the Greek party.

The Greek schools are also an important feature of Greek life in Macedonia. The first establishments were opened in the eighteenth

¹ *Turkey in Europe*, by "Odysseus," p. 285.

century through the munificence of the rich Macedonian merchants residing abroad, and their numbers have been increasing rapidly ever since. They are chiefly maintained by the local communities themselves and by Macedonians in foreign countries, the Patriarchate contributing little more than the land for sites. The Greek Government gives a small contribution and provides the teachers from the training college at Athens. The education imparted is on strictly classical lines.

The neighbourhood of the Hellenic kingdom is of course not without influence on the Greek cause in Macedonia. At one time, as I have said, the talk was all of annexation, and there was a strong revolutionary movement among the Macedonian Greeks, the Greek consulates acting as centres of the agitation. Of late years various causes have contributed to lessen the harmony between the Hellenic consuls and the local Greek communities; but, above all, the disastrous result of the Turko-Greek War was a fatal blow to the earlier ambitions. Since then the Greek Government has followed a prudent policy of waiting for its opportunity, combined with the maintenance of good relations with Turkey. In this attitude the Macedonian Greeks have acquiesced, and they hope thus to regain what the war and the energy of the Bulgarian propaganda have caused them to lose. They have indeed become the most ardent of Turcophiles in

their hatred of the Bulgarians, and throughout the recent rising they aided and encouraged the authorities in every way, frequently bringing down upon themselves the grim vengeance of the rebel bands. The Turkish troops, however, in their work of repression, made little distinction between Bulgarians and other Christians, as many a Greek village has good cause to remember.

The great weakness of the Greek propaganda is that it is spread over too wide an area and therefore loses in intensity. By limiting themselves to the southern and south-western parts of Macedonia, they might have preserved those regions to Hellenism; but instead they have tried to hold their own in purely Bulgarian districts on the strength of a few scattered Greek communities or of doubtful "Bulgarophone" Greeks, thus running the risk of losing even that which might have been secure.

As for the actual numbers of the Greeks, the statistics vary considerably—from 50,000 to 700,000, in fact; but it is only the coast-line and the south-western districts that can be regarded as purely or even prevalently Hellenic. Their numbers probably amount to about 300,000.

THE BULGARIANS.

Until the early part of the nineteenth century the Bulgarians as a people could hardly be said to exist. In a former chapter we have seen

how the Bulgarian nation revived after an eclipse of over four centuries, and how first the language, then the Church, and finally the State of Bulgaria arose once more. When in 1870 the Exarchate was created, the Bulgarian cause received a powerful impetus, and wherever *berats* were issued appointing Bulgarian bishops, it triumphed over all opposition. In the East a nationality can hardly subsist without a national Church, and this the Bulgarians had now obtained. The Exarch became the centre of the Bulgarian propaganda, and his influence increased every day. The Sultan at first did not view the Bulgarian movement with disfavour, as it formed a useful counterpoise to the Greek propaganda when the latter threatened to become dangerous. The Russo-Turkish War and the Treaty of San Stefano created a big Bulgaria from the Danube to the Ægean, and from the Black Sea to Ochrida; but the Berlin Treaty rescinded the arrangement and gave Macedonia back to Turkey, limiting the autonomy to Bulgaria proper. The propaganda continued, supported now by funds from the inhabitants of the free Principality and the agents of its Government. A little book, published on the thousandth anniversary of St Cyril and St Methodius, set forth the claims of the Bulgarians, and was widely distributed throughout Bulgaria and Macedonia. "The whole of our future lies in Macedonia; without Macedonia a Bulgarian State in the Balkans

would be without importance or strength; Salonica must be the chief door of this State, it must be the chief window which is to illuminate the building. If Macedonia does not become Bulgarian, Bulgaria will never be constituted." Other literature of a similar nature was scattered broadcast, and had a wide influence on Bulgarian opinion in both countries. A constant agitation was kept up for the appointment of more Bulgarian bishops, for, although the Porte had regarded the creation of the Exarchate with favour, it did not wish to see it grow too powerful, and opposed interminable delays to the appointment of these ecclesiastics.

An elaborate educational system was established, and the Bulgarian schools, which in 1804 had been about 50, had risen to 293 in 1889. They were organized with an iron discipline, and the teachers, mostly educated at the Bulgarian gymnasium at Salonica, were like a military force, each one sinking his own individuality in the cause of Bulgarism. The education imparted was on more practical lines than that of the Greek schools, as suited the different character of the Bulgarian people. Elementary science and agriculture formed part of the curriculum, and several modern languages were taught, including Turkish. The progress of the Bulgarian cause has indeed been astonishing, extending its ramifications as far north as Kumanova, and as far south as Salonica. It has won over nearly all the

Macedonians who by race are Bulgarians, and many of mixed or uncertain nationality as well. The bulk of the population of central Macedonia is now identified with the Bulgarian cause, within a region limited by the Shar Dagħ in the north, by the mountains round Dibra down to the lake of Ochrida in the west, by a line going from Ochrida to the Bistritza in the south-west, and following that river almost to the sea; in the south by a line running parallel to the coast, and at a short distance from it, to the borders of the Adrianople vilayet.

The object of all this propaganda for a long time was the re-creation of the big Bulgaria of the Treaty of San Stefano, and the inhabitants of the Principality, strong in their newly-won independence, hoped for the realization of their ambition. But of late years another tendency has begun to manifest itself, especially in Macedonia, in favour not of a union of that country with the Principality, but of its formation into an autonomous province. This tendency is strengthened by the fact that the Bulgarians in Macedonia are not quite identical with those of the Principality, but speak a slightly different dialect, although it has all the peculiarities which distinguish Bulgarian from the other Slavonic languages. Those Slavs who inhabit the country east of the Struma, and most of those between the Struma and the Vardar, are Bulgarians; but the rest, especially those east of the Vardar, are

slightly different in race, and may be described as Bulgaro-Macedonians. These people, although their sympathies are entirely with the Bulgarians of the Principality, realize now that union with that country would be a far more difficult matter than was the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia in 1885; for, while in the latter case the two populations in question were practically homogeneous, in Macedonia the Bulgarian or Bulgaro-Macedonian element is not the only one, and incorporation with the Principality would arouse bitter jealousies on the part of all the other Balkan States; even a division of Macedonia among them would lead to trouble, each claiming the largest share, and the mixed districts would create endless difficulties. Of all the Balkan peoples, the Bulgarians have undoubtedly the keenest political insight, and their aspirations have little of the wild and unpractical dreaminess which characterizes those of their neighbours.

At the Berlin Treaty arrangements were made for the better government of Macedonia, and the inhabitants of that province hoped that even if the Great Bulgaria were no longer feasible, at least they would enjoy peace and security. The results, however, proved them to have been deceived, and Turkish rule in Macedonia has been steadily going from bad to worse. All the races suffer by this state of things, Turk as well as Christian, Greek as well as Bulgarian; but

the Bulgarians, being the most energetic, took the initiative in rising against the oppressor. Their aspirations now may be described as nothing more drastic than the execution of the provisions concerning Macedonia set forth in Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty. All that they ask of Europe is that she should fulfil her promises, so that they may live in peace.

The Bulgarians are a curious people in many ways, and different from all the other Balkan races. They are very hard working, very energetic, and of great staying power. They are not brilliant, certainly less clever than either the Greeks or the Vlachs, and not gifted with a keen commercial instinct. But as farmers and peasants they are admirable, and they are found all over the Balkan peninsula from Bucarest to Athens, and from Constantinople to Belgrade, employed in all kinds of work. They are not yet highly civilized, but they have shown that under favourable conditions they are capable of astonishing progress. They are silent, unexpansive, some people might say sullen; but they have one great merit, rare, unfortunately, among the peoples of South-Eastern Europe—they are truthful. They appreciate the value of education most highly, but they are thoroughly practical. They do not talk about their glorious ancestors, like the Greeks or the Serbs; they think of the present and the future. If they have not great historic traditions, they are endowed with solid

qualities which will make them play a large part in the destinies of the peninsula.

With regard to outside assistance, the Bulgarians of Macedonia are naturally helped in various ways by the Bulgarian Government and people. The former backs up their demands to the Porte, and acts as their intermediary with regard to the foreign Powers. Its so-called commercial agents in Turkey are really political agents, but their conduct as a rule is circumspect and prudent, and seldom gives occasion for complaints on the part of the Ottoman authorities. With regard to the European Governments, the Bulgarians are not fortunate. They have arrayed against them Russia and Austria—the interested Powers, who think only of their own territorial ambitions; and the other nations are either indifferent or only platonically sympathetic.

THE SERBS.

It is not always easy to distinguish the Serbs from the Bulgarians in Macedonia, as the two races are often intermingled in the same districts, and their languages, though different in Servia and Bulgaria, become less so in Macedonia. Until the year 1878 the inhabitants of independent Servia aspired to the annexation of those districts of Turkey inhabited by men of Servian race. These were Old Servia, *i.e.* the northern part of the vilayet of Kossovo, Bosnia, and the Herze-

govina. By annexing the two latter provinces Serbia would have come into contact with Montenegro, and the two Serb States might have ultimately united, thus realizing the dream of Servian patriots of a Great Serbia. But when at the Berlin Congress in 1878 Austria received from the Powers the mandate to occupy Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and subsequently showed that she had no intention of relinquishing them, the Serbs were obliged to turn elsewhere for their Great Serbia. So they looked towards the south, and conceived the idea of a Servian Macedonia, with Salonica as its seaport. They made the most of the differences between the Bulgarians proper and the Bulgaro-Macedonians in order to enforce their claim that the latter were not Bulgarians at all, but Servians in disguise. Ingenious philological and historical arguments were devised by patriotic enthusiasts to prove the contention. M. Gopchevich, for instance, in estimating the population of Macedonia, puts the Serbs nearly a million, and does not even mention the Bulgarians. The Servian Government gave official sanction to the movement by appointing consuls at places like Voden and Serres, where the Servian name was unknown. New schools were opened throughout Macedonia, and a Servian gymnasium was established in imitation of the Bulgarian gymnasium at Salonica. But this propaganda lacked both the funds and the venerable traditions of that of the Greeks, and the energy with

which that of the Bulgarians was carried on; it was altogether based on such an artificial foundation, that it had but a scant chance of success. At present most of the Servian schools are closed, and the activity of the Servian consuls becomes every day more limited. In the Kossovo vilayet, as far south as Üsküb, the Servian population is numerous, and forms, indeed, the majority of the Christians; but elsewhere there are very few Serbs at all, save in certain valleys near Struga, in Monastir, and in other towns.

To claim that the Bulgaro-Macedonians are really Serbs is somewhat far-fetched, and hardly any of them have been won over to the Servian propaganda. Even north of the Shar Dagħ in Old Servia the Servian population is being steadily driven back by the lawless Albanians, who are permitted by the Turkish authorities to pillage and outrage them to their hearts' content. Thus while the Albanians formerly settled in Servia have nearly all emigrated to the Kossovo vilayet, the Servians of that province are being forced to emigrate to the Kingdom of Servia. The situation of those who remain behind gets steadily worse. That the Servians should make every effort to retain their hold on Old Servia is right and natural, but by dispersing their forces all over Macedonia they risk, like the Greeks, losing what might have been secure. The only result of the extension of their propaganda has been to accentuate the unfortunate and useless

quarrel with the Bulgarians, thereby preventing the co-operation even of the Slav races of the Balkans.

The Servians have had no autocephalous Church since the suppression of the Servian Patriarchate of Ipek in 1766, and this constitutes their chief weakness as a nation in the Turkish Empire. They belong ecclesiastically to the Greek Patriarchate, although in the Servian districts of the Kossovo vilayet they have Servian bishops and clergy. Lately the Servian nationality has been recognized by the Porte, but this decision is unlikely to have much practical effect.¹ There has of late been a tendency towards a Servo-Bulgarian reconciliation, in the hope that both peoples should co-operate for the common cause of Macedonian freedom, and a similar tendency has been apparent with regard to the Governments of Servia and Bulgaria. Recent events in Servia have kept the country in a state of ferment, and a war for the liberation of Old Servia is regarded in many quarters as a convenient way out of internal difficulties.

If, however, the Servian propaganda is weak in itself, it has acquired powerful outside protection. Russia, who tried to use the Christian populations of

¹ The Turkish Government, as I have said, divides the people according to their religions or Churches, so that this recognition would be a new departure. The existing communities are : Islam or Muhamedans, Rûm or Patriarchists, Bulgar or Exarchists, Katolik or Catholics, Ermeni or Gregorian Armenians, Musevi or Jews, and Prodesdan or Protestants.

Turkey as instruments for her own ends, has been gradually dropping all those who did not fall in with her views. At present the Serbs, who appear too weak ever to become dangerously independent, are being used as were the Bulgarians until they showed their spirit. The Russian consuls and agents in Macedonia have received the *mot d'ordre* to back up the claims of the Servians and repress the Bulgarians by all the means in their power. They foster the jealousy between the Serbs and the Bulgarians, and they present themselves to the former in the guise of liberators. The Serbs are conscious of their own weakness, and hope that by Russian aid they may one day see their aspirations realized. The history of Bulgaria should prove an instructive example of the way in which Russia is likely to treat them also if they should show signs of independence.

THE VLACHS.

The Kutzo-Vlachs, or Rumans of Macedonia, present an interesting ethnographic and linguistic problem. They are usually admitted to be the descendants of the aboriginal Thracians, who amalgamated with the Latin colonists and adopted their language and civilization, and maintained their national characteristics by retiring to the mountain fastnesses of Macedonia. Latin influence also survived in the region north of the Danube, where large military colonies were

formed. There is a strong resemblance between the language of the Macedonian Vlachs and that of the inhabitants of Rumania, although there is no political, and not much racial, kinship between the two, and they are separated from each other by a wide belt of purely Slavonic country.

The Vlachs of Macedonia are very much scattered, their chief settlements being on the Pindus range, and in the neighbourhood of Monastir, Metsovo, Koritza, Krushevo, Vodena, etc. They descend in winter as far as the Gulf of Corinth, Avlona, and Durazzo, where the word Vlach has come to be almost synonymous with shepherd. They are an extremely intelligent, fine-looking people, of considerable business ability. Their towns and villages, which are usually found on the summits of hills, are more solidly built than those of any other Balkan race: Krushevo, which suffered so heavily during the recent rising, was a notable instance. But in spite of their love of well-built stone houses, the Vlachs have strongly ingrained nomadic habits, and in summer-time their towns are for the most part abandoned by all the able-bodied males, who wander about the country as itinerant merchants or *kiradjis* (dealers in and hirers of horses). Many of them are men of substance, and have business connections with all the important centres of the Balkans and Austria-Hungary.

As regards numbers, statistics vary as usual

very considerably. According to some authorities they are not more than 50,000; whereas Rumanian patriots affirm them to be at least half a million; probably they amount to about 100,000. But politically their importance is very small. They have usually kept on good terms with the Turks, who, until the last rising, treated them less badly than their other Christian subjects. They attend to their trade and take little part in political movements. For a long time they were indistinguishable from the Greeks, whose language they spoke as well as their own, and the Greek party still count them as Greeks in their statistics of Macedonia.

But with the growth of a national consciousness among the other Balkan peoples, it was natural that the Vlachs too should follow suit. The first to conceive of a community between the Rumanians of Rumania and the Macedonian Vlachs was a certain Apostolo Margariti of Monastir. He devoted the early years of his life to business, and accumulated a considerable fortune. Then he went to Bucarest, where he was fired with the idea of awakening a feeling of nationality among the Vlachs; in 1865 he returned to Macedonia, and set to work to carry out his plan. He determined to detach the Vlachs from the Greeks, to revive the language of the former, and to agitate for an autocephalous Church—for the Vlachs, like the Bulgarians, though in a less degree, had suffered from the tyranny of the

Phanariot clergy. The Turkish Government rather favoured the Rumanian propaganda; firstly, because it was hostile to the Greeks, who were then regarded as the most dangerous revolutionaries; and, secondly, because, unlike the other races of Macedonia, the Vlachs were separated by a considerable distance from the country where their brethren were free. That Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria should be suspected of wishing to annex Macedonia was natural, but no one could suspect Rumania of similar views. Vlach schools were opened, Vlach literature circulated, and rich Vlachs took to endowing Vlach educational institutions instead of Greek ones, as they had done hitherto. The Greek clergy made every effort to get hold of these funds, and accused the Vlachs of treason to the Turkish Government. But the Vlachs managed to bribe the Ottoman authorities, and have been allowed to continue their propaganda more or less undisturbed ever since. The independent Church has hitherto proved an impossibility. The Patriarchate has refused to grant them even a few Vlach bishops, because in no diocese does this race constitute a majority. This refusal suggested a strange idea to Margariti. Although an Orthodox Christian himself, he was prepared to favour the conversion of the Macedonian Vlachs to Catholicism, if the Pope would grant them their autocephalous Church. Negotiations were actually initiated between

Margariti and the Vatican, by means of Père Faveyral, a French missionary at Monastir. But the movement met with little response, and was soon dropped. The Rumanian party increased, nevertheless, in numbers, and when in 1887 a new Cretan insurrection broke out, which made the Porte still more hostile to Hellenism, it acquired considerable importance. Margariti believed that the best chance for his propaganda lay in acting under Turkish auspices, and he soon became almost a sovereign at Monastir. The Rumanian Government appointed him inspector of Rumanian schools in Macedonia, and he rose in the favour of the local authorities. But his arbitrary methods and the suspicions, more or less well founded, that he denounced rebellious Greeks, and even those Vlachs who remained attached to the Greek party, to the Turkish police, roused a bitter feeling against him, and at last he was dismissed from his appointment.

A few years ago the Bulgarian Committee approached the Vlachs with a suggestion for co-operation in the coming rebellion against the Turks; but the leaders of the movement, both in Macedonia and in Rumania, refused to accede to the proposal. On the other hand, Margariti's attempt to form common cause with the Albanians failed, owing to the strenuous opposition of the Turkish Government, who will brook no tampering with the loyalty of its one support in Europe. The bulk of the Vlachs are hostile to the Bulgarian

movement, but the barbarous repression inflicted by the Turks on loyal Vlachs as on rebel Bulgars, especially at Krushevo, has greatly alienated them from the Sultan. A number of them joined the insurgents, and even formed two bands. The Rumanian Government is naturally favourable to this propaganda in Macedonia, and gives it some pecuniary support. Although it cannot be said to have territorial ambitions, Rumanian public opinion might demand that, should Bulgaria annex Macedonia, or divide it with Servia and Greece, Rumania should have an extension of its frontier in the Dobruja as far as the Rustchuk-Varna line by way of compensation. The presence of the Rumanians in Macedonia, it is considered, gives them a right to make this claim, apart from considerations of the balance of power.

THE ALBANIANS.

The western districts of the vilayet of Monastir and a large part of that of Kossovo are inhabited by a race wilder and more primitive than any to be found in Europe—the Albanians. Very little is known of this strange and interesting people, save that they speak an Indo-European tongue, but do not belong to any of the recognized groups of the Aryan family. It is probable that they are descended from the ancient Illyrians, who were driven westwards by the advancing waves

of Slavs. Their language, like the people themselves, is wild and lawless, and has practically no literature.¹ They are divided into two main groups, viz., the Ghegs in the north, and the Tosks in the south. The Ghegs are the more primitive of the two, and are subdivided into a number of tribes. Although the Romans occupied the country, they left few traces of their rule. Under the Servian Tsars Albania attained a certain measure of civilization, until the Turkish invasion swept over the land. The Albanians under Skanderbeg, the "Athlete of Christendom," made a desperate resistance, but they were defeated after his death. The Turks never really conquered the country, but a large number of the Albanians became Muhamedans in the seventeenth century. The Sultans allowed them a considerable measure of self-government, and the Ghegs, in fact, hardly obey any authority but that of their own tribal chiefs. The Turkish Government has deliberately kept them in a state of barbarism and ignorance, and makes use of them to overawe the neighbouring peoples. It has never enforced the duty of military service in northern Albania, but many Albanians serve as volunteers in the Imperial armies. They pay no taxes to speak of, and are humoured in every way. In the vilayet of Kossovo they are gradually driving back the Servians, whom they murder and rob with impunity, and sometimes

¹ Even the popular songs are very few.

even make raids across the frontier into Servia. They are divided by religion into Muhamedans, who form two-thirds of the whole number, Orthodox Christians, and Roman Catholics. But religion sits lightly on their shoulders, and they are by no means fanatical. In every tribe, save the Mirdits, who are all Catholics, and even in many families, there are both Muhamedans and Christians, and although constantly fighting among themselves, religion is hardly ever the cause of the quarrel. They have but little agriculture, no trade or industries, and indeed few occupations save fighting. The Turks have used them in Europe much in the same way as they have used the Kurds in Asia, giving licence to plunder and practical autonomy in exchange for fidelity to the Sultan and persecution of the other races. They also furnish a useful argument against reforms in Macedonia; for when the Powers demand that the Sultan should fulfil his promises, a rising of the Albanians is at once threatened, and often actually takes place.

When the old division of Turkey into pashaliks was abolished, and the present system of vilayets introduced in its place, large Albanian districts were incorporated into the vilayets of Kossovo and Monastir, with the result, if not with the avowed object, of introducing a further element of disorder and a fresh instrument of persecution among the Slavs and Greeks. For the Slavs, indeed, the Albanians have a peculiar detestation, and

any scheme of reforms for Macedonia which is to be successful, must begin by excluding the purely Albanian districts from its sphere of action. There are isolated settlements of Albanians all over the country, but they are not numerous, and could be easily kept in order.

With all their barbarism the Albanians have many excellent qualities. They are brave, hospitable, and, if you succeed in winning their confidence and attaching them to your person, absolutely reliable. The foreign embassies and consulates in Turkey preferably employ Albanians as *kavasses* on account of their trustworthiness. They are by no means unintelligent, and have furnished the Turkish Empire with some of its ablest generals and civil servants. But their best qualities only develop when they are out of their own country. In Albania they are always more or less savages.

It can hardly be said that the Albanians have any political aspirations, beyond that of maintaining their autonomy and their vested right to plunder their neighbours. Among the Catholic Albanians of the north both Austria and Italy have done something in the way of education; the Franciscans and the Jesuits have opened schools in various towns, and the Italian Government maintains colleges at Scutari and elsewhere. For the Orthodox Albanians the Greek Syllogos has established some schools. But for the Muhamedans nothing has been done. The

Turkish Government will not allow them to be taught in the Albanian language, and indeed refuses to recognize its existence, although most of them speak no other. A certain amount of political propaganda has been carried on by Austria, Italy, and Greece, but it has never been pushed very far. Albanian Committees have been formed by Albanians residing in Italy and in Rumania with the object of developing a national conscience among the people, and newspapers in Albanian are printed in Rome, Bucarest, and Brussels. A number of pretenders to the "Albanian Throne" have arisen claiming to be the descendants of Skanderbeg. But all these movements have had no effect to speak of in Albania itself. Under a wise and strong government, with a good system of education and an iron discipline, the Albanians are capable of great development, and their strongly marked racial and linguistic unity would give them a strength which not all the other races of Turkey possess. But for the present the important point is that they should be separated from the rest of Macedonia and forcibly prevented from plundering their neighbours. There are glimmers of a desire for better government and civilization among them, and last year the Muhamedan Albanians actually sent a petition, signed by many of the chief beys, to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, asking to be placed under the protection of Great Britain, the one great Power whom they feel they can trust.

As regards numbers, they are said to be over a million in all, but less than half of them are in Macedonia; with a rational redistribution of provinces only a small number would remain in that province.

THE JEWS.

At Salonica and in a few other towns of Macedonia there are large Jewish settlements. Like nearly all the Jews of Turkey, they are descended from those driven out of Spain by Ferdinand and Isabella, and they speak a Spanish dialect to this day, but they usually know many other languages as well. At Salonica, they form the majority of the population. Their favourite occupations are, of course, banking and trade, but the poorer Jews are boatmen, porters, servants, small shop-keepers, and in one or two districts even peasants. They are the one subject race whom the Turk has never persecuted, and they are in consequence loyal subjects of his Imperial Majesty. They thoroughly know how to make a "good thing" out of the Turkish Government, and in exchange for being left alone they are its chief financial support. They are industrious, honest, and intelligent. A great many of them are the subjects or the protégés of the different foreign Powers.

The Andrianople Vilayet.

This province, which has been ignored by the Austro-Russian reform scheme, is quite as much in need of attention as is Macedonia itself. Its population is also mixed, but only three races are represented in considerable numbers—the Turks, the Greeks, and the Bulgarians. The Greeks occupy the coast of the Ægean, and that of the Black Sea almost as far as the Bulgarian frontier; they constitute the bulk of the population in the southern part of the country, extending as far inland as Ardrianople city and Kirk-kilisse. The Bulgarians, who are here of pure Bulgar stock, occupy a broad strip of territory along the Bulgarian frontier, with ramifications to the south. As in Macedonia, many Greek towns are surrounded by Bulgarian villages. The Turks are scattered about all over the country, and are numerous in the large towns. In the southwestern districts there are settlements of Pomaks or Muhamedan Bulgarians, and near the frontier there are villages inhabited by a Muhamedan sect called Paulicians, said to be descended from the Paulicians or Bogomils who played so large a part in the religious history of the Balkan lands in the Middle Ages.

Turkish persecution of Christians, and the old hatred between Greeks and Bulgarians, exist in Adrianople as in Macedonia, and in the summer of 1903 the vilayet was the scene of a rising,

followed as usual by a most savage Turkish repression and devastation, and its conditions call for the most serious action. The solution in this case would be fairly simple, for it would be sufficient to separate the Bulgarian half of the vilayet and grant it an autonomy.

Reviewing the conditions of Macedonia, four main features assert themselves: the persecution of all the Christians by the Turkish Government, the mutual jealousy of Greeks and Slavs, the lawlessness of the Albanians, the ambitions of the neighbouring Balkan States. The first point would of course be settled as soon as a decent administration were substituted in the place of the existing *régime*. The lawlessness of the Albanians could be repressed by the presence of a well-organized gendarmerie, and perhaps an international force as well, by the disarmament of the population, and the separation of the purely Albanian districts from Macedonia proper. The ambitions of the neighbouring States are a more difficult question, for if it were a case of dividing Macedonia among them, each would claim the lion's share, certain districts would be claimed by all, and in the end none would be satisfied. But if Macedonia were given autonomy, on the lines which will be set forth in another chapter, this obstacle might be obviated.

The jealousy of the Greeks and Slavs,* and in general the mixture of races in Macedonia, may

seem to offer a well-nigh insuperable obstacle to pacification. But, as I think I have shown, although the population is very mixed, and there are districts where several races co-exist on terms of mutual hatred, still, taken in the mass, we find large areas inhabited almost exclusively by one race. Central Macedonia, limited by the Shar Dagħ to the north-west, and the Struga valley down to the Ochrida lake on the west, the Bistritza to the south, is a prevalently Bulgarian country. To the south-west of the Bistritza, along the sea-coast, and in the Chalcidice, we have a Greek population; the country north of the Shar Dagħ and east of the Kossovo Polje is Servian. The borders of these districts are of course mixed, but in the main this represents the general distribution of the population. The Turks and the Rumans are scattered about everywhere, but they are nowhere sufficiently numerous to affect the general arrangement, and under a strong and just rule they would not be likely to give much trouble. Moreover, a tendency common to most of the Balkan peoples is the migratory instinct, and this would be a help towards a solution of the problem. The obvious remedy is the division of Macedonia into three provinces — Servian, Bulgarian, and Greek—and although islands of one nationality would remain in districts inhabited mainly by another, they would tend to emigrate to the province where they would be in the majority. A movement of this kind could be fostered by the

Government so as to render the various provinces as far as possible homogeneous.

But, above all, what the Christians of Macedonia require is decent government—a *régime* under which all can live in peace and security, where every man's property shall be safe from plunder, every woman's honour from outrage. In desiring this all the Christians concur, without distinction of race, and many of the more enlightened Muhamedans too for that matter. An impartial Government consisting largely of Europeans would help to heal the old sores of race-hatred far more effectually than any division between the Balkan States. Moreover, these different races, were they all on an equal footing, might live side by side in peace, and indeed they would in a sense complete each other, owing to their different qualities—the Greek trader, the Slav farmer, the Vlach shepherd, are all necessary elements of society, and if dealt with wisely might be kept each in his own sphere of utility without interfering with the others. In the future, of course, further difficulties might arise, but for the present the crying need above all others is for peace, security, and impartial justice.

CHAPTER VI

TURKISH MISRULE IN MACEDONIA

BY DR BOGIRADE TATARCHEFF

A PAMPHLET, written in German, describing the condition of the Christian inhabitants in Turkey, published in 1856, begins with these words: "The misrule existing throughout the whole of the Turkish Empire is so great and so universal, that it can be best characterized as a state of chaotic anarchy."

The atrocities committed by the Turkish troops during the present rising have been described in the foreign press, and I shall not deal with them here; but the daily sufferings and grievances which make the life of the Macedonian Christian intolerable are less well known: they are, nevertheless, at the root of the whole trouble. They may be divided into three categories—brigandage, the extortions of the tax-gatherers, and the persecution of the Church and of nationality.

Bands of brigands infest the whole of European Turkey to the very outskirts of the capital. Thousands of Christians have been, and are, carried

off to the mountains and obliged to pay large ransoms for their freedom. The bandits compel the villagers of the neighbourhood to give them all they need—food, clothing, arms, ammunition, and many other things which could not be mentioned. Woe to those who resist or denounce them! Their houses are pillaged and burned, and their women are outraged. Hundreds of villages have been attacked and destroyed by these freebooters time and again. The authorities do not attempt to pursue them, but on the contrary they very often share the plunder with them. Brigandage becomes the only lucrative employment. Commerce is liable to so many risks that it has to be given up; all economic activity is paralyzed.

The exactions and violence of the beys (Muhamedan landlords) are not less fatal to agricultural activity. The beys think themselves at liberty to dispose as they choose of everything that belongs to the peasants; they impose ruinous *corvées*¹; if they are pleased with a horse or an ox, they carry it off by force, or steal it in broad daylight, or offer a ridiculous price for it. If the Christian resists, he will probably be murdered; and if by chance the murderer is brought to trial, he is always acquitted, for he asserts that he has only acted in self-defence. There are hundreds and thousands of instances of this kind which for want of space I cannot even mention, although most of them are doubtless

¹ Forced labour.

reported by the representatives to the different foreign Governments.

There are numbers of villages throughout the country which pay very large tributes to the beys or the bandit chiefs, in order to be protected from the depredations of other brigands. Very often a village pays money to several beys or bandits for the same object. This forcibly imposed tax is called *derudeshiluk*. Often a village is summoned to pay it within two or three days, or even hours, and if it does not, it is liable to be attacked by the bey's bravoos, pillaged and burnt; its cattle, horses, and sheep are driven away, and perhaps some of the richest men or their children are carried off to the mountains, and only released on payment of large sums. The villages of Lazaro-Polje, Galitchnik, and many others in the kazas of Dibra and Kitchevo, last year were obliged to pay thousands of pounds in this way. The central Government does not take any measures whatever against the beys or bandits, and the local authorities, as I have said, very often share the plunder and ransom. The demoralization and corruption of the officials has reached such a degree, that everywhere they give way to the brigands; they do not imprison them, but on the contrary, they very often decorate them for the service they have done to the Empire by molesting and robbing the Infidel!

In Dibra, the Government cannot establish

regular public offices and law-courts; in Üsküb they dare not enforce the tobacco monopoly, which has existed for years in the other vilayets. The Porte on more than one occasion tried to open law-courts in the town of Dibra, but the local Muhamedans protested against such proceedings by wiring directly to Yildiz; they closed the bazaar, and insisted that the Sultan should dismiss the impudent Mutessarif (Vice-Governor) who dared to issue such an order. If his Imperial Majesty does not satisfy their demands, they try to induce by force the Christians to join them in their protest, and if the latter refuse to do so, they are attacked, robbed, and even killed.

Not long ago there was a typical case occurred in the kaza of Dibra. Two or three thousand Albanians invaded the Christian quarter of the town and those of several villages, forced their way into the Christian houses by breaking down the doors with axes, and looted what they wanted, in spite of the presence of Turkish regulars. During the disturbances, which lasted over a fortnight, the Christians, of course, were forced to feed them; in one small village 300 Albanians were kept free of charge during twelve days. At last the Sultan yielded and dismissed the Mutessarif, and the Albanians retired to their homes, laden with plunder, without being punished.

Europeans do not realize that at the present time there is not a single Christian woman in

Turkey whose honour is not at the mercy of the first Musulman whom she has the misfortune to please; that the Turks may enter a Christian house whenever they like and take whatever they wish; that complaint is more dangerous than resistance, and that common justice is unknown.

Although all the Christians of Macedonia suffer from the abominable misrule, the lot of the Bulgarians is worse than that of the others, for they are subject not only to Turkish persecution, but to the hatred of the Greeks. The latter have become still more bitter in their hatred of Bulgarism since the emancipation of Bulgaria and the annexation of Eastern Rumelia to the Principality. They are determined to Hellenize Macedonia if they possibly can, and they are constantly denouncing to the Turkish police all the leaders of the Bulgarians, especially the schoolmasters, priests, and in general all those who have received some education, as *komittadjis*, or members of the revolutionary Committees. In consequence of these accusations many Bulgarian schools are closed and the teachers sent in chains to Salonica, imprisoned, and exiled to Asia Minor. To be found reading a Bulgarian book, to sing a Bulgarian national song, is a crime in the eyes both of Greeks and Turks.

The Turkish officials, civil and military, exercise their utmost endeavours to make the unfortunate Bulgarians abjure their national Church and nationality. They say openly to

them: "The Sultan does not like the existence of Bulgarians and Exarchists in his dominions. If you do not abandon your nationality and your national Church, you will be imprisoned, sent into exile and exterminated; we allow your churches to be opened, but on condition that they are under the Greek Patriarch, and that the Offices are said in the Greek language; for you Bulgarians, with your species of Russian language, are the declared enemies of the Ottoman Empire." Some years ago, at a meeting of Greeks in Salonica, the Phanariot Archbishop closed the proceedings with the following declaration: "He who is a Bulgarian is a Panslavist, an agitator, a revolutionist. Let us ask Galib Pasha to close the schools of these enemies of our Government."

There are many villages and towns in Macedonia where the churches are closed to Bulgarians and given to the Greeks (most of them "Greeks" only because they recognize the Patriarch, but Bulgarian by nationality and language), although the majority are Bulgarians. Whenever a Bulgarian town or village wishes to build a church, the formalities demanded by the authorities are so complicated and costly, that the people prefer to perform the religious ceremonies in a house or in the school, if the authorities allow it. In the town of Resna, the Bulgarians agitated for twenty years before they obtained permission to build their own church. Their old church was closed to them, although they were and are

the majority of the population. In some villages the Bulgarians are not even allowed to perform religious ceremonies in private houses or in the cemeteries.

Macedonia is naturally a rich country in every respect. It has fertile plains and valleys, beautiful mountains full of mines of all kinds, picturesque lakes, whose clear waters abound in trout and all kinds of fish, and fine rivers. Under such favourable conditions one would expect the inhabitants to be prosperous; they are, instead, the poorest in Europe. The reasons for this state of affairs are quite obvious, and I shall try to explain them.

As an agricultural and pastoral country, there would be plenty of employment for everyone who is inclined to work. The land could support a population ten times larger than the actual one, under a good administration. The same condition was in existence in the neighbouring small States of the Balkans under Turkish misrule, but now under a better Government they flourish. The Macedonian labourers, who are not able to earn their livelihood in their own country, are obliged either to emigrate permanently, or periodically at certain seasons of the year, to lands where they find not only work, but liberty and security. There are over 200,000 Macedonians in Bulgaria,¹ who would return at once to their own country

¹ This does not include the refugees who fled to Bulgaria from Macedonia during the troubles.

were it under a better Government, and they would make Macedonia prosperous and rich.

The Turkish Government does everything in its power to keep its Christian subjects as poor and as ignorant as possible. The misery of the inhabitants of central Macedonia is incredible to those who have not seen it. Their houses are hovels, made of sun-dried bricks, with four walls and a roof of straw, and contain no furniture whatever. On one side there is a place for the domestic animals, and on the other for the human beings. There is no ceiling, no windows, no chimney. The inmates of the house sleep on the ground, for there are neither bedsteads nor mattresses. They form a striking contrast, indeed, to the houses of peasants in Bulgaria, which were in the same wretched condition twenty-five years ago.

In considering the official abuses in Macedonia, our attention is first turned to those committed in the collection of tithes. According to the law, 10 per cent. is the limit on agricultural produce—paid in kind for grain, and in money for wine, fruit, and hay—and this constitutes the tithe in the proper sense of the term. Besides this, 1 per cent. has to be paid for the increase of the Agricultural Treasury, $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. for public instruction (out of which not a farthing is spent on the Christian schools by the Ottoman Government), and $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. for supporting the expenses of the army. So the total sum amounts to 12 per cent.

But in reality the taxes, miscalled tithes, are

much heavier, and cause far greater loss to the population. The system is bad enough in itself, but it is rendered still more vexatious through Turkish misrule. The authorities, who farm the taxes, and are interested in obtaining the highest price possible, continually postpone the auction. In consequence, harvesting is delayed, and the crops are often exposed for a long time in the field before they can be brought in. There they are liable to be stolen, or raided by Turks, or destroyed by rain, birds, or other enemies of the peasants. There is yet more waste when the bidder, who has bought the tithes of several villages, has been unable to finish his work in time. However, the losses coming from these two causes are as nothing compared with those to which the people are subjected in consequence of arbitrary impositions on the part of the tax-farmers. Although the law establishes a tax of 12 per cent., in kind, on agricultural produce, this sum is very often doubled or trebled. I shall not dwell on these abuses here, as they have been described in another chapter.

It is in the collection of the taxes that partiality and favouritism are most conspicuous, and lead to the greatest injustice. The rich and influential Musulman, who owns, as a rule, large estates, and who consequently ought to pay larger sums, pays far less than his due, and moreover is allowed to defer payment. On the contrary, the poor *rayahs* are not only forced to pay at once, but

there are also cases in which they must pay, or repay additional taxes under the form of contributions for different needs of the State, and these are paid a year in advance. When there is an emergency—and the Sublime Porte has an emergency once a year—peremptory commands are sent to every Vali ordering him to remit money to Constantinople. Moreover, if two witnesses can be found who will declare before the administrative council that a certain Christian owes money and is solvent, he is instantly thrown into prison; the ordinary legal formalities are omitted, and any appeal to justice is illusory. Many native Christians, who really owe nothing at all, are compelled to remain in prison by the order of the collector. Deprived of work, their families suffering from hunger, they are obliged to pawn even their household utensils, or borrow money at an exorbitant rate of interest. There is no way of escaping from the clutches of the tribute-grabbing Turk; for tribute is not a tax, as Europeans understand the word. In the imposition, levying, and destination of the sums demanded the Macedonians have no voice. The Turk commands, the Christian must obey. There are, as it were, two hostile camps—in the one a dominant military caste, an armed minority; in the other a subject people, unarmed and helpless.

The economic problem is the result of a decayed feudal system. The greater part of the

land belongs either to the Vakuf,¹ or to the powerful beys (feudal landowners). The Christians who cultivate the land are the serfs of the beys or of the Vakuf. In the former case all the produce of the land belongs to the proprietor, and the peasants receive wages which are not sufficient to keep a family of five persons. They amount to something between £10 to £15 per annum. The peasant finds his own implements, his sowers, and his seed, but receives only one half of the produce, out of which he pays taxes to the Government, and even this division is strained to the utmost in the interests of the landlord. In many cases the income of the farmer is less than that of the mere servant. Both alike must pay from their slender earnings the taxes and the forced contributions, yearly demanded by the Musulman beys and the bands of Albanians, which go to the maintenance of private retainers, tax-collectors, gendarmes, and the local troops. These disciplined robbers, not content with living on the labour of the poor, commit unspeakable atrocities on their persons and families.

After all these taxes have been deducted, there remains to the peasant an insignificant sum with which to maintain his household; in consequence, nearly all the peasants incur debts. As they are never able to repay the capital, their obligations

¹ The administration of the property of mosques and other religious foundations.

to the money-lender increase, and the latter exacts an additional 30 per cent. interest.

Besides the above-mentioned taxes there are other personal taxes. In Turkey each new-born Christian male must pay a tax, called *bedel*, of seven shillings yearly. When he reaches the age of fifteen years he pays the *hidjaret* instead, which ranges from six shillings a year upwards, according to the means of the family. From his eighteenth to his sixtieth year he pays a sum of four to six shillings yearly, for the maintenance of the Turks who pass through the town or village, and as much for the *Gardes Champêtres*. Landed property is taxed heavily, and the tax on live stock is one shilling for a sheep, goat, or pig, old or young.

These are the chief contributions, but there are others which are imposed forcibly on the Christians only, such as those for Governmental building purposes, barracks, etc.; taxes for people who suffer from fire in Constantinople, from earthquake, epidemics, etc., etc. Voluntary contributions for charitable purposes are hardly known in the Turkish Empire, but they are imposed on the Christians and collected like ordinary taxes.

In many districts the beys compel the Christians to work for them, without wages, on Sundays and feast-days. The peasants of one or more villages are ordered by the bey to work on his estates for nothing, or to send his ploughs to plough the farm of the landlord. The Christians pay taxes for making roads and bridges, but never-

theless they are compelled to work on them and repair them. The roads and bridges themselves, however, are never properly kept up, for the system results in a maximum of labour combined with a minimum of result.

Turkey is a country where bribery has been brought to a fine art. Without bribery a Turkish official cannot exist. Bribes are taken for everything and from everybody. A Bulgarian proverb in Macedonia says: "A Turk won't hurt you without bribery." The Vali, Kaimakam, Mudir, judge—in a word, all officials, from the highest to the lowest, accept bribes. A Kaimakamlik, for instance, costs from £T200 to £T300; a Mutessarifik, about £T500; a Valilik, over £T7000. There is a special *bureau* at Constantinople, where civil appointments and promotions are purchased. The father of bribery, up to 1896, was Dervish Pasha, a marshal, and a most influential and powerful Privy Councillor of the Sultan. The Vali of Monastir, like many others, used to pay him a yearly tribute of about £T3000. This Vali was a despot of the worst kind. Everybody, Turk as well as Christian, was terrorized by him. His abuses were so great that many of the Turkish high officials of the vilayet were indignant with him. He protected the brigands to such an extent that the whole country was infested by them. Many of the bandit leaders divided their spoils with the Vali; those who were bold enough not to pay him

tribute, were sometimes arrested and imprisoned, but soon released. From one of these the Vali took £T500. He used to accept as bribes even eggs, chickens, butter, sheep, etc. The people began to send petitions to the Sultan, asking him to dismiss the obnoxious Governor; but Constantinople turned a deaf ear, until at last some military officers of the garrison of Monastir sent similar complaints. A Commission was appointed by the Sultan, which arrived in the town to examine the complaints. The upshot of the matter was the dismissal of the commandant of the 3rd Army Corps in the town, while Izett Pasha, in Constantinople, and some other petty officials were arrested; but the Vali remained at his post!

Another fruitful source of abuse is the institution of the *Gardes Champêtres* or Field Guards. A *Garde Champêtre* is a man whose duty is to watch the fields, orchards, and cattle of a town or village. He is, and must be, a Muhamedan. In past times the Christian villages were allowed to appoint Christian guards, but for many years they have been deprived of that privilege by the Kaimakams and Mudirs, who appoint their own favourites, usually the scum of the earth, the greatest thieves and criminals of the place; they become thus personages of importance, with unlimited privileges and power. The *Garde Champêtre* is the plague of the village. He interferes even with the domestic affairs of the peasants, and regulates

their marriages. He stays in any house he likes, and behaves as lord and master. He helps the Turks who wish to abduct Christian girls. He points out to the brigands the most well-to-do peasants. He is the right-hand man of the local bey, and procures concubines for his harem. The honour of no woman is safe from him. He steals the best grapes and fruit by night, and sells it to anybody who likes to do business with him. If a peasant complains, woe to him and his family!

According to the latest reports a certain number of Christian Field Guards have been appointed in Monastir; but unless the reforms are seriously taken in hand by the Powers it is doubtful if they will remain long in the service.

Printing presses, as a rule, are forbidden to the Bulgarians by the Government; all their classical books, and most of their school-books, have to come from Bulgaria, and are subject to a very strict censorship. The schools are under close supervision, and the possession of a suspicious book is punished with extreme rigour. Many school-boys, and sometimes even their fathers, have been exiled to Asia Minor, because they possessed suspicious books, or had in their desks pictures of Russian or Bulgarian officers. There are only two Bulgarian newspapers in Turkey; one, *Novini* ("News"), the organ of the Bulgarian Exarchate in Constantinople, and the other, *Zarnitza* ("Morning Star"), the organ of the

Protestant propaganda. Independent Bulgarian newspapers or periodicals are not allowed, nor is there a possibility of establishing any so long as the present Turkish rule exists. The *Novini*, like all other newspapers in Turkey, is not allowed to print anything about the internal affairs of the Empire. It may not even mention the words, *liberty, my country, tyranny, society, Macedonia, Armenia, Albania, etc., etc.* It must not praise the Prince of Bulgaria or publish his full title of "Royal Highness"; it may not even speak of the "Bulgarian Cabinet." Bulgarian history, Bulgarian literature, or Bulgarian geography may not be taught in the schools. From Turkish history only glorious events may be recorded. All stories, poems, or novels in which progressive ideas are expressed are forbidden.

The misery and persecution to which the Christians in Macedonia are subject, apart from the massacres during a repression, are inexhaustible, and cannot be adequately described in a small space. The situation is as follows: everything Bulgarian in Turkey is ruined both morally and materially. The Turks are afraid of the Bulgarians, who are the strongest element in Macedonia. In the south the Turks support the Greek propaganda; in the north they encourage the Servian propaganda, and everywhere they persecute the Bulgarian Church, schools, and nationality. In the south the people are ruined by the beys;

in the north they are harassed by the brigands, and everywhere by the authorities, by the tax-collectors, by the money-lenders. The Macedonians demand justice and liberty, and they are determined to fight until they obtain them.

CHAPTER VII

THE MACEDONIAN COMMITTEES AND THE INSURRECTION

BY FREDERICK MOORE

THE idea of the Komittadji prevailing in Western Europe is as awful as the word (though that is simply "committee-man" in Turkish). Boris Sarafoff is the only revolutionary leader whose name is at all well known beyond the Balkans, and he is supposed to be the unscrupulous chief of a band of criminals, who capture lady missionaries, extort money by threats of violence, assassinate Greek priests and mutilate their bodies, goad peasants to hopeless risings, wilfully provoke the Turks to massacre, and even despatch envoys to neighbouring States to murder writers who dare to condemn them. With the exception of Sarafoff's authority over the insurgents, practically all of these things contain some truth. And yet with a knowledge only of outrages committed by the insurgents one's impression of the movement for the freedom of Macedonia and Adrianople must be necessarily most distorted.

When the Berlin Treaty rescinded that of

San Stefano and consigned Macedonia and Adrianople again to the tender mercies of the Turk, there was no uprising in the unfortunate provinces, not even a demand for justice—simply a widespread despair. The more intelligent class of Bulgarians at once began to emigrate from Turkey to the Principality of Bulgaria and to Eastern Rumelia. The Turks soon discovered that England, France, Germany, and the other signatory Powers of the Berlin Treaty, did not intend to enforce Article 23 of that instrument, which provided for reforms, and the petty persecutions to which the Christians had been subjected prior to the Russo-Turkish War were renewed and increased. In a few years the peasants too began to cross the frontier to the free lands.

In a short time the emigrants from Macedonia commenced to agitate for the fulfilment of Europe's promise. They held mass meetings in Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia—in Turkey, of course, that was not possible—and besought the Powers to insist on the execution of Article 23. This agitation went on for six years, but they might as well have pleaded with Abdul Hamid himself. After the war with Servia, in which Russia displayed such marked unfriendliness towards the Bulgarians, despairing of help from without and encouraged by the military successes of the Principality, small armed bands of Macedonians began to make raids into Turkey. Having no organization and not acting

in concert, these expeditions were invariably defeated sooner or later by the Turkish troops, and it was realized in a short time that method and united effort were necessary for success. Associations were formed by the Macedonians in Bulgaria wherever they were in any numbers, and at the same time three secret committees were formed in Macedonia itself. These were the beginnings of the External and the Internal Revolutionary Organizations of which we now hear so much.

Along with the formation of committees in Bulgaria a literary propaganda was carried on with the object of enlightening the masses and interesting them in the Macedonian Question. The movement met with a hearty support from the Bulgarians of the Principality as well as from the Macedonian emigration, and by the end of 1894 the cause of Macedonia held the heart of every Bulgar from the Danube to the Ægean. But lack of unity was still a conspicuous feature of these organizations: there was no bond between any of them, each was entirely independent and free to work on its own lines; so a congress of delegates of all the Associations was summoned at Sofia. The famous "High Committee" was the outcome of the meeting, and the "Statutes of the Macedonia-Adrianople Organization" were then drawn up.

The following are the principal Articles of that document as revised by a later congress:—

I. *Object.*

1. The object of the Macedonia-Adrianople Organization is to secure for the population of Macedonia and the vilayet of Adrianople a political autonomy, declared by the Organization, introduced and guaranteed by the Powers.

II. *Means for Attaining the Object.*

2. Moral and material help to be given to the Macedonia-Adrianople Slavs in their struggle against oppression.

3. Union between the Macedonia-Adrianople emigrants and all who sympathize with the Macedonia-Adrianople cause.

4. To arouse the interest of all the civilized world in favour of the cause, by means of writings, propagandas, and meetings.

5. Any other actions which may be dictated by circumstances.

III. *Macedonia-Adrianople Associations.*

6. All the Macedonia-Adrianople Associations in Bulgaria and other countries are to be constituted into one body, at the head of which will be a High Committee, established in Sofia.

IV. *The Committee.*

18. The Committee directing the affairs of all the Macedonia-Adrianople Associations bears the title of "High Macedonia - Adrianople

Committee," and has a seal bearing the same inscription.

19. The Committee is composed of six members elected by secret ballot in the Congress, with a mandate of one year; they elect among themselves a President, a Vice-President, a Treasurer and a Secretary.

20. The Committee decides all questions by a majority vote, and the President executes its decisions.

21. The Associations must obey the decisions of the Committee unconditionally.

22. The Committee is responsible to the Congress for its acts.

V. The Congress.

29. The Macedonia-Adrianople Congress is composed of the delegates of all the Macedonia-Adrianople Associations.

30. The Congress is summoned by the Committee to ordinary and extraordinary sessions.

36. If the Congress is not summoned by the Committee for an ordinary session, the Associations have the right to send delegates to Sofia, who will constitute themselves into a Congress in the last days of the month of July.

VI. General Dispositions.

41. The Committee has the right to enter into negotiation for joint action with all Associations formed by persons of other nationalities but having the same objects as the Macedonia-Adrianople Organization.

A Macedonian school-teacher, Traiko Kitancheff, whom all the Bulgars loved and respected, was elected president, and in a few months a general activity was the result of his efforts. Early in the spring of 1895 new bands were formed and sent across the frontier. Six enthusiastic young Macedonian officers of the Bulgarian army resigned their commissions and returned to their native land as revolutionary leaders. Among these was Boris Sarafoff.

The successes achieved by the bands in that year were not remarkable. Sarafoff with seventy men captured the town of Melnik, and held it for a short time, but the winter and the Turkish troops together drove all the insurgents back across the frontier.

A still more serious disaster for the whole movement was the sudden death that autumn of Kitancheff. The first president of the Macedonian Committees was a true patriot, and his country's freedom was to him so paramount an object that it obscured any personal ambitions which he may have had. The individual ambition of subsequent leaders was the cause of the disruption in the ranks of the Organization.

Until the election of Boris Sarafoff, in 1898, there was no energetic president. The regular publication of the organ of the Committee, the collection of fees from the members in Bulgaria and in Switzerland, France, Belgium, and America, and the publication throughout civilized lands of

accounts of Turkish atrocities, was the extent of their activity. But while the External or Bulgarian Organization was inert, the Internal Organization in Macedonia itself began to take shape. Leaders were beginning to rise from among the young men who had not, like their fathers, lost all hope, and secret societies sprang up. But these organisations, too, were all independent of each other, as were those of Bulgaria.

Damian Grueff, the present revolutionary leader in the vilayet of Monastir, had been taken to Servia when a boy for his education; but on returning to Macedonia he dropped the Servian nationalist theories which he had been taught in that country, and offered to lead all the peoples who would follow him towards freedom. He found the Bulgarian element the most ready to rebel, and after much work he welded their local organizations into the Macedonian Internal Committee. But through the denunciations of a Greek, he had hardly completed this task when he was arrested and exiled to Asia Minor. He was liberated in the general amnesty of 1903, which followed the first Austro-Russian reform scheme, and returned at once, like numbers of others, to the bands.

The Internal Organization was more fortunate than the External one in finding worthy successors to its first leader. Delcheff, a youthful lieutenant of Grueff's, assumed command immediately after the arrest of his chief; but after the latter was

liberated he (Delcheff) was killed with his entire band in an encounter in the Serres district. Gerjikoff, a young law graduate of the university of Geneva, then teaching in a school at Monastir, roused that province. He soon fell under suspicion and was arrested, but from his prison he continued to direct the organization of his district.

Under Delcheff and Gerjikoff, and many minor leaders, fresh committees sprang up everywhere. Soon the Organization became a terrible force, a State within the State, with whom not only the people but even the authorities had to reckon. It had local bands who were charged with the policing of districts, and general bands for the transport of arms and ammunition to be distributed for the general rising; it had its own tribunals, by which members who transgressed its laws were punished with a severity deemed necessary to maintain loyalty, and also Macedonians of whatever nationality for acts of treachery and espionage. The country was divided into revolutionary districts, departments, and communes, with officers at the head of each. Above all the local associations was the Central Revolutionary Committee, which had no known or established residence but sat chiefly at Salonica. Four newspapers were issued in different parts of the country to acquaint the members with the real course of affairs; for, according to the few journals permitted in Turkey, all is ever peaceful and

prosperous in the sublime Ottoman dominions. The movement was popular with the Bulgarian element, and there are examples of hamlets of fifteen houses giving more than one hundred pounds to the cause—a respectable sum in view of the poverty which exists in Macedonia.

As soon as night covered the land all was in a simmer of revolutionary activity: rifles, cartridges, bombs and dynamite were transported from place to place; agitators sowed the seed of rebellion; messengers carried news, warnings, and instructions hither and thither; and one by one the peasants stole out into the fields to meet and drill. It became a common saying that the day was to the Turk but the night to the Komittadji.

In their methods the Internal Committee was drastic, as the circumstances demanded. Governments levy taxes and exact payments; this the Internal Committee did. Governments demand revenues of foreigners residing within their States; the Committee made Turks, Servians, Vlachs, and Greeks pay as well as Bulgarians. Governments at war often draft men to serve in the army; but this the Committee seldom did, because there were never enough arms in hand even to supply volunteers. Governments put spies to death, and the Committee did the same.

The majority of the spies in Macedonia are Greeks, chiefly priests. The Greeks had been approached under the *régime* of Gerjikoff and Delcheff, and asked to cast in their lot with

the Bulgarians. A certain number of Servians and Wallachs had joined the bands, and even a few Turks had secretly lent them aid; but the Greek priests, in their hatred of the "schismatic" Exarchists, threatened any of their flock who did the same with excommunication. Some were not deterred by this but became "Bulgars," and joined the revolutionary bands. The Patriarchist priests, however, more than counteracted the gains of the Bulgarian cause; their offer of immunity from Turkish attack induced whole districts to declare themselves Greek and to be inscribed as Patriarchists. This method of proselytizing was strongly resented by the Committee; but there was no way of stopping it save by terrorizing the Greek propagandists. The Greek priests appealed to the Turkish Government, and were given a guard of Turkish soldiers to defend them and their houses. The Bulgarians were not killed by the komittadjis for becoming Patriarchists, for the leaders knew well that the change was only for the time being; but threats, nevertheless, were often employed.

With all its strength the Committee was weak in the face of the Turks. It existed within the enemy's country and of necessity its methods had to be drastic so as to inspire terror equal to that of the Turks and respect for its laws. Its organization was flimsy for lack of facilities and experience, and as its taxes had to be collected in secret, and its punishments meted out under the utmost

danger, excessive penalties were applied. Then, too, the men selected as executors were always the most daring, and were often, from long-pent animosity, as ferocious as their oppressors. One of these once said to me: "Nothing which is in human power to do to the Turks can sufficiently punish them for the centuries of infamies to which we have been subjected"; and one can readily understand how men worked to that pitch mutilate the corpse of a Turkish soldier, or a Greek priest who assisted the Muhamedan.

It was not, indeed, possible to punish light offences lightly. The Committee could not send men to jail or into exile. A light transgression brought a threat; a second offence, according to its character and that of the offender, was punished with a fine, a beating, or assassination. The komittadjis struck terror into the heart equal to that inspired by the Turks, and the accounts of their deeds, exaggerated by Turks, Greeks, and Russians, secured for them the accusation of having equalled the Turks in criminality.

In 1898, the External Committee, at the annual meeting in Sofia, elected Boris Sarafoff as its President, a young man of twenty-six, ambitious, and not too scrupulous. He was strong, energetic, and gifted with a personal magnetism which made men follow him to the death. But his methods and the fact that he made foreign countries feel his power obscured the fact that

the movement was a genuinely popular one born of centuries of persecution. There is no doubt, however, that he acted with strong convictions, and that he believed that by his methods alone Macedonia could be freed.

Sarafoff dominated the High Committee. He ruled chiefly under the clause: "Through actions dictated by force of circumstance," and paid little regard to the other laws. To him is due the subsequent strength of the External Organization. A political party which had secured the election largely by intimidation at the polls used Sarafoff's aid to maintain its power. He was rewarded with a certain amount of support on the part of the Bulgarian Government. Collectors were allowed to pass through the army on pay-day and request a small percentage of each officer's salary for "the Cause." Sarafoff issued a "patriotic loan," to which his emissaries enforced subscription by threats. Even a few murders were committed. Of course this state of things aroused strong protests from many quarters, but Sarafoff was not relieved of his office until later.

A few words must now be said about two deeds which first called public attention in Western Europe and America to the Macedonian Committees.

One was the capture of Miss Stone, the American Missionary, and Madame Tzilka, a Bulgarian Protestant, which was undoubtedly planned by Sarafoff. The captives were not ill-

treated, and the only object of their being detained was to obtain a large ransom with which to buy arms. The American Government was not sufficiently convinced of the responsibility of the Turkish authorities to exact the refunding of the ransom from the Porte. Sarafoff told me that the Committee fully expected that the Sultan would have to pay the bill for the arms used against him—for that £16,000 purchased many of the modern rifles and the dynamite used in the rising of last year.

The other event was the assassination of Professor Mihaileanu in Bucarest, which almost caused a war between Rumania and Bulgaria. Mihaileanu was a Rumanian journalist who published the most violent attacks on the Committees and on all things Bulgarian. Greeks who had grudges against Bulgarians, but feared to communicate directly with the Turkish police, gave information against them in letters to Mihaileanu; the professor had them promptly printed, and the Turkish Legation at Bucarest forwarded the papers to Constantinople as soon as they appeared. Without further proof, investigation, or trial, the men accused, some of them totally innocent and merely victims of personal spite, were imprisoned and exiled. Mihaileanu was condemned by the High Committee, and assassinated in the streets of Bucarest. The actual murderer was arrested, tried, and condemned to lifelong imprisonment; but the Rumanian Government also

demanding the extradition of Sarafoff, whom they deemed to be the instigator of the crime. There is, however, no extradition treaty between Bulgaria, a Principality under the suzerainty of the Porte, and the Kingdom of Rumania; the treaty existing between Rumania and Turkey legally applies to Bulgaria, but there was no means of enforcing it. The action of Rumania united the Bulgarians in support of Sarafoff. The Bulgarian Government refused to deliver him up, but tried him at Sofia. The verdict declared him innocent. Rumania massed her troops on the Bulgarian frontier and Bulgaria massed hers, and for a time the two countries were on the verge of war; the troops were afterwards withdrawn, but it was not until 1903 that friendly relations were resumed.

While Sarafoff was under trial, a congress of the External Organization was summoned by rivals in the ranks to elect a new president. Tzoncheff, an ex-general in the Bulgarian army, and a strong advocate of the annexation of Macedonia to Bulgaria, strove to win the election. He secured the vice-presidency under Michailoffsky, but became the virtual leader of the movement. Instead of following the rules of the External Organization, which clearly stated that its duty was to give moral and material aid to the Macedonian Committees, he set about at once to subject the latter to his own sway.

The Internal Organization, *i.e.*, that of the Committees in Macedonia, was beginning to develop an

entirely new view with regard to the future of that country. At first no other idea had entered the heads of the Bulgars save that of eventually annexing Macedonia and reviving the Big Bulgaria; but when a number of Servian Macedonians and Vlachs had begun to join the revolutionary ranks, the rebels took a broader view of national aspirations. A free Macedonia, with the possible addition of the vilayet of Adrianople, with its sea-board would be the most powerful of the Balkan States. It would contain members of all the other Balkan peoples. Russia and Austria, for their ends, maintain a balance of weakness in the Balkans by creating enmities, aiding the weak and hampering the strong, just as the Porte plays with the various races in Macedonia. The balance of weakness would be broken with the accomplishment of Macedonia's freedom. A state like Macedonia, from its geographical position and its ethnographic peculiarities, would, in the opinion of the rebels, form the nucleus for a confederation of the Balkans, the realization of which would make an impregnable bulwark against Russian expansion towards the Mediterranean. Many of the Bulgarians of Bulgaria still believe that the annexation of Macedonia would be an even quicker way towards a confederation; but that policy would arouse the jealousy of the other States. The watchword of the Macedonians is "Macedonia for the Macedonians!"

General Tzoncheff's ambition and jealousy, as

well as differences on matters of politics with the Internal Committee, led him into blameworthy acts. He worked not only against the Turk, but against the Internal Organization as well. The newspapers of Bulgaria divided and took up the battle, and mass meetings were organized on either side. So violent became the rupture that the local organisations called for another congress to decide the question. Tzoncheff opposed a new election, as he knew that he could not count on a majority of the local organizations. It was forced upon him, however, and to accomplish his ends he excluded, on various grounds, the delegates of twenty committees contrary to him, and created new ones in smaller villages. By this means he secured his election by a vote of forty to thirty, whereupon a member of the minority rose and declared that, in view of the methods employed, the minority would secede, and with the disfranchised twenty constitute themselves into the regular congress of 1902. Delcheff was present at the rupture, as the representative of the Internal Organization.

Since 1895, the whole work of Delcheff's organization was directed to preparing the peasants for a general revolution. Many of the villagers were armed, and this work was being gradually carried on. It was calculated that in 1904 or 1905 the peasants would be thoroughly equipped for a sudden and overpowering rising. Tzoncheff knew of this programme, but sought to wrest the glory

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from the other leaders, or at least to make their success impossible, by an abortive rebellion. Delcheff, seeing what was about to be done, was in despair. He despatched messengers across the frontier to spread the news and warn the inhabitants against the fatal step, and succeeded in localizing the revolt to the frontier district of Razlog. Delcheff here came to the conclusion that an independent Committee in Bulgaria could not go on. With the consent of the secessionists from Tzoncheff's organization, the External Committee was declared dissolved, and representatives of the Internal Committee appointed to reside at Sofia, collect subscriptions, dispense news, and further the interests of the cause in other ways, and Sarafoff, now released, went into Macedonia and became one of the most active leaders of the bands of the Internal Committee.

General Tzoncheff, with his military training and experience, should have proved extremely useful to the cause. He was brave, as were many of the leaders under him, like Saieff, Yankoff, and Darvingoff. But the rising in the Razlog district was foredoomed to failure. The bands were soon driven across the Bulgarian frontier, having accomplished nothing, but brought about a persecution of the inhabitants.

It had been stated by some of the revolutionary leaders that a series of outrages by the Turks such as would horrify the civilized world was what they hoped for and intended to bring about.

A man who had made many of the purchases of arms, ammunition, and dynamite for the Committees, explained to me that the daily petty persecutions of the inhabitants of Macedonia had become absolutely intolerable, although they did not affect Europe. Outrages, murders, and extortion are such a matter of course in the dominions of the Sultan that unless the figures are appalling the European press assigns the reports of them to obscure paragraphs if not to the waste-paper basket. To go on under the existing oppression was maddening, and could bring relief to nobody; but if a large number of the inhabitants were put out of their misery it might relieve the survivors. This was in the minds of a few leaders; but the fact that they abstained from the one act which would certainly have brought about a general massacre of Christians in any town of Macedonia, proves that such was not the deliberate intention of the Organization. In spite of all Turkish "official statements," no bomb was ever placed in a mosque, though such a thing would have been a very simple matter.

The Turks made a house-to-house search for arms in the Razlog district during the winter of 1902-03, in order to prevent a recurrence of the insurrection the following spring. The persecution accompanying this perquisition, the beatings and the tortures inflicted to make men produce arms, sent several thousand refugees over the snow-covered Balkans into Bulgaria.

A great outcry went up from the Principality against the Turks, and strong protests followed from the Turkish Government against Bulgaria. A little sympathy for the Macedonian peasants was aroused in Western Europe, together with a great dread of war. Russia seized the opportunity, and, under the cloak of humanity and peace, undertook to institute reforms.

If Russia had honestly desired reforms in Macedonia, no way would have been surer, safer, or simpler than by co-operating with the other signatory Powers of the Berlin Treaty. By that instrument, Russia, Austria, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy promised protection to the persecuted peasants of Macedonia; but all the Powers had forgotten this obligation until the Macedonians, in despair, brought it forcibly to their attention. A joint action of the Powers, even at this late date, would have accomplished its object and maintained the *status quo* of the Turkish Empire, so much desired by England and France. That, however, would have been a more or less permanent settlement of the question, and this Russia does not desire. The Western Powers, who felt some platonic sympathy with the Macedonians, hesitated to act, as they feared that Russia and Austria, with their interests in the break-up of Turkey, would have put all manner of obstacles in the way. So when Russia and Austria became allied, and offered to undertake the reform of the Turkish government of Macedonia, while still maintaining

the *status quo*, the Western Powers, wishing to show a solid front to the Turks, and also to be rid of a troublesome business, accepted the proposition. Why the vilayet of Adrianople, suffering as much as Macedonia, was not included in the scheme of reforms which "the two interested Powers" presented to the Sultan, no one thought of asking. But Abdul Hamid, with his usual diplomacy, swallowed the scheme at once, and said he felt much better for it; and suggesting that Adrianople had been forgotten, he included that vilayet in his Iradé of reforms. Russia offered no objection to this show of generosity, because she was well aware how little the Sultan meant by his Imperial edict.

But both the Bulgarians and the Macedonians knew the Russians, and put no faith in their scheme. In the annual Note which the Committees handed to the representatives of the Powers at Sofia, in which the plea for the execution of Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty, the insufficiency of the scheme was pointed out. The Committee also announced that it would not suspend operations; but the assertions so often made by the Turks that its activity prevented the institution of reforms is absurd. Up to the time of the Monastir rising in August 1903, the komittadjis avoided important encounters with the Turks. Fights would take place whenever a band was discovered by the troops, but regular battles were always avoided.

Long after the failure of the reforms had become manifest, and the persecution of the peasants—under Hilmi Pasha, the Inspector-General appointed to carry the scheme out—became worse than before, the Monastir district rose in rebellion. Ten thousand men, of whom only a portion were armed with modern rifles, against more than two hundred thousand Turkish soldiers and a host of bashi-buzuks!

The Turk has no other idea of governing a discontented province than by repression. When a few men committed acts of anarchy, which a score of London police and detectives would have prevented, every Turkish official, including the Inspector-General, immediately declared with one accord that the only way to put an end to the disorders was to strike at the root—to fight Bulgaria as Greece had been fought when she was following a similar policy.

The affair commonly known as the "Salonica Outrages" was ingenious both in design and execution. The desperation and the self-sacrifice of its authors has almost a mediæval character. Gerjikoff and Sarafoff told me that the official revolutionary organization had no hand whatever in the affair. The Internal Committee was approached by a number of young school-teachers and students, mostly of Salonica, and informed of the plan. The leaders tried to discourage them because of the bad effect the outrages would have on European sympathy. But the young

men replied: "Europe put us back under the Turk, after we had been freed, and promised us protection. When the European Powers had accomplished that part of the Berlin Treaty which affected them, they forgot the people whom they had sacrificed. We have pleaded for twenty-five years that their promises should be executed; we have pointed out the insecurity of our property, of our lives, and of our women's honour, but all to no purpose. These things must be brought home to the people who have betrayed us. The death of half a dozen Europeans they will feel, but every soul of us can perish with no effect on them."

It is very easy, sitting at home comfortably in London, under as beneficent a government as exists in the world, to dismiss from our minds an annoying sense of duty when an excuse like the "outrages" of Salonica comes to us. But if your wife or daughter were outraged at will by brutal soldiers; if you dared not wear good clothes when going to market, lest they should be taken from you on your way home by the man with the gun; if not only your material possessions, but your children were stolen from you; if, when you remonstrated for any of these frequent occurrences, your evidence were set aside for that of any Muhamedan, and you yourself imprisoned and beaten for daring to object, I wonder then if you would be content to fight only according to "civilized methods" with the certainty of defeat?

The revolutionary leaders undoubtedly sym-

pathized with the dynamiters ; they argued against the attempt out of policy and not on ethical grounds. But as the young men were determined, the leaders suggested that they should wait until the peasants were armed and let the explosions come as a signal for the uprising. That was agreed to, and the insurgent chiefs themselves were surprised when the Salonica affair occurred prematurely on April 29th, 1903.

Early in February a Bulgarian rented a little shop in a narrow street directly opposite the Ottoman Bank. He stocked it at once with groceries, but his prices were so exorbitant that they kept much trade away. Half a dozen regular customers who patronized his shop daily, however, seemed to purchase great quantities of provisions. They brought baskets and oil-cans and buckets, and took them away heavily laden ;—but their purchases merely served to hide quantities of earth. For forty days this comedy lasted, and all the time the Imperial Ottoman Bank was being successfully mined. Considering the fact that a house at the corner was known even to the man in the street as a den of dynamiters, and the presence of the host of spies which the Government employs—rewarded according to the work they do, and therefore doubly industrious—it is difficult to believe that the authorities were not aware of what was going on in the very heart of Salonica. Feruh Bey, the Turkish Commissioner at Sofia, told me a few weeks after the explosions

that he was informed of the intention of the dynamiters a fortnight before the occurrence. He advised the Porte to let the attempt take place, because of the effect it would have in weaning European sympathy from the Bulgarian cause.

"How did you know this?" I asked His Excellency.

"Through one of my secret agents. Moreover, we knew that two custom-house officials at Salonica were fast growing rich."

The tunnel was finished in good time. But one day the plotters saw men with picks and shovels digging in the street at a spot not far from the tunnel and approaching it. On inquiry they learned that there was some trouble with the water-pipes to the Hôtel Colombo. There was no time to warn the revolutionary leaders in the mountains. The men mustered, probably twenty-five in all, and decided to carry off the affair on the following night.

On the morning of April 29th, a train of Anatolian troops barely missed being blown up just outside the station of Salonica. The "infernal machine" placed on the track was timed a few minutes too soon, and exploded before the train reached it. During the day the *Guadalquivir* incident occurred. A Bulgarian took a passage for Constantinople on the French mail-boat, and came on board with a bag about half an hour before the ship sailed. At the last moment he hailed a small boat and went ashore, ostensibly

to speak to a friend on the quay, leaving his bag behind. As he did not return, the ship weighed anchor without him; but hardly was she in motion when a terrific explosion occurred amidship, and a moment later flames burst out which soon enveloped the whole hull. It was not learned definitely until the evening that dynamite had been the cause.

At eight o'clock, when the open-air cafés and music-halls along the quay were crowded with foreigners and the wealthier natives, and the chief thoroughfares were thronged, a number of open carriages drew up simultaneously in front of all the more popular resorts. Their drivers were unaware of the mission in which they were doomed to play a part. The "fares" were all dynamiters. Some of them stood up in the carriages and others dismounted, and lit and threw the half-dozen bombs apiece which they carried. A series of explosions followed, creating a panic, but only a few people were killed. With the exception of one or two ex-officers of the Bulgarian Army, not a man of the dynamiters had handled explosives before. The hollow-cast shells, about $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches in diameter, the dynamite, and the fuses had been imported separately, and put together in the little shop opposite the Bank and in other places about the town. The Bulgarians generally threw their bombs too soon, and the people had time to get away from them before the explosions occurred. When the British army used the hand grenade

the soldiers were trained to count three slowly after lighting the fuse; this the Bulgarians did not do.

Suddenly in the midst of all the excitement that ensued, the lights throughout the city were extinguished. It had been a simple matter to place a charge of dynamite under the gas main outside the walls. There was no mistake about the timing of that charge; the gas was cut off just at the critical moment. Then came the climax. At five minutes past eight, four Bulgarians staggered out of a carriage in front of the Turkish Post Office, pretending to be slightly tipsy, accosted the two guards at the gate, cut their throats, and began to throw dynamite into the building. At the same moment another party drove up behind them and attacked the German Club, adjoining the Bank, in the same manner. Almost simultaneously a heavy charge of dynamite under the Bank and the German Club knocked in the back wall of the former building, and demolished the latter. There were about thirty men within, all of whom, with a single exception, escaped.

It was part of the plan of the Bulgarian band to make German subjects suffer—Germany having been the best support of the Ottoman Empire. The German Club was blown up with the Bank, and it had been planned to destroy the German School also. For this purpose some time previously a little house next door to the

school had been rented. From the terrace, while attention was drawn off to the burning Bank, a bomb was cast at the nearest window of the school, where it exploded, but did little damage. Other bombs followed fast, and were equally ineffective. In a few moments a barrack across the street opened fire on the house occupied by the dynamiters, and troops rushed up the street in front. Almost simultaneously another detachment poured down from the other direction, and one force, in the darkness mistaking the other for Bulgarians, fired a volley into it before the error was discovered. For more than two hours the din continued, during which thirty bombs exploded, and thousands of rifle-shots rent the air. Finally the bombs ceased, and the Turks entered the house. They dragged out two bodies, more dead than alive, already shot in a dozen places, and finished them.

Thus ended the Salonica outrages. The scheme was gigantic and well laid, but it failed in many points. It proved, however—if further proof were needed—two things: the corruption of Turkish officials, and the desperation of the Macedonians. All the explosives necessary were brought in through the Salonica custom-house. The importation of table salt into Turkey is prohibited, but even dynamite may come in by bribery.

Many of the dynamiters were blown up with their bombs, and the soldiers succeeded in killing

a few that night, but the majority escaped for the time being. A house-to-house search through the Bulgarian quarter and the Bulgarian schools was begun at once. Where members of the conspiracy were discovered, fights took place. Generally the houses were burned from around them, and the inmates were shot as they emerged. All the other Bulgarian men of the town were hounded out, a few were shot in their hiding-places, some were beaten to death with the butts of rifles, but the majority were thrown into prison.

Hilmi Pasha may have had hopes of "saving the Empire" by means of the reforms, when he became Inspector-General under the Austro-Russian scheme; but if he had such hopes, they were of short duration. Before he left Üsküb to direct the "suppression" of the rebellion in the Monastir district, he had abandoned all effort at honest reforms, and lapsed into the easier task, in which the Turks are adepts, of duping consuls and deceiving foreign correspondents.

After the Salonica explosions the Turks were given practically a free hand. The effect on the Western Powers was just what the Turkish Government had calculated that it would be.

The Internal Committee had been waiting for a favourable turn of European sympathy before beginning their rising. In Russia's sympathy they never had faith; now England, France, and Italy withdrew theirs. They strove

to delay the revolution, but the acts of the Turks forced their hands. It came to the point, in the Monastir district, that the leaders could no longer hold the people.

Throughout June and July the arrests, beatings, and shootings of Bulgarians assumed appalling proportions, and a rising was known to be imminent. At last, on the night of August 2nd, the insurrection broke out in the kazas of Ochrida, Perlepe, Monastir, Florina, and Kastoria. During the next few days fighting took place between the troops and the komittadjis at Smilevo and Ekshisu; and various Turkish villages, whose inhabitants had frequently gone out as armed bands of bashi-buzuks to plunder their Christian neighbours, were attacked. The bands concentrated especially in the Karadjova mountains, and the whole region between Florina and Kastoria was in their hands by August 6th.

On the night of the outbreak in the Monastir vilayet some three hundred revolutionists entered Krushevo, the wealthiest town in Macedonia, inhabited chiefly by Vlachs belonging to the Patriarchist Church. Some ten or twelve Turkish soldiers were in the gendarmerie station at the time, and there were also thirteen Turkish officials in the town. The soldiers escaped, but the officials were surrounded in the Konak, the building was set on fire, and the Turks shot as they came out. Their wives and children, however, were safely escorted to a Christian house

close by, with the exception of one woman who was shot, whether by accident or by an insubordinate komittadji, I could not learn.

The revolutionists declared the town free from Turkish misrule, and established their headquarters in the Greek School, three of the leaders forming a governing Triumvirate. Their first act was to commandeer provisions. The komittadjis went about from house to house, knocking at the doors and demanding contributions of bread. At the same time they requisitioned all the lead in the town to make bullets. That same day they seized two Greeks known to have been in the Ottoman employ as spies, gave them a semblance of a trial, and shot them. A number of the young Vlachs of the town had been secretly armed before the revolution, and these, with some other bands who came up later, swelled the number of the rebels to about 1000.

The next day men were summoned to appear before the Triumvirate, and ordered to pay into the treasury sums of money in proportion to the wealth of each. In every case the money was forthcoming, and some £T3000 are said to have been collected. Paper money, redeemable on autonomy being granted to Macedonia, was given in exchange.

For more than a week no attack was made on the half-armed band that held the town. A large number of troops were brought up, with General Bakhtiar Pasha in command. A man

named Adam Aga brought up bashi-buzuks to the number of about 5000. This week was allowed for him to collect the latter from the neighbouring Turkish villages as far away as Perlepe.

The town of Krushevo is situated on the summit of a ridge of mountains. The houses are of stone, with roofs of huge slate slabs. I entered one house through which two cannon balls had passed. It was still standing, and had not been burnt. Every burned house in the town had been ignited individually. Oil-stains trailed down from the window-sills of many of them on to the rocks, and the marks of the axes with which holes had been cut in the doors so as to thrust in the fire-brands were visible everywhere. But in most cases the doors had been burst open, and the soldiers and bashi-buzuks rushed in to plunder and kill before the houses were set on fire. The gates of the unburned houses bore the marks of the adzes and axes with which the Turks provide themselves when a looting expedition is on the programme. They still carried their adzes in their belts while I was there.

The bashi-buzuks, who had often visited Krushevo on market-day, knew the wealth of the town, and they knew which were the houses most worth plundering. The plunder, which was collected by the soldiers and bashi-buzuks, was carried off in the vehicles of the victims, or

on the backs of their own animals, and much of it sold publicly in the bazaars of Monastir and Perlepe. The officers got the money that was found in the houses, and the soldiers and bashibuzuks the furniture, silver, and provisions. After the sack the Turkish authorities circulated a declaration for the people of Krushevo to sign, stating that the Bulgarians had committed the atrocities. A few, under compulsion, actually did sign it.

The Krushevo affair was a grand plunder, not a massacre. I think eighty-eight was the number of non-combatants killed. The people were ordered to leave the town before the Turks entered. On their way out they were stopped and searched for valuables, and even any good clothes which they wore were taken from their backs. Some of the young women were outraged, and some carried off by the soldiers. The fate of those who refused to leave the town was worse than that of the others. At the time of my visit, bones were still lying in a dry water-course which passed through the town; some of the inhabitants had hidden under the bridges, only to be shot on being discovered. One woman, who had been wounded herself, had had her infant held up before her eyes, and its life threatened by a man with a sword unless she produced money. When the inhabitants returned to the ruined town, they were not even allowed to bury their dead, and some of the bodies were

left lying about the streets for several days after until devoured by dogs.

The insurgents had retired from the town when the troops began the bombardment. The Turks have often let the bands escape, and there is little doubt but that an opening in the lines was left for them at Krushevo. The Turks dread dynamite, which is given as one of the reasons that the Bulgarian quarter was left untouched; but I believe the real reason why they sacked only the Greeks and Vlachs was principally, if not entirely, that they knew them to be extremely wealthy, while the Bulgars were poor. The only instance of fighting in the town was the case of Peto, a komittadji leader and a native of Krushevo, who had fought the Turks for eighteen years. After the rebels had captured his native place, he declared that he would never again surrender it to its oppressors. With a few other members of the band known as the "Knights of Death," who had sworn to die in the cause, he barricaded himself in an isolated house just outside the town, and fought the Turks for several hours. The little band is said to have shot down nearly fifty Turks before it was finally exterminated.

The rising spread eastward. Fighting occurred along the Salonica-Üsküb Railway, and bands appeared near Doiran and Gyevgeli, while others were entrenched at Gumenja. But, save in the Monastir vilayet, the revolt was not general. The

tactics of the rebels were to lure small bodies of Turkish troops into difficult positions, and then attack them in force. If attacked themselves by superior numbers, they would retire; if surrounded, they threw dynamite bombs, and escaped in the ensuing confusion. The komittadjis had no artillery, but the hand-grenades made an excellent substitute in warfare of this description. The Turks have a horror of dynamite, and gave as an excuse for their failure to defeat the rebels that the latter "carried their cannon in their pockets."

On August 6th, M. Rostkovski, the Russian Consul at Monastir, was assassinated by a Turkish gendarme, and a general massacre of Christians seemed imminent. This, however, was avoided, and only a few Bulgarians were killed.

An important engagement took place on August 17th at Ezertse, near Armensko, between 400 komittadjis and 1000 (some reports say 2000) Turkish soldiers. According to the Turkish version the rebels lost 74 men killed and wounded, and the Turks 43; whereas the Bulgarians say that 200 Turks fell. There is no doubt that the troops were forced to retire, and they vented their rage on Armensko, a Patriarchist village, whose inhabitants had taken no part in the insurrection. They sacked and burnt all the houses, they murdered 130 people, chiefly women, children, and old folk, outraged many women, and even corpses. The case of Armensko was no isolated instance.

By the middle of August the rebels had captured Klissura, and on the 25th they surprised the garrison of Neveska, taking 80 prisoners, whom they disarmed and set free, and levied a contribution on the town of £T1000. An engagement took place at Smilevo, east of Monastir, between 400 rebels and 11 battalions of Turks, with a large contingent of bashi-buzuks under Bakhtiar Pasha of Krushevo fame. The insurgents retreated, but 50 wounded Turks were brought into Monastir at once, and other batches afterwards. The rebels are said to have lost 60 men. The same scenes as at Armensko were repeated at Smilevo. A number of the villagers were subsequently allowed to take refuge in Monastir, on the strong representations of the consuls.

In the meanwhile, on August 18th, the rebellion broke out in the Adrianople vilayet. The revolutionary movement had been preparing for about a year, under the direction of Michael Gerjikoff, and was assisted by bands from Bulgaria. Whether the actual outbreak was determined by the visit of the Russian fleet to Iniada Bay (which had been sent to exact compensation for the murder of M. Rostkovski) or not is uncertain, but the rebel leader himself assured me that it broke out before he knew of the approach of the Russian fleet. Malko-Tirnovo became the centre of the rebellion, and in a few days the whole country from that town to the sea was in the hands of the insurgents. The troops were

several times defeated, and, as usual, vented their rage on innocent non-combatants. The Government called out every available man under arms, and the country was flooded with Albanian levies, who were little better than bands of brigands.

In the west Nazir Pasha, the military governor of Monastir, had divided up the country into six districts, and surrounded each one in succession with troops, with a view to exterminating the bands by means of a converging movement. A "drive" was conducted in the Klissura district by Edhem Bey against some thousands of rebels: the latter were forced to retreat, but without heavy losses, and they were not pursued. The troops re-occupied Klissura and Neveska, where they committed no excesses, because they had orders to behave well. The Turkish soldier knows how to obey orders, and the responsibility for the atrocities must not be laid entirely at the door of the privates. But the result of these operations was inconclusive. A district would be swept of komittadjis, a number of villages burnt, a few of the enemy and a great many non-combatants killed. The bands were not destroyed, but merely displaced and obliged to take up new quarters for a time. Large numbers of komittadjis appeared in the Morihovo range near Monastir in the middle of September, and repeatedly drove back the troops sent to dislodge them. More extensive operations were conducted by Said Pasha, but were equally unsuccessful. Three

times the bands were surrounded, but they always managed to escape, and on several occasions the troops met with severe losses, and large numbers of wounded were brought in to Monastir. In spite of the official statement that the military hospital contained only a small number of wounded men, it was in reality full to overcrowding. A similar movement was conducted by Suleiman Pasha in the central kazas of the Salonica vilayet, where some strong bands had entrenched themselves, with the same result. The attack on Barovitza failed, and the Turks retired. In fact, it was evident that the troops did not attack the komittadjis with any vigour, but contented themselves with devastating the country, burning the villages, and looting everything they could lay their hands on. The losses of the bands as a result of the rising were insignificant, the number of non-combatants, men, women, and children massacred, it is difficult to estimate; but we have the statements of foreign consuls, that 120 villages were razed to the ground in the Monastir vilayet alone, and over 60,000 persons rendered homeless.

The following official proclamation, posted in the streets of Monastir, at a moment when the rebellion was at its height, is worthy of attention:

“MONASTIR, *September 26th, 1903.*

“There is no need to mention how much His Imperial Majesty, the Sultan, our benefactor and enlightened master, desires the prosperity of the

country and the welfare of all his subjects without exception, sacrificing sleep and quiet day and night, thinking how to perfect his lofty purposes, and therefore, commands the execution of certain benefits: everywhere courts are approved and established for the preservation of the rights of the people; for the guarding of faithful subjects and the execution of the laws, bodies of police and gendarmes are enlisted; for the protection of life and property, guards are appointed; for the spread of education, schools are opened; roads and bridges are constructed for the people to carry food and merchandise; as also various other needed benefits, are begun everywhere and to this end part of the local income is apportioned.

“Every one must attend to his own business, and expect the results and fruits of these favours by the Imperial Government. But some evil-minded ones, not wishing the people to be benefited by these favours, and regarding only their own selfish interest, deceive the inhabitants and commit various repulsive transgressions. There is not the least ground for the lies and assurances with which the Bulgarians are deceived. All the civilized peoples of Europe and elsewhere regard with horror their deeds, which destroy the peace of the land, and everywhere with great impatience—the suppression of these enemies to peace and order is awaited. The Imperial Government observes with sorrow that many people still rebel notwithstanding that until now—because of its great mercy—it has proceeded with marked clemency toward the agitators. But since the Government cannot coolly see the order of the country destroyed, and the peaceful population subjected to murders and other evils, it categorically orders the commanders of the troops, wherever they are sent, to disperse and kill most

severely (*sic*) the disturbers and their followers who still remain in rebellion. Therefore, for the last time, the Bulgarians who have been deceived, and have left their firesides and their trades, are invited to return to their homes and their villages, and those who do not return and run toward the mercy of the Imperial Government will be punished and destroyed in the severest fashion."

The covering letter from the British Vice-Consul at Monastir transmitting this document to the Foreign Office, forms an instructive commentary on Turkish official literature.

"MONASTIR, September 30th, 1903.

"SIR,—I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the Proclamation to the Bulgarians which has been published throughout the vilayet by Hussein Hilmi Pasha. The list of reforms accomplished is purely illusory, and I venture to express the opinion that it is likely to remain so as long as the work of reform is left in its present hands.

"The only new Tribunal of the creation of which I am aware is the extraordinary Tribunal for the trial of persons accused of complicity in the insurrectionary movement, and, if the number of Courts of Law of the ordinary Turkish type has been increased, it can hardly be considered a matter for congratulation. The police and gendarmerie have not undergone any kind of reform, unless the appointment of a special Commission of Inquiry can be described as such. The Inspector-General has shown me a list of the rural watchmen appointed in the Christian villages; but I am assured that in a great number of cases, the appointment is merely nominal, the Musulman

watchmen continuing to draw their pay as formerly, and, in the single instance where I have been able to make personal inquiry—that of the Patriarchist village of Boukovo, about half-an-hour's distance from Monastir—I have discovered that no Christian watchman had been appointed, and that two Musulmans had been forced upon this purely Christian village.

“ . . . With regard to the opening of schools, I have no statistics regarding the number of these establishments left intact by the troops, but at the present moment the only Bulgarian school open in this vilayet is the primary school at Monastir.

“ . . . The minatory clauses of the Proclamation will, of course, fail to produce any effect on the insurgent bands, and it is probably the peasantry who will have an opportunity of experiencing the “severer” measures foreshadowed by his Excellency. In my humble opinion, the chief interest of these clauses is in the admission that the insurrection, the suppression of which has been so often announced, still exists, and in the contrast it affords to the tenor of the overtures reported as having been made by the Imperial Representative at Sophia.

“Simultaneously with the publication of this Proclamation, the Inspector-General, acting under instructions from Constantinople, has appointed a Commission which, under his presidency, will assist in the application of the reforms. The Commission is composed of the following members: Khouloussi Bey, President of the Salonica Municipality; Naoum Nikaroushi, a Greek member of the Administrative Council of the vilayet; Nikola Robeff, a Bulgarian member of the same body; Mikhail Katsoyanni, *a Greek who, notwithstanding his protests before the Inspector-General in my presence, has been made to pose as a Wallachian;*

and Niko Effendi, a Servian member of the Administrative Council of the Vilayet of Kossovo.

“A Commission thus constituted is unlikely to prove obstreperous.—I have, etc.,

“(Signed) JAMES M‘GREGOR.”

Towards the end of September the methods of suppression did become even more severe. The activity of the insurgents began to diminish, and the surrender of arms on the part of the villagers became more frequent ; but while the above proclamation promised clemency towards all who would run towards the mercy of the Imperial Government, punishment was always meted out to surrendering peasants, and an instance of forty who laid down their arms being decapitated in cold blood came to my notice. The discipline among the komittadjis proper was less perfect than before, as is attested by a captured letter from an insurgent leader, who blames the outposts for the failure of some of the operations. There is, in fact, little doubt that the bands were not sufficiently numerous nor well drilled for anything more than guerilla warfare on a small scale.

But on September 27th, a new rising broke out in the Perim mountains. A few bands had appeared in that district some weeks before, and one led by Doncho had had an encounter with the Turks on the 13th. The komittadjis entrenched themselves near Perim village, and a small party of them attacked a Turkish outpost

at Rogene Chiflik, near Melnik. They then withdrew, pursued by a Turkish force, and rejoined the main body. The Turks attacked the latter, but were repulsed with loss. On the arrival of further reinforcements (seven battalions in all, with guns) another attack was made, and again the Turks were repulsed with a loss, according to some accounts, of 300 men. A third assault on the 19th also failed, upon which the troops retired, owing to the inclemency of the weather. A few more bands now began to cross the frontier from Bulgaria, under the direction of General Tzoncheff, to operate in conjunction with the local Committees. This was the first act of reconciliation between the Tzoncheffists and the Internal Organization.

On the 27th the rising broke out at midnight in a number of villages. The object of this movement is said to have been to save the Bulgarian population from their Muhamedan neighbours. The country in question is inhabited by Pomaks as well as Christian Bulgarians, and the latter, always subject to outrages, now feared a general massacre. Fighting occurred between the bands and the local Pomaks, reinforced by Turkish regulars. Massacres followed, and a wholesale exodus of Christian villagers across the frontier began. The same thing had been going on from the Adrianople vilayet, and soon over 25,000 starving and destitute refugees were thrown on the slender resources of the Principality. The fighting did not last very long, but it recalled

a large number of Turkish troops from other parts of the country, and this brought about a recrudescence of the rebellion in Monastir. Encounters took place at Presba, Florina, Morihovo, and even at Demir-Hissar. But by the middle of October the situation was less critical, and the bands everywhere began to disperse, as winter was approaching.

While the rising and the repression were at their worst, the relations between Turkey and Bulgaria were strained to breaking-point. The Bulgarian Government was sincerely anxious to avoid war, and it did what it could to prevent bands from crossing into Turkish territory; but the task was beyond its powers: the sympathies of the people were wholly on the side of the Macedonian movement. Troops were massed on both sides of the frontier, and large reserves were called out. Then, in consequence of the pressure of foreign Powers, attempts to arrive at an understanding were made, a mutual demobilization proposed, and, on the Bulgarian side, begun; but it was suspended on account of a frontier incident, and relations once more became critical. War seemed at one moment imminent, but owing to the hostility of Russia and Austria, to the fact that the Bulgarian Government was not sure of a large majority in the Sobranye, and to the insufficiency of armaments, it was warded off for the time being.

On October 24th, the second Austro-Russian

reform scheme was brought forward, and although it was imperfect and inadequate, both the Bulgarians and the Macedonians deemed it best to give it a chance. If it should be carried out loyally, and subsequently improved upon, they will hold their hands; but that this is possible no one in the country believes. A newer and more radical scheme must be adopted if the question is to be definitely settled without bloodshed.

There the situation now stands: on the one side a wasted land, inhabited by a starving population, whose only chance of existence lies in joining the bands—men who have lost everything have fewer restraints, and nothing more to fear; on the other hand, a free people longing to fly to the assistance of their persecuted kinsfolk. Both Bulgaria and Turkey have been diligently arming all winter; each is convinced that war is the only way out of the *impasse*, and each believes that it stands a very good chance of success. The recently signed Turco-Bulgarian treaty does not really change the situation, save that it gives Bulgaria a *locus standi* in the Macedonian Question, which Austria and Russia had hitherto denied her on the grounds of her being a State vassal to the Porte. Both parties, however, have made promises which they are unable to fulfil.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ATTITUDE OF THE POWERS

BY VALENTINE CHIROL

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THE attitude of the European Powers towards Turkey has passed through three principal phases. The first was that of fear, and lasted as long as the Turks were powerful enough to threaten the West. It may be said to have ended with their defeat before Vienna in 1683. In the second phase the Western nations gradually drive back the Ottoman invader, reconquering many of the countries which had been lost to Christianity for centuries. The third phase—which differs from the second mainly in the importation of a new *modus operandi*—is that in which the Christian Powers begin to take an active interest in the conditions and sufferings of the *rayahs* or Christian subjects of the Porte. This last phase commenced late in the eighteenth century, and as, on the one hand, the efforts made on behalf of the oppressed Christians have often been only a cloak for aggressive designs on the part of the Powers concerned, and Turkey, on the other hand, has by her own short-sighted policy defeated the endeavours of

tion of policy in the Near East was that all intervention in favour of the Christian subjects of the Porte should be carried out by Russia alone—ostensibly because they were members of the same faith as the Russians, and it was easier for one Power to bring energetic pressure to bear on the Sultan than for many; in reality, because Russia wished to have a free hand for the extension both of her political ascendancy and of her territorial boundaries.

Though not specifically defined, Russia's claim to the right of interference between the Sultan and his Christian subjects was tacitly recognized by the Turks. England, however, never admitted it, and it was in order more effectually to resist it that she first sought to organize what has come to be known as the Concert of Europe, on the basis of the necessity for a collective intervention of all the Powers. In consequence of the anarchy in which the Turkish Empire was involved in the 'thirties, when Mehemet Ali was in revolt, and Egyptian armies under Ibrahim Pasha overran Syria, Arabia, and Asia Minor, the Sultan applied for Russian as well as English and French aid. The Russo-Turkish Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, in 1833, seemed at first destined to place Turkey in a position almost of vassalage towards Russia. A Russian army prepared to march into Turkey, but it retired on the approach of an Anglo-French fleet, and eventually, in 1840, England, though she had

in the meantime become once more estranged from France, persuaded Austria, Russia, and Prussia to take joint action, with the result that Syria and Crete, which had been occupied by Mehemet Ali, were restored to the Porte.

It was at this juncture that Sir Stratford Canning (afterwards Lord Stratford de Redcliffe) returned as British Ambassador to Constantinople, where he was for many years to exercise over the councils of the Porte an influence such as no other foreign representative ever wielded before or after him. He had already on several occasions discharged important political missions in Turkey, especially in connection with the emancipation of Greece, and it was in the light of former experience that he was able without hesitation to shape British policy on the lines it was to follow for nearly half a century. That policy was, on the one hand, to maintain the authority of the Sultan and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as a barrier against Russian aggression—of which Constantinople was believed to be the ultimate goal—and on the other hand to secure by constant friendly pressure, and, if necessary, by the collective intervention of all the Powers, such a thorough reform of the Turkish system of administration as should afford real protection to the Christian subjects of the Porte, and render them contented and even loyal. The Hatt-i-Sherif of Gul-haneh (1839) had already enacted many reforms, which on paper were excellent. There still

remained to see them effectually carried out in practice.

This policy received but little active support from the Continental Powers, and Russia fought it with all the covert resources of her diplomacy. She enlisted against it the co-operation of the whole forces of reaction in the Turkish Empire, and in spite of the great Elchi's masterful personality, his influence only partially and temporarily arrested the internal process of disintegration which was going on throughout the Ottoman Empire. The Tsar Nicholas had revealed his plans to the British Government as early as 1844, when during a visit to England he proposed a partition of Turkey, which the British Ministers refused to countenance. He returned to the charge at the beginning of 1853, when a dispute between Latin and Orthodox monks concerning the Holy Places gave him another opportunity of raising the question. His overtures were again rejected in London, and also in Paris. Thereupon he decided to take independent action, and he sent Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople to demand for Russia the exclusive protection of all the Orthodox Christians in Turkey. For the Sultan to have admitted this claim would have been tantamount to his resigning all authority in his own dominions, and his refusal to comply with the demand led to the Crimean War.

The Treaty of Paris (1856) solemnly confirmed the principles of British policy. Turkey

was admitted to participate in the public law and system of Europe, which meant that her fate would henceforth be the direct concern of all the other Powers. On the other hand, she undertook to improve the condition of her subjects, without regard to differences of race or religion. In fulfilment of this obligation, the Hatt-i-Humayun of 1856 elaborated a very complete charter of reforms. The Convention of Paris of 1858 granted a fuller measure of autonomy to the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, and added to them Bessarabia, which, after having been annexed to Russia in 1812, had been retroceded by her in 1856. France and England wished to go further and unite the two principalities, so as to form a stronger barrier against Russian expansion, but this was prevented by the action of Austria and Turkey. A personal union was, however, effected in 1859, when they both elected the same prince as Hospodar.

Russia now found herself baffled on all sides. Not only had she been beaten in the Crimea, but she had alienated the sympathies of the Rumanians by the conduct of her generals while they occupied the country, whose complete union was effected in 1862 under the auspices not of the Tsar, but of the French Emperor. The Russian claim to exclusive protection of the Christians in Turkey had been rejected. The Greeks were showing themselves less and less inclined to be moulded to Russia's purposes, and even the Œcumenical

Patriarchate proved a less docile instrument than Russia expected. Serbia and Montenegro alone, who were too far removed from Russia to fear absorption, remained faithful to her. All these facts suggested a new direction for her activity in the Balkans. While she was repairing the effects of the war, she began to evolve the doctrine of Pan Slavism, as a substitute for her former claim to the protection of the whole Christian population of Turkey. The old antagonism between Greek and Slav was now revived and intensified by the awakening of the various European peoples to a national consciousness, and the Balkan Slavs were aroused to a new conception of independence and civilization on other than Greek lines. This movement proved Russia's opportunity, and when in the early 'sixties the Bulgarians began to advance demands for autonomy, and to agitate at the same time for an autocephalous Church, Russia came forward as their protector, not only against Turkish misrule, but also against the oppression of the Greek Patriarchate. The Greeks were quietly dropped by Russia, who now reserved all her favours for the Slav races of Turkey. The policy of the Western Powers with regard to reform was being once more defeated by the incurable obstinacy of the Turks; and whilst the Hatt-i-Humayun shared the fate of the Hatt-i-Sherif, chaos continued to prevail in the administration, and the Christians looked

in vain for any redress of their oppressive disabilities.

The Bulgarian movement, however, was not at first viewed altogether with disfavour by the Turkish Government, who regarded it as a useful counterpoise to the Greek revolutionary agitation, and finally, through the pressure of Russia, a firman was issued in 1870, constituting an independent Bulgarian Church, or Exarchate, and the recognition of Bulgarian nationality as a *millet* or Christian community endowed with certain rights of self-government. The Slav provinces of Turkey remained, nevertheless, in a state of chronic ferment, and in 1875 there were risings in Bosnia and the Herzegovina which defeated the ingenuity of European diplomacy. Then came in the spring of 1876 the abortive rising in Bulgaria, followed by hideous massacres on the part of the Turkish troops and bashi-buzuks. In July Montenegro and Servia took up arms against Turkey, Russian officers and volunteers flocked across the Danube, and a Russian ultimatum alone saved the Servian armies from complete destruction.

Everything seemed to menace a general conflagration. The British Government made another attempt to avert this final catastrophe by inviting the collective intervention of the Powers. But their attitude had changed considerably since the Treaty of Paris. England was the only active exponent of the old policy of reforms by means

of friendly pressure on the Sultan, and public opinion in England was divided between horror at the Turkish atrocities and distrust of Russia. France was sympathetic, but was absorbed in the task of restoring her shattered forces after the war of 1870. Italy, too, had no decided foreign policy, and was unwilling to run risks. Austria, as before the Crimean War, was jealous and distrustful of Russia, and anxious to extend her influence in the Balkans, but afraid to act; and she, like Germany, cared nothing for the ethical aspects of the question. Germany, above all, was anxious, then as now, to do nothing to annoy the "Eastern neighbour." Russia, on the other hand, was keen to retrieve the position and prestige lost by the Crimean War, and her people were genuinely stirred by an agitation which appealed alike to their religious and racial feelings. The Panslavist movement was now at its height, and the policy of liberating the "Little Brothers" of Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke, with the possibility of eventually uniting all the Slav peoples under one sceptre, kindled the enthusiasm of all classes. Nevertheless, in December, 1876, a conference of the six great Powers met, on the initiative of England, at Constantinople, to discuss the affairs of Turkey; but it proved abortive, as the Sultan, reckoning upon the divergent aims and interests of the different Governments, rejected its chief recommendations, which included foreign control for the protection of the Christians. Russia con-

tinued to bring pressure to bear on Turkey, but without success, though another collective protocol, signed in London, gave the Porte practical warning of the consequences; and at last, in the spring of 1877, war broke out between the two Powers. After a victorious but hard-fought and exhausting campaign the Russian troops came within sight of Constantinople, and the Treaty of San Stefano was signed on March 3rd, 1878.

This document may be described as first and foremost a Panslavist Treaty, for it was drafted exclusively for the benefit of the Slav peoples of the Balkans, and for the aggrandizement of Russia in Europe and in Asia. Bulgaria was to extend from the Danube to the Ægean, and from the Black Sea to the Black Drin, while Servia and Montenegro were given extensions of territory. Greece, on the other hand, received nothing, and Rumania was rewarded for having sent her armies across the Danube to retrieve the situation before Plevna, by seeing Bessarabia filched from her. With regard to the condition of the *rayahs* still under Turkish rule, it was provided that the Porte should apply the Organic Statute of Crete of 1868, and draw up similar statutes for the rest of European Turkey; but no provision was made for enforcing those stipulations. The Slav peoples had been freed from the Turkish yoke, and that was the important point from the Russian and Panslavist point of view. Bulgaria, once erected into a fair-sized

second-class Power, would, it was hoped and believed, be wholly devoted to Russian interests, and prepare the way for Russian supremacy in the Balkans.

This arrangement, however, was far from meeting the views of the other European Powers, and England, who had already checked the Russian armies at the gates of Constantinople by sending her fleet through the Dardanelles, stepped forward as the champion of the old principles of Western policy, but with important modifications. Russia, weakened by the war and without allies, agreed to negotiate, and ultimately the Powers met in congress at Berlin, where the Treaty of San Stefano was rescinded. The Berlin Treaty, which was substituted for it, was a compromise between the old policy of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, together with reforms to be carried out by the Turkish authorities, and the recognition of the new claims of nationalities. The Big Bulgaria was, as we have seen, cut up, and the Bulgarian people divided into three water-tight compartments: the vassal but virtually independent Principality of Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia, which was to be ruled by a Christian governor as an autonomous province under the sovereignty of the Sultan, whose troops were to hold certain strategic points, and Macedonia and the Adrianople vilayet, which were placed once more under Turkish administration, though a special scheme of reforms was to be elaborated

for them. Bulgaria was further shorn of the Dobruja, which was given to Rumania as compensation for the loss of Bessarabia. Bosnia and Herzegovina were handed over to Austria, under certain restrictive conditions. The claims of Greece and of Montenegro were recognized, but left unsettled; Servia received an extension of territory (Vranja and the Bulgarian district of Pirot).

The cardinal defect of the Berlin Treaty was the inadequacy of the provisions for the protection of the Christians left under Turkish rule. This was all the more fatal in that the idea of a Big Bulgaria was bound to remain the aspiration of all Bulgars, and the bogey of all the non-Bulgarian races in the Balkans, especially of the Greeks. The reforms remained an open question, the satisfactory solution of which was conditioned upon the genuine and cordial co-operation of all the Powers, whose rivalry had only been superficially composed at the Berlin Congress. It is curious to note in this connection that both Russia and her rivals should have made exactly the same mistake with regard to the character of the Bulgarians, whom both believed destined inevitably to become mere instruments of Russian ambition. The spirit of independence which they afterwards displayed came as a surprise to all. Another obstacle to the success of the Berlin Treaty, which, however, the Powers could hardly have been expected to foresee, was the character of the Sultan, Abdul

Hamid II. No one imagined at that time that the young ruler would prove both a ruthless autocrat and a master of diplomatic resourcefulness.

The results of this policy, given the actual circumstances of the case, were bound to prove nugatory. Austria's hands were tied for the next two years in the conquest and pacification of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Russia was busy during the same period manipulating the administration of Bulgaria. Greece and Montenegro were sore because their claims remained still unsettled. The Powers collectively were engaged in drawing up the Organic Statute for Eastern Rumelia, which was promulgated in 1879, and proved a good piece of work, as far as it went. It provided the province with a Christian governor, a provincial assembly, a native militia and gendarmerie, elaborated an improved system of justice, and put an end to the inequality before the law of Christians and Muhamedans.

England in the meanwhile was devoting herself mainly to the task of carrying out in Asia Minor an experiment in her favourite policy of reforms through the existing Turkish authorities. Both the Treaty of San Stefano and that of Berlin contained provisions in favour of reforms in Armenia, and by the Anglo-Turkish Convention of June 4th, 1878 (better known as the Cyprus Convention), Great Britain pledged herself to support Turkey in the event of further

Russian aggression in Asia Minor, the Sultan on his part undertaking to execute the necessary reforms, and giving England Cyprus as a pledge. Great Britain at once appointed a number of military officers as consuls and vice-consuls in Asia Minor, whose duty it was to keep a watch on Russian movements, and at the same time exercise a salutary control over the doings of the local authorities. They travelled all over the country, wrote reports, received petitions, listened to grievances, and where the pressure on local Turkish officials failed to have the desired results, pressure was brought to bear on the Porte through the Embassy at Constantinople. The results achieved by this system, although of a temporary nature, were by no means unpromising. The mere presence of impartial and honest Europeans in these little-visited districts was of itself a check on the maladministration and injustice of the Turkish officials. The Porte, weakened by the war, and ever menaced by the Russian peril, could not afford to disregard the representations of its British mentors. The results achieved in Asia Minor, where Great Britain had a free hand, are a proof that the old policy of England, if consistently and energetically followed, was not altogether so futile as it has since been represented. It had the great advantage of doing justice to, and securing the support of, the best Musulman as well as Christian elements. But it was

at best only a palliative which did not strike at the real root of the evil. Moreover, that which England was able to do by her own preponderating influence in Asia Minor was impossible to the divided councils of the six great Powers in the European vilayets.

The change of Government in England in 1880 led to a total reversal of her Eastern policy, and for the system of reforms by means of firm but friendly pressure on the Turkish authorities, was substituted a policy of forcible coercion. This policy proved successful in securing the settlement of Greek and Montenegrin claims. Dulcigno had been awarded to the Montenegrins instead of the Albanian district of Gusinje, where they had been unable to enforce their authority. But to this arrangement the Turks and Albanians opposed equal resistance until an international naval demonstration at Dulcigno forced them to give way. By similar means the Powers compelled the Turks to surrender Thessaly and a part of Epirus to Greece. But to the question of reforms in the provinces still directly under Turkish control, the policy of coercion was never applied. A programme of administrative reforms was indeed drawn up on paper by the collective wisdom of the Powers, but, unlike the Organic Statute of Eastern Rumelia, it was allowed to remain a dead letter. At the same time the excellent work begun by Sir Charles Wilson and his military consuls in Asia Minor was allowed to

drop, and the field abandoned to the corrupt and fanatical influences of Palace officials, of which the Armenian massacres were to be the sanguinary outcome.

The efforts of Russia had been chiefly directed towards reducing the Principality of Bulgaria to the condition of a mere Russian province. Prince Dondukoff-Korsakoff was Imperial Commissioner during the interregnum between the Berlin Treaty and the election of the Prince; he treated Bulgaria as though he were its ruler, and he filled all the chief posts in the Civil Service with Russians. The Bulgarian National Assembly was encouraged to draw up a Constitution, which combined autocracy and democracy in such a fashion that if the Prince should prove the willing tool of Russia, he would have almost unlimited powers, whereas if he were to show signs of undesirable independence, means were provided by which his people could checkmate him. What, however, was not contemplated was that prince and people should unite in opposition to Russian tutelage. The Constituent Assembly met at Tirnovo and elected Prince Alexander of Battenberg, nephew of the Tsar Alexander II., a choice naturally agreeable to Russian views. The history of Bulgaria is told elsewhere in this volume, and all that need be said here is that for a time Prince Alexander ruled according to his powerful protector's suggestions, and was in high favour at St Petersburg.

When the first Bulgarian Parliament returned a majority of Liberals opposed to the Conservative or Russophil party, the Prince was induced by his Russian advisers to suspend the Constitution on 9th May, 1881. He made the Russian General Ernroth his Prime Minister, and obtained absolute powers, which he exercised under Russian auspices. The President of the Council, the Minister of War, the Chief of Police, the Governor of Sofia, and three hundred officers of the Army were Russians. A very efficient machinery was thus organized for the complete Russification of Bulgaria, whilst the national sentiment was humoured by the prospect of speedy aggrandizement in the teeth of the Treaty of Berlin. Russian agents and consuls in Eastern Rumelia strenuously promoted the agitation for union with the Principality, where of course the movement was no less popular than in the southern province.

The radical change in the attitude of the British Government towards the Porte after Mr Gladstone's return to office, hastened the development of reactionary tendencies in Turkey. The Sultan, irrevocably alienated from Western influences by the policy of coercion, of which Great Britain was now the chief advocate and instrument, applied himself to restore the prestige he had lost through the surrender of his territories, by reviving, on the one hand, the spiritual authority of the Khalifate, and on the other by concen-

trating the whole power of the executive in his own hands. This double policy increased the fanaticism of the Turks against their Christian fellow-subjects, and involved the proscription of all the more liberal and independent statesmen of the Empire, who recognized to some extent the necessity of harmonizing Turkish rule with Western standards. The Sultan at the same time developed extraordinary diplomatic adroitness in exploiting the jealousies of the different Powers, and in playing them off against each other. He had speedily realized the change of public opinion in England, and the British occupation of Egypt, in 1882, intensified his resentment. He was therefore quite ready to intrigue with Russia or any other Power against Great Britain; but for some time more Russia did not trouble herself so much about Turkey as about Bulgaria.

A reaction was setting in there against Russian methods of government. The Prince chafed under the tutelage to which he was subjected, while the people resented the arrogance of the Russian officials and officers, and the extravagance with which they squandered Bulgarian money. Prince Alexander realized that he could win the confidence of his people by restoring the Constitution, which he did in 1883; and after vainly trying to reconcile the demands of Russia with those of his people—for he found that the new Tsar Alexander III. hated him cordially—he quietly

got rid of his Russian advisers, and the Liberals ruled in their stead.

The agitation for the annexation of Eastern Rumelia continued, alternately encouraged and discouraged by Russia, who was beginning to see that her hold on Bulgaria was not so strong that she should wish to see the Principality strengthened or enlarged. When, in 1885, the bloodless revolution of Philippopolis took place, and Prince Alexander was proclaimed Prince of North and South Bulgaria, Russia hardly attempted to conceal her chagrin, for she saw that this union, which she had herself originally promoted, would now redound, in the eyes of the Bulgarian people, not to her credit, but solely to that of the Prince, whose independent attitude had given great offence in official circles at St Petersburg. To punish the Bulgarians for their audacity, Russia actually encouraged the Sultan to adopt a menacing attitude towards the Principality, and the Bulgarian army had to be mobilized on the Turkish frontier in anticipation of armed intervention by the Porte.

Austria took up simultaneously an equally hostile attitude towards Bulgaria, but inspired by very different motives from those which prompted Russia. Austria's foreign policy, always behind the times, had failed to realize the change which had taken place in Bulgaria's sentiments towards Russia, and was still convinced that the aggrandizement of Bulgaria could in the long

run tend only to promote Russian ascendancy in the Balkans. She was therefore also opposed to the union, and in this she certainly derived much encouragement from Berlin, where Austria was regarded as a useful instrument for counter-acting Russian ambitions without compromising the relations of Germany with St Petersburg. Hoping at the same time that an easy victory would consolidate the position of her protégé, King Milan, in Servia, she induced him to take up arms against Bulgaria, on the plea that the union of Eastern Rumelia with the Principality destroyed the balance of power in the Balkans. At this critical juncture, when Bulgaria was exposed to attack on both fronts, the Tsar suddenly recalled all the Russian officers serving with the Bulgarian army, hoping thus to render it powerless, and secure by its defeat the recognition that Bulgaria was helpless without Russia's support.

The valour of the Bulgarian troops, and the brilliant generalship of Prince Alexander, stultified these treacherous hopes. When the Servians were let loose upon Bulgaria, the Bulgarian army was concentrated on the Turkish frontier, whence the chief danger had been hitherto apprehended; but by a series of forced marches it executed a magnificent change of front just in time to meet the invaders and defeat them utterly after three days' fighting at Slivnitza. The Servian retreat degenerated into a rout, and the Bulgarians were

only prevented from marching on to Belgrade by an Austrian ultimatum to make peace on the basis of the *status quo*. But the campaign had proved Bulgaria's vitality to the world, and made an impression which no subsequent political vicissitudes could efface. Bulgaria had shown that she was able to stand alone, and did not mean to be merely the satellite, even of Russia.

But Bulgaria was not yet saved. Where force had failed, diplomacy might still be successful. Russia and Austria, backed by Germany, made a final effort to prevent the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia at the Constantinople Conference. But Lord Salisbury had grasped the change in the Balkan situation to which Austria had remained blind, and Sir William White, who knew the politics of Eastern Europe as no English statesman had known them since Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, represented Great Britain at Constantinople. The Russian, Austrian, and German Ambassadors urged that the Sultan should be armed with an European mandate to occupy Eastern Rumelia and restore the *status quo ante*. But Sir William White, who was supported by his French and Italian colleagues, defeated this proposal by the sheer weight of his remarkable personality, which overawed even the Sultan himself. England and Russia had thus changed rôles with regard to Bulgaria.

In the face of British opposition to a policy of coercing Bulgaria, the Sultan abandoned his

resistance to the union, which, as a compromise, it was agreed should be merely a personal one, *i.e.*, the Prince of Bulgaria was to be formally appointed Governor of Eastern Rumelia, and the appointment was to be nominally for five years. For a moment even, under Sir William White's influence, the Sultan seemed to realize that a strong and independent Bulgaria might be the most powerful barrier against Russian ambitions. He not only sought a *rapprochement* with Bulgaria, but a Turco-Bulgarian convention was actually signed, early in 1886, which amounted to a defensive alliance. This departure caused intense irritation in Russia, and the Russian Government determined to make Prince Alexander pay dearly for his audacity. It found the situation in the Principality itself suitable for a *coup de main*. Public opinion was not yet ripe for an alliance with the Turks, and the new convention somewhat outran popular feeling. The incompleteness of the union, the discontent of some of the Bulgarian officers who did not think that their services in the war had been sufficiently recognized, and the uneasiness of the Church at the idea of Russian estrangement, caused a certain amount of disaffection, and Russia was not slow to profit by it.

Prince Alexander was kidnapped in August 1886. Though he was successfully conveyed into Russia, the Russian Government did not venture to detain him, and he was allowed to return to Bulgaria; but his unfortunate telegram to the

Tsar from Rustchuk rendered his position untenable. He understood the irreparable mistake he had made, and though his return to Bulgaria had been a triumphal progress, he abdicated the throne (September 7th, 1886).

To assist the Bulgarians in their choice of a successor, the Russian Government sent Major-General Kaulbars, the brother of the General Kaulbars who had been Minister for War in Bulgaria five years before. His conduct increased the growing anti-Russian feeling in the country, for he posed openly as a dictator, and to ensure the election of a candidate subservient to the wishes of St Petersburg, he stumped Bulgaria as an electioneering agent, assisted by all the Russian consuls and vice-consuls. But finally, having failed to dragoon the Bulgarians or to plunge the country into a state of anarchy, which might have served as an excuse for Russian military intervention, he broke off all diplomatic relations and left the country in disgust, followed by the Russian consuls and agents.

Protracted and vain negotiations between the Bulgarian regents and various candidates for the vacant throne, and the refusal of King Charles of Rumania to entertain the overtures made to him for a union between the two countries, which might have paved the way for a confederation of the Balkan States, ultimately induced the Grand Sobranye to elect *faute de mieux* Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha (August 14th, 1887).

Stamboloff, the head of the anti-Russian party, had been the soul of the Regency, and he was made Prime Minister under the new *régime*—a position he held until 1894—still continuing to act practically as a dictator. Prince Ferdinand, however, gradually tired of his tutelage, and he was above all anxious to be recognized by the Powers, especially after his marriage with a Bourbon princess. The sullen hostility of the Russian Government barred the way to his recognition, and no means were neglected to make the Bulgarians feel the weight of its displeasure.

Finding no support elsewhere, Bulgarian resistance began to weaken. In 1894 Stamboloff was dismissed, and in 1895 he was assassinated. The most powerful obstacle to the reconciliation with Russia, towards which Prince Ferdinand had for some time inclined, was thus removed. It was soon afterwards effected and sealed by the “conversion” of the infant Prince Boris to the Orthodox faith. This act was followed by the recognition of Prince Ferdinand by Russia and the other Powers, including the Porte. But in spite of numerous concessions to the wishes of Russia, and the apparent ascendancy of pro-Russian sentiments, the old spirit of independence has never died out in Bulgaria. The Russophil party in the Sobranye, after various vicissitudes, was completely defeated at the last elections, in the autumn of 1903, for the keen political instinct of the Bulgarian people has

taught them that the Russia of to-day is no longer the Russia of the Tsar liberator. They know what they have to expect from her now, and they have come to fear her, even when she is bringing gifts.

Meanwhile the condition of the *rayahs* in Turkey had been steadily going from bad to worse. The Sultan's despotic system of personal government, rooted in corruption and delation, his terror of plots against his own life, and the revived fanaticism, of the Muhamedans aggravated the already wretched condition of his Christian subjects. Revolutionary movements arose in Armenia, repressed in the usual Turkish fashion—massacre, outrage, and devastation. The Powers protested a great deal, and did very little. England alone was disposed to take forcible measures, but the only Power inclined to support her was Italy, and Lord Salisbury flinched from the risk of international complications in presence of the indifference, or worse, of Germany and Austria, and of the covert hostility of Russia, to whom France was bound by her alliance. The rebellion in Crete and the insurrectionary movement on the Turco-Greek frontiers (somewhat similar to the recent action of the Bulgarian bands in Macedonia) led to the Greek War of 1897. Its disastrous results rendered the Sultan more intractable than ever to the representations of the Powers in favour of reforms, and increased his prestige among the Muhamedans, for he had

now some claim to bear the title of "Ghazi," or the "Victorious."

The policy of all the Powers towards the Eastern Question had slowly undergone a great change. England, to whom the affairs of Turkey had once been matters of vital importance, was becoming indifferent. For this various facts are responsible. In the first place, the fear of Russian expansion at the expense of Turkey had been largely prompted by apprehensions for the safety of the road to India; but after the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, it was felt that communications with the great dependency were less vulnerable, and that even with the Russians at Constantinople the danger would no longer be so serious.

At the same time other engrossing questions had arisen which distracted the attention of the British public from the Near East. The situation in South Africa, which had grown steadily worse since the first Boer War of 1881, the loss and the re-conquest of the Sudan, West African, and other colonial problems, and the new complications which were looming in the Middle East, and still more threatening in the Far East, successively absorbed public interest at home. The idea began to gain ground among a considerable section of the British people that the affairs of Turkey had ceased to be a matter of serious concern to this country, and that even if Russia were to absorb the whole of the

Balkan Peninsula, we should not be tempted to put our money again on the wrong horse. This view was making way among Conservatives as well as Liberals, and for some years the British public and press took little or no interest in the Near Eastern Question. The Armenian massacres aroused intense indignation, but Russia was felt to bar the way, and no decisive action was taken. The Cretan Question and the Greek War awakened the old Phil-Hellenic feeling once more, but the very poor figure cut by the Greeks considerably lessened the sympathy of Englishmen for their cause, as well as for that of the other Christian races subject to and struggling against the Turks; for the average Englishman finds it even now difficult to discriminate between the different Christian races in European Turkey. "Six of one and half a dozen of the other," was the opinion freely expressed by the man in the street, while the Government did not wish to be entangled in the affairs of Turkey, when other matters of greater apparent urgency claimed their attention. Occasionally, as in the Cretan Question, they put their shoulders to the wheel and helped to lift the cumbrous "steam-roller" out of the ruts; but as a rule they preferred, as the lesser of two evils, to give way to the obstructive influences which paralyzed the Concert of Europe at Constantinople.

The attitude of Austria has been affected

by various considerations. When the Hapsburg Monarchy, in 1866, lost the bulk of its Italian provinces and its hegemony in Germany, it adopted for a time a policy of *recueillement*; but its tendency since that date has been to become more and more a Slavonic rather than a Germanic Power. This tendency was strengthened by the pressure of the German Empire, which wished to drive Austria towards the East, so as to reconcile her to the idea of eventually losing her remaining German provinces, and also to prepare the way for Germany's more remote schemes of expansion. This is in brief the origin of the famous *Drang nach Osten* policy. Ever since the days of Prince Eugene of Savoy, Austria had aspired to the conquest of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The annexation of Dalmatia, in 1814, made that occupation almost a necessity, and for many years Austrian agents, especially the Franciscan monks, prepared the ground. The Berlin Treaty, as we have seen, gave over those provinces to Austria, and the admirable administrative work of M. de Kállay and his subordinates may be held to have justified her claim to them. But amongst an influential school of Austrian politicians, her ambitions were not intended to stop there. Bosnia and the Herzegovina were only to be a means to an end, and as soon as they were pacified the eyes of many in Austria began to look longingly towards Macedonia and Albania.

The Berlin Treaty, and the Austro-Turkish Convention which followed it, gave Austria the right to place garrisons in the Sanjak of Novibazar, where the Turks were to retain the civil administration, and were also allowed to maintain their own garrisons by the side of the Austrian troops. Austria availed herself of this curious arrangement only as far as concerns the Lim district, which borders on Bosnia proper, where at Plevlje, Priepolje, and Priboj Austrian and Turkish troops can be seen quartered side by side. But the right still remains valid for the whole of the Sanjak, *i.e.*, as far as Mitrovitza. What the forward school proposed was, that she should gradually strengthen her influence in the border districts by a strenuous propaganda—and other methods, perhaps, of a less avowable character—and at the same time build a railway from Sarajevo to Priepolje, the furthest point occupied by Austrian troops, and eventually to Mitrovitza, where the line would join the Oriental Railway from Nish to Salonica. Any disturbance in the Kossovo vilayet would provide an excuse for further action, and once the head of the Vardar valley was occupied, the *Doppelaar* might soon be flying at Salonica.

But various circumstances have delayed the execution of this ambitious programme. In the first place the personal influence of the venerable Emperor Francis Joseph has always been opposed to a policy of adventure. Moreover, neither the

Germans nor the Hungarians would have viewed the incorporation of a million more Slavs without apprehension, as added to those already within the Monarchy, they would become the predominant element.¹ Moreover, these Macedonian Slavs are all Orthodox Christians, a community which both in the Monarchy itself and in Bosnia has proved somewhat intractable, and inclined towards political aspirations incompatible with the existence of Austria-Hungary. Then there were financial difficulties, for the execution of such grandiose projects involves very heavy expenditure. But above all, the responsible statesmen of the Monarchy dreaded international complications. Russia was hostile to any movement which might have jeopardized her own schemes in the Balkans, and she was quite capable of mobilizing in case of need the Serbs and the Montenegrins to resist an Austrian advance. In fact, the Russian consuls in Bosnia and Southern Dalmatia were often little more than revolutionary agents. At the same time, Italy, Austria's ally, resented the idea that Austria might one day occupy Albania, a move which the conquest of Macedonia would render almost inevitable. In addition to all these obstacles there were the internal difficulties of the

¹ The Germans of Austria-Hungary are about 11,000,000, the Magyars 8,000,000, the Rumanians 3,000,000, and the Slavs 20,000,000. The inhabitants of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, who are all Slavs, are 1,600,000.

Monarchy, which were becoming yearly more serious, both in Austria and in Hungary. Thus all schemes of expansion were, at least, kept in the background, and Austrian activity was limited to secret propaganda.

Germany's policy, apart from furthering Austria's *Drang nach Osten*, has been mainly dictated by two considerations—one, the reluctance to do anything which would offend Russia; the other, the desire to strengthen her political position at Constantinople and to preserve the Turkish Empire, where she had discovered a new field of economic exploitation. With these objects in view the Emperor William did not hesitate to call Abdul Hamid his friend, when the latter's hands were still red with the blood of the Armenians, and the sufferings of the Christian populations of European Turkey were not likely to divert him from his purpose.

In the recent phases of the Near Eastern Question Germany has been content to play, as unobtrusively as possible, the part of a drag upon any policy calculated to offend the susceptibilities of the Sultan or to run counter to the wishes of Russia. The policy of France and Italy will be dealt with fully elsewhere.

The beginnings of the present Macedonian rising date from about the year 1895, when the Bulgarian insurgent Committees were first founded, but for some time they attracted little attention, owing to the Armenian massacres and the Greek

War of 1897. But in Austria and Russia the potentialities of the movement were probably better understood, and the *rapprochement* which had been growing up between those two Powers was consummated in the Agreement of 1898. Russia's policy in the Balkans had undergone a complete transformation since 1878. The unexpected and inconveniently independent spirit shown by the Bulgarians had disconcerted her plans, and she had resolved to apply henceforth to Turkey the policy which she has so successfully pursued elsewhere in dealing with corrupt and weak Oriental monarchies. Instead of seeking to subdue them by overt conquest, the object of Russian policy is now to bolster them up for her own purposes, and whilst securing their complete subserviency by a judicious combination of threats and blandishments, to leave them to complete the work of internal disintegration pending the time when they shall be deemed ripe for final absorption. To such an end she can have no better ally than the Sultan, and hence the lukewarmness with which she handles every suggestion of serious internal reforms in Turkey which, by improving the lot of the inhabitants, might ultimately restore the vitality of the Ottoman Empire, or, at least, secure the vigorous development of the rising nationalities within its present frontiers.

Parallel with this transformation of Russia's policy towards Turkey, a profound change has come over the whole spirit of her national policy.

Within the last quarter of a century the tendency towards centralization has been growing steadily, and all movements in favour of self-government of any kind have been repressed with increasing severity. Above all, a cast-iron scheme of Russification has to a great extent displaced the old Panslavist ideals. The Russian Government has become more and more hostile to any and every form of nationalism both within the Empire and in those countries which it has ear-marked for its own. Its treatment of the Finns, of the Jews, of the Armenians in the Caucasus, are cases in point. At the same time, the ascendancy of the reactionary party tends to indispose Russia towards any movement of which the aims or methods have a "revolutionary" flavour. Just as in the old days Metternich condemned the Greek War of Independence at the Congress of Verona as a violation of the Conservative principles of the Holy Alliance, Russian diplomacy abandoned the Armenians to their fate because their cause was tainted with the "revolutionary spirit," and the Macedonians have been denounced on the same grounds. In fact, all the newly-created Balkan States, with the exception of Montenegro, are endowed with Constitutions of an extremely democratic and popular character, and the people themselves, especially in Bulgaria, have shown a strong aversion to autocratic methods. Hence they have all become more or less "suspect" at St Petersburg.

In the early days after the Russo-Turkish War the Balkan peoples were favourably disposed, if not towards annexation by Russia, at least towards a general acceptance of the overlordship of the Great White Tsar, whom they looked upon as the natural and benevolent protector of all the Slavs. A Panslavonic confederation under Russian hegemony seemed at that time by no means impossible. But while conscious of their common Slavonic stock, they are keenly attached to their own individual nationality and language, and they have begun to realize that absorption by Russia to-day would be tantamount to the loss of all national individuality.

When the revolution broke out in the Balkans last year, Russian diplomacy was somewhat uncertain as to what steps it should take. The connection between the Russian Government and the Macedonian Committees is as yet very obscure; if we are to believe the komitadji leaders themselves, the insurgents at first regarded the Russian diplomats and consuls as friends, and confided their plans and aims to them in the hope of obtaining sympathy and assistance; but they soon discovered that all the information thus given was communicated to the Turkish police, after which these confidences ceased. Whether this story be true or not, there can be little doubt that Russia has been playing a double game in this phase of the Macedonian Question. On the one hand, the old Panslavist ideals in Russia

are not entirely dead, and occasionally have to be humoured; thus some assistance and encouragement is still occasionally given to the "rebels"—the Shipka demonstrations and the action of pro-Macedonian committees in Russia are instances of these cross-currents of Muscovite policy—but on the other hand, the weight of official Russian diplomacy is thrown in the balance against the Macedonian movement.

The Russian consuls and other agents in Macedonia have lately been exerting themselves in favour of the Servians and their claims, as being too weak to have any importance without Russian assistance, and therefore more amenable to the wishes of St Petersburg. The Tsar's representatives in Macedonia have apparently received the *mot d'ordre*, quite in the style of M. Gopchevich,¹ that the bulk of the inhabitants of that country are really Servians, although they do not realize it. At the same time their aggressive attitude towards the Turkish officials and soldiers can hardly be explained, except on the theory that it was part of their mission to provoke unpleasant incidents, though one cannot suppose that such tragic issues as the assassination of M. Stcherbina at Mitrovitza, and that of M. Rostkovski at Monastir were foreseen at St Petersburg.

All these different and sometimes contra-

¹ Author of *Makedonien und Alt-Serbien*, a book written to propagate the Great Servian theory.

dictory tendencies seem nevertheless to have had one main object in view, viz., to keep the sore open until Russia's policy has matured. The Austro-Russian agreement is another proof of this. Russia's ideal, of course, would be the intervention of Russia alone in the settlement of the Macedonian Question; but as this would arouse too many suspicions both in the Balkans and elsewhere, the joint intervention of Austria and Russia has to be accepted as a temporary alternative. For it has at any rate the advantage of giving rise to less jealousy, as the one Power may be assumed to act as a check on the ambitions of the other. But as a matter of fact, Austria-Hungary's internal dissensions, and the difficulties in which they have placed her army, are such that in the event of a partition she would have to be content with anything that Russia chose to give her. This would probably be Albania, of all the Balkan lands the one most difficult to conquer, and the one most likely to arouse Italian susceptibilities—unless indeed the recent meeting of Austrian and Italian Ministers at Abbazia has resulted in some mutual pact of "reinsurance" on this delicate point. In any case it is obvious that Russia and Austria are the two Powers most directly interested in the break-up of Turkey, and to leave the settlement of the Macedonian Question to them is to make them judges and parties in the same suit. Their policy in this case, unless strong pressure is brought to bear upon them, can hardly be other

than what it has been, *i.e.*, to present ineffective schemes of reform which will not reform anything, but will open the way for increasing their own influence and furthering their own schemes of ascendancy at some future and more convenient date.

The second Austro-Russian project, with its "Civil Assessors," is obviously designed with this object, and although it contains some provisions which would improve the conditions of Macedonia if they were meant to be executed, Russia and Austria have given but little proof that they wish to enforce it.

In the meantime Russian agents, avowed or secret, are swarming all over the Balkans to prepare public opinion for some further move. A certain M. Missirkoff, formerly Secretary to the Russian Consulate at Monastir, to quote one instance, is stated to have been recently on a lecturing tour through Servia and Bulgaria, denouncing the action of the komitadjis, and advising both the Servians and the Bulgarians to do everything to stop further insurrectionary movements in Macedonia; otherwise, he said, Bulgaria and Servia, as well as Macedonia, will be lost to the Slavonic cause for ever. He urged that the Slavs of the Balkans should place their destinies in the hands of the Tsar, and connect themselves as closely as possible with the Russian Empire, which alone could save them from being subjugated by the Germans. Colonel Bendereff, who was one

of the ringleaders in the kidnapping of Prince Alexander of Battenberg, was in Sofia a short time ago, and he told the Bulgarians with whom he came in contact that they were all fools if they really believed in the possibility of the existence of an independent Bulgaria. Russia and Austria had agreed to divide the Balkan Peninsula between them, and the Bulgarians could not prevent it. All they could do was to secure for themselves a small amount of self-government under Russian suzerainty, but even this they could only obtain if they accepted the inevitable with a good grace, recognized the Tsar as their master at once, and placed their army under his direct orders.

These, of course, are only small incidents, but they are the straws that serve to show which way the wind is blowing. There are, in fact, many signs that this is the real tendency of Russian policy in the Balkans, whereas there has as yet been nothing to show any earnest desire for reforms on the part of Russia. The existing state of chaos is far more likely to prepare the way for the realization of her ambitions. Even the wiping out of the whole of the Macedonian people would not be without its advantages from the Russian point of view, for it would permanently weaken the Bulgarian element which has proved so stubborn an obstacle to the Russification of the Balkan peninsula, just as the Armenian massacres went a long way towards destroying the only

Christian nationality which might ultimately have stood in the way of Russian ambitions in Asia Minor.

The last phase of the Near Eastern problem has to some extent aroused English public opinion from its former indifference. In dealing with this point it is well to remember the essential difference between the expressions, "English opinion" and "Russian opinion." The former signifies the ideas of a large section of the population, which no British Government can afford to ignore. When public opinion expresses itself strongly in any particular sense, the Government is bound sooner or later to shape its action in that sense. Russian opinion, on the other hand, means simply the views of a certain number of powerful Government officials in favour of a policy which they believe to be advantageous to Russia. Expressions of feeling on the part of the people have but little influence on the governing class, and are indeed hardly allowed to manifest themselves at all, unless the Government wishes to make use of them for its own purposes. Occasionally a great wave of national sentiment, sprung out of traditions fostered for generations by the Government, carries even the autocracy with it, as in 1877, when the Tsar Alexander II. felt himself powerless to resist the popular cry for war against Turkey. But these are rare exceptions which only prove the rule, and during the later phases of the Near Eastern Question such public opinion as exists

in Russia has been kept under rigid restraint. The British Government has been, for a variety of causes which have been already indicated, reluctant to step once more into the foreground of Balkan politics. But the daily tales of horror which reached England from Macedonia last autumn made a deep and widespread impression. The altered tone of many of the more important newspapers, which have urged the necessity of enforcing genuine remedial measures in Macedonia, was symptomatic of the general change of feeling in the country.

The British Government have adopted a mean term. Lord Lansdowne agreed to leave the initiative of Macedonian reform to Austria and Russia, but he has brought constant pressure to bear on them in favour of certain modifications to their scheme and of greater energy in its execution. Originally he had suggested two alternative schemes, viz., the appointment of a European Governor for Macedonia, or the maintenance of a Turkish Governor, but assisted by civil assessors.¹ The two Powers in question naturally chose the second alternative, and Hussein Hilmi Pasha still remains Inspector-General of Reforms, assisted by a Russian and an Austrian *adlatus*. It is difficult to discover what assistance they have so far rendered. The one feature of the scheme which promises any substantial results

¹ See Dispatch of September 29th, 1903, in the Blue Book "Turkey, No. 3, 1903."

is the appointment of European officers to organize the gendarmerie. Last year the British Government vainly urged upon the other Powers the expediency of sending military *attachés* to accompany the Turkish forces in Macedonia. Their presence would at least have done something to restrain the ferocity of Turkish repressive measures. But Russia and Austria objected, on the plea that they would not be sufficiently numerous to effect any useful purpose. Yet these same Powers have allowed the Porte to whittle down the numbers and the authority of the proposed gendarmerie officers, and if after months of futile wrangling at Constantinople, they have at last started on their work, it is mainly due to the persistent efforts of the British Ambassador. But in these circumstances one must be very sanguine indeed to believe that the Mürzsteg programme will really prove a panacea for the troubles of the Balkan peninsula.

Should the second Austro-Russian scheme fail like the first, the British Government have reserved for themselves their full liberty of action, and there can be very little doubt that they would have the support of the country in taking the initiative of fresh and far more drastic proposals than those which Continental diplomacy has hitherto favoured. The responsibilities imposed upon Great Britain, not only by the administration which brought about the Berlin Treaty, but also by the administration which two years later

reversed its predecessor's policy, and defeated some of its most salutary results without providing any permanent remedy for its defects, are beginning to be realized alike by Conservatives and Liberals. Most Englishmen recognize now, that in taking up the cause of the Christians of Turkey, they need not be afraid of playing into the hands of Russia or of any other Power.

Sir William White, when he was engaged in pleading the cause of Bulgaria against Russia and her then allies, Austria and Germany, in 1885, at Constantinople, wrote as follows to his friend and colleague Sir Robert Morier, H.M.'s Ambassador at St Petersburg :—

“As for the line we have adopted, I am sure you must approve of it. The future European Turkey—to Adrianople, at any rate—must sooner or later belong to Christian races. There is no example in history, since the siege of Vienna two centuries ago, of the Turk's having regained any inch of soil that he has once yielded to native races. Is Eastern Rumelia to constitute an exception to this rule? We have always been accused by Russia and her agents in the East of being the chief obstacles to the emancipation of Christian races in European Turkey. The reasons for a particular line of policy on our part have fortunately ceased to exist, and we are free to act impartially, and to take up gradually, with proper restraints, the line which made Palmerston famous in regard to Belgium, Italy, etc. The Russians have made sacrifices to liberate Greece, Servia, and the Principalities. But they have lost all their influence in Greece, Servia, and

Rumania. Montenegro alone has remained faithful and grateful. They are now about to lose the Bulgarians. . . . These newly emancipated races want to breathe free air and not through Russian nostrils. . . .

“I feel, of course, that all these things may have a *contrecoup* in Asia, but we cannot shape our course in Europe by purely Asiatic considerations. Of course, our great interests are there; but we still have a European position, and even European interests.”

If this conviction could be brought home to every one in this country, a great step would have been taken towards a sound comprehension of the problem. Its solution cannot rest with England alone; but it is her bounden duty to leave no stone unturned in trying to carry the other Powers with her in promoting its solution on such lines as shall secure within practicable limits the cause of freedom and enduring peace in the Balkans.

CHAPTER IX

THE ATTITUDE OF FRANCE

BY VICTOR BÉRARD

Chroniqueur of the Revue de Paris

FRENCH policy in the Macedonian Question has not always followed a uniform and consistent line. Whatever our detractors may say, no one can deny that on many occasions French influence in various parts of the world has been highly beneficial to peoples struggling for liberty against oppression. France has instilled the spirit of freedom in many lands ground down by tyranny, and has again and again taken an active part in their liberation. If the people of France were to realize the actual situation in Macedonia, and to attempt to put an end to Turkish misgovernment in that unfortunate country, they would only be acting in conformity with their best and most glorious traditions. But intervention in Macedonia is for us not merely a sentimental duty ; it is, in my opinion, an act of political necessity, to avert dangers both to the peace of the world in general and to our own interests in particular.

We have, in dealing with Eastern affairs in past times, more than once acted as the supporters

of Turkish misrule, from fear lest other rival nations should step in and upset the balance of power by annexing some portion of the Turkish Empire. If we must plead guilty to this charge, we are not the only offenders in this respect. At the time of the Armenian atrocities, to go no further back, the fear of a general European war made the Government of France, together with the whole Concert of Europe, the accomplice of Abdul Hamid's crimes. It seemed as though European diplomacy were passing through a "crisis of intelligence." This crisis is repeating itself with regard to Macedonia to-day. The Armenian precedent has created a delusion. Diplomats flatter themselves once more that they can put the evil to sleep and hold the patient once more under the knife of the operator. But they are deceiving themselves. Circumstances have undergone a great change within the last six years. At that time the European Concert, *i.e.* the Governments of Europe, might, owing to the ignorance of the peoples, co-operate in the abominations of the Sultan. To-day the truth is beginning to be known. If the diplomats—above all, our French diplomats—have a true regard for our future; if they desire to maintain the alliances and understandings which they have created for us in Europe to the greatest benefit of peace and of our national interests, they must realize, and make our friends and allies realize, the consequences of such a policy. The

events of Armenia became known to us too late to diminish the esteem and the sympathy which we still feel for the Dual Alliance; but if the Russians really desire our friendship, they must not lead us back to the paths of massacre.

"Redoubtable eventualities," wrote our Ambassador at Constantinople in a recent dispatch, "are to be feared. I try to hope that even this time complications—which are so dangerous owing to the consequences which follow on every disturbance in the Balkan Peninsula—may yet be averted. But I cannot feel in this matter the optimism which I felt last year. The symptoms are grave. They render it my duty to call the attention of your Excellency to these provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which may yet be preparing many more surprises and embarrassments for Europe until the day of the final solution which shall decide their fate."

What then remains to be done? What line should France follow in her Near Eastern policy? The present is no time for archaic panaceas, for ideal remedies. We must seek out the true solution, the solution of the day, and this lies only in European control. Macedonia is not yet ripe for absolute independence, but she is ripe for European control. That is perhaps not the definite solution, but it is for the present the only prompt and effective one.

It is interesting to note the constant changes in the policy of the various European Powers

towards the rebellious subjects of the Sultan. What is still more curious is that when any Power or group of Powers happens to be in a Turcophil mood, it not infrequently accuses us French of fomenting revolutionary agitation in the Sublime Ottoman dominions. At the time of the Greek War of Independence, Russia went back on her policy of 1770, which had sown the seeds of the revolution, and the Tsar Alexander declared that "the movement had its centre in France, that Ypsilanti would have gone to obtain his instructions in Paris, had he not wished to hasten the explosion so as to help the Italians, and that there remained only one common interest to all sovereigns—that of combating the revolutionary spirit." This is admirable language in the mouth of an autocrat who had made Ypsilanti his aide-de-camp, his friend, and his favourite, and who counted among his ministers Capo d'Istria, the future president of the Hellenic Government!

Foreign newspapers are once more taking up these same accusations against France and French intrigues. I know that one only gives to the rich. But before history, and in the face of the gratitude of the human race, when the time comes for measuring the work accomplished during the past century by our disciples and our imitators, we shall be sufficiently rich in glory not to want to deprive others of the share which is due to them. In Macedonia

we have been but the workers of the eleventh hour. Until quite recent years, France ignored the Macedonians. We regarded them as Thracians, Peonians, Slavonians, slaves for the slave-market, a savage and almost mythical people inhabiting a remote and unknown land. We were ignorant of them, or we knew of them only through the diatribes of the Greeks, both ancient and modern. We cannot therefore be justly accused of disturbing the peace of Europe by stirring up the "contented Macedonians" to revolt. The merit of arousing them is due in the first place to the atrocious misgovernment of the Turks; secondly, to the voluntary or involuntary action of Russia, and lastly to that of Austria and Germany. In the past our ignorance was shared by the rest of Europe. It was Russia who, partly for her own political ends and partly out of a feeling of race kinship, first declared that these Macedonians were human beings. Throughout the twenty-five years between the Crimean War and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, Russia, both officially and privately, worked to arouse these resigned and brutalized peasants. She supported the revolutionary movement and procured the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate, and eventually of the Bulgarian State, albeit the latter was reduced in size by the Berlin Treaty. But since 1878 her sympathy for the Macedonians has gradually been declining, and although she still aspires to eventual expansion

in the Balkans, she no longer pursues her policy by protecting the *rayahs* from persecution. Between 1878 and 1903 it is the influence of Austria that is to a great extent responsible for the revolutionary spirit in Macedonia, not only by means of her agents and consuls, but by the railways which she has built or promoted in the country, and the education which her universities and those of Germany have given to the youth of Macedonia and Bulgaria. When a people are given education and railways, it is hopeless to expect them to remain submissive under such a government as that of the Sultan. It is therefore obvious that Russia and Austria, in exciting the revolutionary spirit on the one hand, and in maintaining the country under Turkish rule on the other, have no other object than that of keeping the Macedonian sore open until such time as they are ready to intervene for their own ends. Will Europe be content to leave her rights and her interests in the safe-keeping of Austria and Russia? We know that those two Powers are very active and very energetic whenever it is a question of despoiling the Turk and of reducing a people to subjection; but when it is a question of reforming Turkey and of liberating persecuted peoples, Russia and Austria never do anything. Our diplomats tell us that those two Powers have "superior interests" in Macedonia, and that therefore they must have the mandate to reform that country.

Austria's "superior interest" seems to be to reduce the Macedonians to extremities and then intervene herself and extend her action from Sarajevo to Mitrovitza, and from Mitrovitza to Üsküb and Salonica. In what way are Russia's interests superior to those of France, England, and Italy? For the present she is too busy with Far Eastern affairs to be ready to act in Macedonia, so that she too wishes to keep things as they are until she can extend her influence throughout the Balkans.

We must therefore consider what is likely to be the effect of leaving Austria and Russia alone to deal with the Macedonian problem. For a time nothing at all will be done, and the unfortunate Macedonians will be left to suffer at the hands of the Turks. Then when the two "interested Powers" think that the moment for intervention has arrived, they will advance with the object of dividing the Balkan Peninsula between them. This would not only be contrary to the wishes of the natives themselves, who after all have a right to be consulted, but it would constitute a grave menace to the political interests of France and of the other Western Powers. France has long held a position of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, a position of moral, commercial, and political influence, which she could not renounce without a great loss of prestige and power. Now the partition of the Ottoman dominions and the Balkan States between Russia and Austria would mean the

end of that influence. It would mean the expansion to an unlimited extent of two great military monarchies at the expense primarily of the Balkan peoples, and eventually of all the liberal and progressive nations of Europe. The advance of Austria, be it remembered, will redound to the ultimate advantage of Germany. It is Germany who is pushing Austria towards the Ægean—the famous *Drang nach Osten* policy. Budapest is the meeting-point of the two great routes from Germany and the point of departure for the Balkans. From Budapest the road leads to Belgrade and Nish, where it divides into two branches, one for Sofia and Constantinople, the other for Salonica. The Austro-German route is clearly that to Salonica, as being the shortest, and also because it avoids Bulgaria, whose rulers, for her good fortune, are very different to those of Servia, and by no means wholly subordinate to German influences. It is for this reason that Germany would willingly loose the Ottoman armies on the Principality, as she did in the case of Greece in 1897. Germany regards herself as the destined heir of Austria when the day of the break-up of the Hapsburg monarchy shall come, and in every extension of Austrian influence we must see the hand of Germany.

Therefore we may expect to see at no very distant date an Austro-Russian partition of Macedonia, as a beginning of that larger partition. What then will the other Powers do? Either

they must acquiesce, and see their own influence and prestige gravely curtailed, or there will follow an unseemly scramble for the fragments of the Ottoman Empire, each Power trying to seize as large a slice as possible. The Russians will make for Constantinople, the Austrians for Salonica and Üsküb, the English for the Dardanelles, the French for Rhodes or Mitylene or Syria, the Italians for Albania, all co-operating for the ruin of their common interests. The outcome cannot be anything but a general European war of the most terrible kind. Thus will Europe be punished for having neglected her duty and violated her obligations.

I am convinced, moreover, that these immediate interests are nothing in comparison with a superior interest, which should, in my opinion, dominate all our policy. The English Radicals, who are utilitarians and base their policy on interest alone, declare that all progress of civilization is a net profit for British industry and trade. How much more easily this truth can be demonstrated if you transfer it to our own country! Artistic workers, producers of expensive wares and articles of luxury, we Frenchmen ought never to forget that our prosperity is bound up with the development and wealth of the whole human race. Whenever a land, near or far, under our flag or that of our neighbours, passes from misery to prosperity, from barbarism to civilization, from slavery to freedom, we should

rejoice: it is so much gained for our trade and benefit.

There remains but one line of policy for France. The various Balkan peoples are not yet sufficiently developed for any one of them to take charge of Macedonia and obtain the hegemony of the Peninsula. The maintenance of the Ottoman Empire in some shape is still a necessity; but its integrity is only possible by means of European control. Without it the continued existence of Turkey is not only an iniquity, it is a sheer impossibility. The Sultan's only idea of governing an unruly province is by massacre and pillage; but in Macedonia this method has failed utterly. That Macedonia can be pacified by means of European control the case of Crete should convince us. The Cretan Question was at least as difficult as the Macedonian Question. In Macedonia we hear much of religious and racial problems. In Crete it was the same thing. There were Musulmans and Christians, and of the Christians some were devoted to the Greek dynasty, some to autonomy, and some to their own personal interests, and between the different Christian parties there was as much rivalry and hatred as there is now between the Macedonian parties. Diplomats told us that the Cretan problem was insoluble, and that the Cretans must continue to be massacred by the Turks, because one could not bring the island out of

its hopeless condition without a European war. And yet the Cretan problem was solved. It was solved through the joint action of the three Liberal Powers—France, Italy, and England. That co-operation was far more difficult then than it is now; at that time there were on both sides of the Channel many virtuous people who said that England and France had been created by Providence for the purpose of detesting each other, while on both sides of the Alps there were also people who said that Italy and France could never be friends. But while the Governments and the newspapers were quarrelling, there were in Cretan waters three men who by their action—an action in which they forced the hands of their own Governments in the higher interests of their peoples and of humanity—cut the Gordian knot. These men were Admirals Pottier, Noel, and Canevaro. It is to them that the end of Turkish misrule in Crete is wholly due. What was achieved in Crete by the three Admirals should surely not be impossible in Macedonia to-day. On the contrary, now that an *entente cordiale* has been established between England, France, and Italy, the task should be far easier. The Macedonians themselves, we are told, have no faith in Austria and Russia, but trust only in the three Liberal Powers. Let that trust be justified. What better proof of the reality of the high *entente cordiale* could there be than the execution of a

plain duty towards humanity, which is also in accordance with the highest political interests of all concerned? If we really desire a substantial and lasting *entente cordiale*, it must above everything serve humanity; for the only friendships which outlast the expediency of a particular moment are those which are based upon honesty and peace.

CHAPTER X

THE POLICY OF ITALY

BY AN ITALIAN DEPUTY

RECENT news from the Balkans allows us to hope that serious troubles will not break out again immediately in Macedonia. Therefore the Turkish Government and the great Powers have more time to take the measures which are necessary in order to attenuate the principal causes of disaffection and troubles, which have the most dangerous counter-effect on the interests of Europe and on the international relations.

What is the position of Italy with regard to these problems ?

Italy has considerable interests of her own in the Ottoman Empire, both political and economic, to protect, and these interests, which coincide with the general interests of peace and the international balance of power, must inspire her policy.

Since the achievement, but a short time back, of her political independence and unity, she has seen the international struggle for the possession of the great trade markets of the world assume gigantic proportions, at a time when she herself

was still unprepared both materially and morally to take part in it. She then began to realize two contradictory necessities, manifesting themselves in two opposite tendencies, which, instead of moderating each other and co-operating towards one political end, have each alternately gained the upper hand, and have materialized themselves into two diverging currents of public opinion, the one prevailing in the North, the other in the South of the new State: they are exclusive of internal development and expansion.

In other words, on the one hand Italy must look after her own economic revival and internal reforms, while on the other she cannot afford to see herself excluded from all hope of expansion in the future, nor to fall into a trap, blocked at one end by a French Bizerta, and at the other by an Austrian Avlona, which would close the exits to the streams both of her emigrants and of her exports. To quote an instance connected with the object of this article, Italian trade in the Ottoman dominions, favoured by the equality of the existing customs tariffs, is in proportion expanding more rapidly than that of any other country; whereas if these provinces were to fall under the rule of protectionist Powers like Austria or Russia, and even perhaps of independent Balkan States, Italian trade would soon be driven from the Near Eastern markets, or at all events very greatly reduced. Italian policy should therefore be inspired by conservative tendencies, avoiding

all violent rearrangements of the map which would likely prove advantageous to more powerful States.

If we apply these theories to the Macedonian Question, the consequences are obvious. Italy has every interest in preventing the influence of Austria and Russia in Macedonia from extending and being gradually converted into a more or less effective condominium. It is therefore to her advantage that, at all events in theory, the suzerainty of the Porte should be maintained as long as possible. This policy, if we look beyond the immediate present, is favourable to the interests of the various nationalities of Macedonia, because if Austro-Russian control becomes really effective, it may give the Macedonians a better administration than that of the Porte; but it will constitute a danger for their national future, for the various national ideas, above all for the Bulgarian cause.

On the other hand, however, if the suzerainty of the Porte and the authority of the Sultan are, as I think, to be maintained in any form, it will be necessary to put an end to the abuses and misgovernment which are the chief, if not the only, cause of the constant disturbances in Macedonia. I shall not enter into the question of the exact shape which the reforms should take, as they are dealt with elsewhere in this volume, but there is no doubt that when once some real material improvement in the conditions of the Macedonians has been

introduced, time will help to heal the old sores. The reform of the gendarmerie and of the financial administration may be carried out by means of institutions nominally Turkish but of a European type, and with a European personnel, such, for instance, as the Ottoman Bank, the Public Debt Commission, and the Tobacco *Régie*, which are well managed and give satisfactory results.

From Italy's point of view, one of the most necessary reforms is the rearrangement of Macedonia as far as possible according to the division of nationalities. This country—by which I mean the three vilayets of Salonica, Monastir, and Kossovo—extends right into the heart of Albania, to within a few kilometres from the Adriatic. It is therefore of paramount importance for us that we should favour an equitable division between Albanians and Macedonians. So long as the fate of the Macedonians is intimately connected with that of a large section of the Albanians, Italy must do all in her power to limit Austro-Russian influence in Macedonia, and to strengthen the collective authorities of the six great Powers or the suzerainty of the Porte, according to circumstances. She should also do her utmost to prevent the agitation in Macedonia from extending to Albania, and oppose the active intervention of any single Power in the latter country, with the double object of simplifying the Macedonian Question by removing an extraneous and perturbing element, and of

ensuring the future of Albanians, who may constitute a potential bulwark both against Pan-slavism and Pangermanism. Italy must insist that from the vilayets of Kossovo and Monastir the purely Albanian districts shall be separated, and that a special *régime* shall be applied to Albania, suitable to its needs, and different from that which might seem the most opportune for Macedonia itself, the conditions of which are so utterly different. In the reorganization of Albania, which should remain, at all events for the present, under the suzerainty of the Porte, no other Power should be allowed to have exclusive influence. The chief defect of the first Austro-Russian reform scheme was that of having disregarded the necessity for the separation of Albania from Macedonia, and the serious disturbances in Old Serbia were the direct consequence of this oversight. In the second scheme a suggestion of this kind is made in somewhat vague language; a definite arrangement is necessary, and although there may be difficulties in the way, there are no insuperable obstacles.

These fundamental interests of Italy may not perhaps appear in harmony with the aspirations, at all events of the more extreme revolutionists, but she desires nevertheless to see their nationality preserved, and not absorbed by the influence of any of the great Powers. Her policy must be to act in harmony with those Powers who do not wish for radical alterations in the international

status of Macedonia, and are anxious to avoid anything which may furnish any Power with an excuse for a military occupation and eventual absorption of the provinces in question. This can only be ensured by applying a reasonable and satisfactory scheme of reforms, and seeing that it is effectively carried out. Those Powers which have no desire to annex any part of the Ottoman Empire for themselves, are unquestionably well fitted for this task, which is in accordance with the interests of European peace, of civilization, and also of the Ottoman Empire and its different nationalities of all religions.

CHAPTER XI

A SUGGESTED SCHEME OF REFORMS

By E. HILTON YOUNG

THE story of Macedonian reform as told in previous chapters may seem a mass of inextricable difficulties involved in a cloud of obscurity. To try even to present any fresh suggestions for the solution of a question, which so many experienced diplomatists and skilful politicians have already failed to solve, may well be thought rash. It would, in fact, be presumptuous to approach the subject in any confident spirit; but it would be futile to reiterate that something in general must be done without being prepared to suggest in addition some particular remedy. There should indeed be no discouragement in the fact that the past contains so many failures. Each may serve at least to eliminate one possibility of failure in the future.

All the efforts that have been made to give the Macedonians some security and prosperity in life combine to teach would-be reformers that there is no possibility of theorizing more than a single step in advance of actual and present fact. Something might have been gained had others learnt

this as thoroughly as the Turk has, who from time to time has skilfully countered his reformers by casting their modest schemes into the shade with brilliant programmes of Parliaments and Parish Councils and School Boards. Such strange exotics could never thrive in the inhospitable soil of Macedonia, but have perished, as the Turk foresaw, without an effort to take root.

The actual facts of the present situation are, however, hard to ascertain. Externally racial and ecclesiastical propagandists obscure the issues on every side, concealing what is material, exaggerating what is immaterial, and painting for themselves and the world in general imaginary pictures of what they wish to be. Internally the great forces of inactivity, waiting for a time when action may be more completely under their control, add to the obscurity with desert mirages of reform. But in the light of experience it is perhaps possible to grasp the essential facts of the situation, to select between the various measures of reform which have been proposed, and aided by the record of the past and the opinions of experienced men to indicate which of them would, and which would not, be effective guarantees of good government.

A year ago, while events were still under control, a small dose of the antidote to the poison at work in Macedonia would have been sufficient. For want of this the malady is now almost out of control, and is running its course to

an inevitable crisis, with all its manifold risks of European complications.

There are two policies now before Europe: one a last effort at reform, the other a first attempt at reconstruction. By reform we may understand such provisional patching up of the present *régime* as can be effected immediately by ordinary diplomatic means; while by reconstruction is implied the best possible permanent settlement, requiring the intervention of some extraordinary international authority, such as a Conference of the Powers.

The chapter of reform is nearly closed, and may be so altogether by the time these words reach the reader. It is time, indeed, that it should end, before its well-intentioned or well-calculated futilities have involved Europe in some of the misery which they have long entailed upon Macedonia.

There is, indeed, nothing more striking in the annals of Macedonian reform than the witless or wilful neglect to profit by the experience of previous failure. Great as has been the improvement during the past century in the moral tone of the profession which has charge of the political welfare of Europe, its realization of public responsibility is still inferior to that, for instance, of the profession which has charge of the public health. What would be thought of a sanitary authority which consented out of opportunism to conceal the real condition

of a plague-spot as dangerous to the public health as Macedonia has been for the last ten years to the public peace? or which, to avoid trouble and allay anxiety, ostentatiously applied preventative measures repeatedly proved to be quackeries?

The recent history of the Ottoman State has been one of centralization—a centralization of all political power in the Palace, by material means, such as telegraphs, railways, rifles, and *règlements*, without any moral return of efficient administration, or even of material prosperity. Soon after the introduction of the new centralized *régime* in the twenties, the Government realized the bad results in the provinces of the suppression of the feudal system and the unrestrained depredations of Stambuli officials and tax-farmers. Such measures as the granting of tax-farms for life were tried, in the hope of creating a local authority interested in the prosperity of the provinces; but these, of course, did not survive the first financial pressure. Since the disappearance of feudal Derrebeys the provinces have known no authority more humane than that of the professional official bent on extorting as much as possible in as short a time as possible. Centralization reached its fullest legislative expression in the 'sixties; its subsequent exaggerated developments have been mostly administrative.

The 'sixties were an epoch of foreign, and especially French, ascendancy. The reformers at

the Porte may be excused for thinking that political salvation lay in the introduction of foreign codes, just as prosperity seemed to revive under the influx of foreign capital. Thus it came about that Midhat the reformer was allowed to experiment in the application to his vilayet of the Danube of the French departmental administration. This system shows its origin in an empire based on a revolution by its delicate counterpoise of popular representative institutions against a highly centralized executive. The substitution of such elaborate political machinery for the simple personal government of a Pasha under the Padishah was doubly dangerous; but the possibility that the provinces would be disintegrated by the democratic element was more obvious than that they would be devitalized by over-centralization. The Porte pursued its policy of reform to its *reductio ab absurdum* in the Constitution of 1877; but since 1880 the Palace has been in power with a policy of reaction, which has led to the practical suppression of all privileges, legal or customary, providing for provincial participation in the government. The authority of the Porte has become centralized in the Palace. It has become merely a circumlocution office; a Mr Jorkins to be consulted at length whenever it is difficult to say no; an *evet effendi* to be quoted whenever it is particularly iniquitous to say yes. Under these conditions the fate of the delicate

mechanism of French provincial institutions as embodied in the "Laws of the Vilayets" of 1867, 1868, and 1871 has been much that of the thirty-knot destroyers recently ordered from Italy. These products of civilization on their arrival were met by Palace emissaries sent to remove the screws to safe keeping at Yildiz, and the warships have since provided a convenient resort for the gulls and cormorants of the Golden Horn. In the same manner the motor of the French system, the local council, has been suppressed; and the mechanism has become mere machinery, either useless or perverted to base uses. In 1880 Sir Henry Drummond Wolff described the Laws of the Vilayets, as "a disastrous experiment": and Lord E. Fitzmaurice, the British representative on the Reform Commission, writes: "They have done much to ruin the country by spreading a complicated and highly centralized system of government over a land already impoverished by officials."

A system of provincial administration in Rumelia should have provided (1) protection of the Christian against the Musulman, without giving the Christian majority of two to one the means of obtaining ascendancy; (2) protection of the peasantry in general against the officials, without unduly weakening the executive or reducing the revenues; (3) protection of the province against the metropolis, without injuring the prestige of the Empire. These three require-

ments, so admirably observed, *mutatis mutandis*, in our administration of India, are not secured to the Rumelian vilayets by the present law; though ample provision has no doubt been made for the enforcement of the restrictions.

Thus, by the letter of the law, protection is provided for Christian against Musulman by local councils with advisory powers. The small proportion of elective members they contain is divided equally between the two faiths, but the inclusion of numerous officials as *ex-officio* members secures an overwhelming majority to Islam. The more important of the councils are extinct, and the powers of the smaller are seriously curtailed. The law provides, for instance, that each village shall elect its own *bekji* (field-guard); as applied, however, in many places, only landowners, who are mostly Musulmans, are allowed to vote.

The peasantry in general, and the Christians in particular, require protection against excessive and abusive taxation and official corruption. Even with the meagre powers assigned to them the councils might by now have developed into a power for reform, or at least into a check on abuse. But the forces of centralization were too strong, and from the extinct Parliament down to the still active commune, the greater the nominal importance of a council the less is its real importance. The Parliament met once; the General Councils of the vilayets met a few

times. The Sanjak Council, of which only about one-third of the members are elective, is still working, but is quite uninfluential. The same applies to the Kaza and Nahie Councils. In view of the insignificance of the representation, the precautions of the electoral system are excessive. The electors of a kaza choose double the number of candidates required; the Mutessarif then nominates half of them to the Kaza Council. The Kaza Councillors submit a similar list to the Vali, who nominates half of it Sanjak Councillors. They repeat the process, and the Vali nominates the General Councillors, subject to sanction by the Porte. Municipal Councils, which have a much more ancient origin, have a more rational system of election, but they have also been reduced to impotence, and their authority assumed by the president, a Government nominee.

Two institutions retain some little importance, the Administrative Council, to which the spiritual heads of the religious communities are admitted,¹ and the commune. It is to be noticed that the origin of both these institutions is social, and based on the division of Ottoman society into

¹ The Administrative Council, in spite of its modern name, is in truth the old provincial *divan* of the Islamic régime. Its composition and powers are still practically the same. The *Kodja-bachi* representing the bishops or rabbi had the right to sit in it. Savas Pasha says of this office: "On le considérait comme le *Tribunus Christianorum*" (*Tribunal Musulman*, p. 46). This is still practically the only representation enjoyed by non-Musulmans.

religious communities, and not political, or based on equal civil rights for all. Their existence is due to the same principle that led the Porte in 1870 and 1890 to concede to the Bulgars privileges as a separate religious community, while refusing them rights which they would share equally with their Musulman fellow-subjects. They provide political evidence of a fact to which there is abundant practical testimony, that the statute law, with its French ideas of civil equality, has never really replaced the Islamic law; and that the government of Rumelia remains Oriental in character, a government of communities by an individual, and is not, as it might appear to be, a government of individuals by the community.

This feature of the situation, of fundamental importance in considering future reform, becomes still more clear when the relations of the province to the central Government are examined. In this relation the laws of the vilayets are merely a screen for the unregulated and unlimited authority of the Palace over the entire administrative and fiscal system of the provinces. The abuse of this authority by the Sultan and his satellites has ruined the provinces morally and materially, not only by direct exhaustion, but by rendering all economy and even system impossible. The Vali is the proper delegate of Imperial authority, and he should legally be responsible for the government of the province.

But under the law as now applied his powers are chiefly supervisory. His subordinates have for the most part independent positions, and uncontrolled relations with the central Government.

This is the case in the important departments of police, justice, and finance. The police are under his orders, but the officers hold their posts by Iradé of the Sultan, and are responsible to the War Minister. The law provides that "in situations compromising public safety" the Vali may do nothing without orders from Constantinople.¹ He cannot spend a *para* without permission, and the provincial treasury department is independent of him, and subordinated to the Ministry of Finance. On the other hand, he is responsible for raising the revenues required for the annual budget of the province, and for the fluctuating but never-ceasing drain of drafts on the provincial treasury issued by the Palace, the Tophané Commission, the Finance Ministry, and other central authorities. The total of these drafts generally exceeds the surplus available after payment of provincial salaries and expenditure, and sometimes even the total gross revenues. This ruinous proceeding is nominally illegal. The last Iradé prohibiting it was obtained by the ex-Grand Vizier

¹ Article 14 of the Law on the Administration of the Vilayets, which gave the Vali discretionary powers over the troops in emergencies, was repealed by Iradé in 1886, requiring the military authorities to refer his request to the Central Government. The Inspector-General of Macedonia (Hilmi Pasha) now nominally has this power.

Said Pasha, some fifteen years ago. But it is the Sultan himself who has always been and is still the worst offender.

The law, therefore, cannot be said to be satisfactory; but it is not the object of the argument to show that reform should take the shape of new administrative enactments. *Quid leges sine moribus vanæ proficiunt?* There are already too many of them. *Corruptissima republica plurimæ leges.*

Reform, as distinct from reconstruction, requires no elaborate legislation. M. Steeg, the able French Consul-General at Salonica, sums it up in two lines: (1) effective realization of the powers conferred on the Valis by the Laws of the Vilayets;¹ (2) the establishment of a system of finance based on complete separation of the provincial budget from the central financial authority.

¹ Mr Goschen wrote in 1880 (*Turkey*, No. 680, p. 18):—

“No effectual reforms are possible if the position of the Governor-General is not radically changed. . . . Unless the power and responsibility which is absolutely indispensable to a proper discharge of the duties of Governors-General is clearly defined, as also the guarantees which will relieve them from the apprehension of constant dismissal, no opinion can be formed of the efficacy of the reforms. It is clear that the Governors-General should have some clear understanding as to the period during which they will hold office, and must be set free from the constant interference with the minutest details of their administration which has hitherto paralysed their action.”

And Sir Henry Layard in the same year (*Turkey*, No. 780, p. 7):—

“There is a general conviction that the only measures that can save Turkey are . . . the extension of the powers of the Valis.”

The next question is, why has not some measure of decentralization in the direction of local autonomy been tried by foreign reformers? for that it could only come from outside is sufficiently obvious.

In 1876 a Conference met at Constantinople to try to save the peace of Europe by mediating between the Turk and the rebellious *rayah*. It failed in its object, but the reform scheme it suggested was better than any of the series that was to follow. It is a fact to be noted, as not altogether unconnected with the declining influence of Great Britain in Turkish affairs, that schemes of Rumelian reform have steadily deteriorated with every renewal.

By the scheme of 1876 each vilayet of Rumelia was to be placed under a Christian Vali appointed by the Powers. The vilayets were to be divided into sanjaks and nahies, in charge respectively of governors appointed by the Vali, and mayors each elected by his nahie. In each nahie there was to be an Administrative Council of members, elected one by each village, and these councils were to elect a Provincial Assembly to have control over financial matters. The Provincial Assembly was to elect ten of its members as an Administrative Commission to assist the Vali. A sum not exceeding 30 per cent. of the revenues of the province was to be paid to the Ottoman Bank, to be devoted to payment of the Ottoman Public Debt, and the remainder of

the revenues was to be retained for provincial needs. Tax-farming was to be prohibited. The Turkish troops were to be concentrated in garrison towns, and the gendarmerie was to be recruited from Musulmans and the various Christian sects, in proportion to the numbers of each religion. In order to enforce these measures, an International Commission was to be appointed for a year to watch over their execution, assisted by a special gendarmerie recruited from the armies of Europe. These comprehensive and admirable proposals were swept out of sight by the Russo-Turkish War, and found only a faint echo in the notorious 23rd Article of the Treaty of Berlin.

In 1880 the Commission, on which we were ably represented by Lord E. Fitzmaurice, met at Constantinople to carry out the provisions of the Berlin Treaty relative to Rumelian reform. Their objects were stated to be "to establish a greater administrative decentralization without damaging the power or the unity of the Turkish Empire," and "to prevent the entire absorption of the provincial revenues by the State." Their procedure was unfortunately not so sound as their programme. The elaborate scheme they recommended took the form of a codification of the Law of the Vilayets with modern improvements, and a special arrangement for Albania. The scheme followed the Laws of the Vilayets as to the organization of provincial administration

and the appointment of important officials by the Sultan. The new features were a General Legislative Council containing a majority of representative members nominated by the Nahie Councils and elected by the Kaza Councils, two from each kaza. This was to have wide legislative powers, subject only to the Sultan's veto. It was also proposed to strengthen the representative element on the various councils by allowing the electors to make a direct choice of their representatives, instead of compelling them to submit a list to the officials for their selection. Local expenses were to be satisfied first out of the local revenues; 15 per cent. of the surplus was to be employed for works of general local benefit, and the remainder was to go to the Imperial Treasury. The gendarmerie was to be subordinated to the joint authority of the Vali and the War Minister, and to be recruited from Musulmans and non-Musulmans in proportion to the population. The rural guards were to be under the control of the nahie authorities, and to be recruited by them.

These measures provided considerable rights of popular local government, almost more than was altogether safe, but did not guarantee them by any provisions for decentralization. Consequently, had they been forced on the Sultan, they would never have been realized; and so far as Macedonians themselves were concerned they seem to have aroused no enthusiasm. Of late

these democratic provisions have provided the Bulgar Committees with a convenient text-book for their scheme of autonomy, first published in 1896; the Bulgar being the most numerous element, popular government by the majority naturally has attractions of a not exclusively liberal character.

The scheme was dropped, but no one at the time seems to have cared. The reforming Powers, England and France, being at the time occupied in trying to save some of the money they had put on the wrong horse, neglected to press the matter. By 1885, Macedonia had again settled down under uncontrolled and unreformed Ottoman rule as re-established by the Treaty of Berlin. That settlement was then generally considered as durable if not definitive, and Europe, weary of ten years of Eastern crises, was disposed to leave the Empire to work out its own salvation. For Bulgaria, occupied with digesting Eastern Rumelia, and disengaging herself from Russia, good relations with Turkey were indispensable. Greece had obtained in Thessaly a rational frontier, and her demands for more were being severely snubbed by the Powers: Russia, disgusted at Bulgaria's "ingratitude," had dropped the Panslavist propaganda: England had salved her conscience by the elaboration of Rumelian reforms: and Austria had her hands full of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The internal condition of the province was so tranquil, that even

some public works were attempted. Brigandage had been brought within bounds, and the propaganda confined to educational activity. During the troubles of 1875-85 the Bulgar peasantry had to a large extent sought refuge from persecution by professing Hellenism, and consequently the parties of Slav and Hellene were still fairly evenly balanced.¹ During this decade the Turkish Government seems to have had a fair field and a free hand for the vindication and consolidation of its rule, and yet it is during this decade that the only spontaneous and practical Ottoman reform was crushed by centralization. ✓ *supra*

About 1887, brigandage, which had been kept down in Monastir by Ahmed Eyub with the help of martial law, under the milder *régime* of Rifaat began to gather head again. Determined to put it down, the latter, instead of reviving martial law, simply replaced the professional *bekjis*, or rural guards, by a rural militia recruited among the villagers; that is to say, he deprived the Musulmans of their monopoly in weapons, and allowed a certain number of Christian

¹ "Supposing that Macedonian Bulgars were to-day called on to declare their Bulgarism, it is a humiliating admission, but it must be confessed, that the greater part have as yet no national consciousness, and that if Macedonia were now to choose a nationality the majority would be lost to us. The rural districts are Bulgar, but they follow the towns, and these, except in the north, are Hellene."—*Exposé de l'état présent du Bulgarisme dans la Macédoine*. Publié à Philippopolis, 1885. Traduction grecque de Koumariamios.

villagers to carry arms in their own defence and in the interests of public order. The effect of the innovation was immediate in the districts where it was applied, and in a few months the peasantry there were relieved of the burden of some 2000 *bekjis* and 1000 brigands. Such effective support of law and order argues a peaceably disposed population, hostile only to those who gravely injure its material interests. Moreover, the measure had obviously made peace both in the external and internal political situations, neither of which offered anything to arouse the fears or fanaticism of the Musulman minority. But that minority saw only the moral dangers of any access of power to the Christians, or the material disadvantages of a loss of their own valuable prerogatives. The fanatical felt humiliated; the fearful considered their safety compromised; the brigand was menaced with dishonouring death, and the Bey and his rural guard with an honest livelihood. Though the reform was of Turkish origin, and admitted by leading Musulmans to be beneficial, these influences were sufficient to secure its condemnation by local Musulman public opinion, and at the Palace. Rifaat was recalled in 1890.

Some space has been devoted to this small measure of Ottoman reform and the circumstances in which it failed, because it proves the essential subjection of the Christian to the Musulman, and the impossibility of any practical

measure of reform ever coming from a Turkish source.

By 1890 the respite given to Turkey was fast running out. A semi-educated class issuing from the Bulgar propagandist schools, which between 1885 and 1890 had trebled in number, found no prospect of making a livelihood in the social and political bondage imposed on the province; accordingly the propaganda, hitherto educational, assumed a political character. Active agitation began with the abortive inroads of bands in 1895. The raids failed, being conducted by inexperienced students, and meeting with little or no encouragement from the peasantry. The central Government were, however, seriously alarmed, and the Bulgar peasantry began again to feel the heavy weight of the Government's displeasure, added to their other burdens. The judicial and administrative persecution which followed the raids of 1895 was, as is usual in Turkey, accompanied by paper reforms.

The reform scheme of 1896, drawn up for application in Anatolia, under pressure of Great Britain in consequence of the Armenian massacres, was extended to Rumelia. This was done in fulfilment of a principle of Turkish policy never to provide a basis for subsequent decentralization by assigning special privileges, however unimportant, to a locality, however vague. The basis of this scheme was not decentralization as in 1877, nor

even democratization as in 1880, but the admission of a certain proportion of Christians to employment as Government officials.

As to this principle, the pseudonymous author of *Turkey in Europe*, whose means of forming an opinion are generally supposed to have been exceptional, writes: "It is often asserted that the only effective protection to Christians lies in the appointment of as many as possible. This would no doubt be true if it were possible to choose the functionaries and to give them sufficient authority to secure their independence; but this the Muhamedans always succeed in preventing." In fact, if we gauge this scheme against the three postulates of reform already laid down, we find it is reforming from the wrong end, by attempting to provide protection for Christians against Musulmans before providing protection for the province against the capital. It contained, therefore, no true basis for reform. We have to go back to the scheme of 1876 to find the first essential of a decentralization sufficient to protect the province against the capital, and thus providing a stable basis for reforms which would ensure the other two species of protection.

Bearing this well in mind, there will be no danger of being imposed on by the verborities of subsequent paper reforms. Poor reading as it is, some space must nevertheless be devoted to indicating their less insignificant clauses and their more important failings. Thus in the

scheme of 1896 was revived the obsolete arrangement that the Vali was to have a Christian assistant (*muavin*). Of this institution "Odysseus" writes :—

"Extraordinary ingenuity was shown in depriving these 'appointments' of all importance. The Christian appointed was never of the same race or sect as the population of the province . . . as long as the Vali was at his post the deputy was not allowed to do anything. . . . If the Vali went away he was replaced not by the deputy but by the official next highest in rank . . . which needless to say the Christian never was."¹

M. Bérard, another authority on Macedonia, describes the position of the Christian *muavins* thus :—

"Sans prérogatives certaines, sans pouvoirs définis ils ne furent que des témoins aveugles et passifs auxquels on ne soumit aucune affaire. À Monastir, dans le Konak du Gouverneur, le bureau du Mouavin Chrétien fut installé à la porte des lieux d'aisance."²

Another revival of the same character was the enrolment of a fixed number of Christians in the gendarmerie. This is also an old story. In 1876, Christian gendarmes were to be employed in proportion to the total Christian population, in 1880 in proportion to that of the vilayet;

¹ *Turkey in Europe*, p. 159.

² *La Macédoine*, p. 229.

the proportion was now reduced to 10 per cent., and was recently, in February 1903, raised to 20 per cent., to be replaced in the latest scheme by the wording of 1876. As a matter of fact, the number of those employed has always been insignificant, and the quality still more unsatisfactory. It would not be fair to say that no attempt was made to provide the peasant protection against the official; the institution of judicial inspectorships was revived for the purpose. The results attained are thus indicated by M. Bérard: "Des inspecteurs parurent et tinrent de grands jours à tous les chef—lieux de vilayet et de préfecture; tous les rayahs qui vinrent déposer contre les fonctionnaires furent emprisonnés."

The period from 1895 to 1900 was one in which the agitation originating among the proletariat of the schools was developing into a peasant rising. The dangers of the situation increased yearly, but so far from drawing a warning from the regularly recurring trouble in the spring, the authorities came to consider a state of semi-suppressed guerilla in the summer, and of semi-starvation in the winter, the normal condition of the Macedonian *status quo*. Intervention was not suggested, and the more imminent the crisis became, the more incapable were the Turks of any spontaneous concession.

The Turkish reform scheme of December 1902 was not the result of intervention, but it

was an anticipation of it. The only clause of any importance was that appointing a Musulman Inspector-General of Rumelia, which was adopted into the Austro-Russian scheme of February, 1903.

It had by this time been so generally recognized that decentralization was the only real reform, that although the two Powers charged by Europe to effect some reform did not for reasons of their own intend to admit any efficient measure, something had to be produced which would have the semblance of decentralization to those who did not look too closely. The way in which this was done was ingenious.

The system of Ottoman provincial government seems to consist, roughly speaking, of three constituent parts: the regular civil servant, the direct delegate of the central authority, who is usually an inspector of some kind, and the spy. Of the three, though all are necessary to centralized authority, the inspector is perhaps the most indispensable. Whenever corruption or incompetence causes a local crisis, he is despatched with sufficient powers to tide over the difficulty. Such powers are of course purely personal and provisional, and have no political importance.¹ In adopting the Inspector-General as the leading

¹ Prominent examples of such missions are that of Server Pasha, Imperial Commissioner to the Herzegovina in 1875; Abeddin Pasha, to Armenia in 1880; Shakir Pasha, Inspector-General in Armenia in 1895.

feature of their reforms, it is much to be feared that the two Powers hoped that this emissary of centralized authority would pass muster as the executive official of some local power independent of the Palace. Colour was given to this fallacy by such clauses as those securing his appointment for three years, giving him the power to move troops, enjoining obedience to his orders on the Valis, etc. The Inspector-General nevertheless remains a mere delegate of the Sultan, and has consistently shown that he realizes himself to be nothing more.

The financial decentralization claimed above as especially essential was also provided for in an equally specious manner by the scheme of the two Powers. Each vilayet was to have a separate annual budget; a provision which had appeared already in the Law of the Vilayets (Art. 10) and ever popular with the Central Government, for it is one of the means by which it learns how far the province can be bled. Provincial expenditure was to be a first charge on provincial revenues; that also was already the law; the only difficulty was in securing its execution. The scheme meets this by providing that the revenues shall be paid into provincial branches of the Ottoman Bank—a provision made long ago by the Bank Charter of 1875. The method by which these safeguards have been nullified by the exchequer drafts (*havale*) of the central Government has already been

indicated, and is in no way touched by these "reforms."

The terrible events of 1903, and the renewal of interest in the question evinced in England and expressed by the Foreign Office, produced a fresh crop of similar provisions, known as the Mürzsteg programme. It had become evident that not only was a measure of decentralization necessary, but that some European guarantee for its execution was indispensable. The two Powers accordingly provided a foreign control as ineffective as their scheme of decentralization. Foreign control is to be effected by two means. These are, in the first place, two "assessors," who are in fact nothing but Consuls accredited to the Inspector-General instead of to a Vali. They are to advise him and report to their Embassies like consuls, and, as in the case of consuls, if their advice is not followed, their Embassy may complain to the Porte. They have no administrative powers, and their interests are those of their respective Governments. In the second place, foreign control is to be exercised through the local gendarmerie. Here again it is evident that the authors of the programme merely meant to provide foreign inspectors and reorganizers, while conveying the idea that the gendarmerie was to be under effective foreign control. Precedents are not wanting as to the small value of the presence of foreign gendarmerie officers without executive functions or security against the

intrigues of the Palace. Such a task was fruitless when undertaken by England in 1880,¹ and though the mere presence of foreigners may have a restraining effect during the coming troubles, their influence over the gendarmerie itself will very probably be extremely limited. Had they been put in actual command, at all events one department would have been decentralized, and could it have been made to work thus isolated, would have formed a valuable starting-point for future measures. But the old devices for countering such reforms have succeeded once more. The Sultan has secured that the functions of the foreign officers shall be advisory, not executive.

Such are the reforms of the Dual Control; their application is limited to three years, and they are at most palliatives. They fail of their object both for want of an effective guarantee of their execution, as did the schemes of 1876, 1880, and 1896, and also for want of sufficient decentralization. Yet other provinces of the Empire have

¹ "They (the reforms accepted by the Sultan) include a gendarmerie organized by European officers, the appointment of Europeans as financial and judicial inspectors in the provinces of the Valis for five years. Not one of them has been loyally put into execution, and the obligations entered into by the Sultan have been systematically evaded. The English officers brought out to reorganize the gendarmerie have been treated with the most marked discourtesy and neglect. Only three have been employed, and every difficulty has been thrown in their way. . . ."—Sir H. Layard, April 27th, 1880.

been more fortunate, and have been rendered prosperous by successful foreign intervention, successful because it included both essentials.

After the Greek War of Independence Samos was restored to the Ottoman Empire, but fortunately the necessity was realized of securing for it a government guaranteed by the Powers. An international Act to this effect was signed in 1832, providing very shortly for complete autonomy under a Prince-Governor nominated by the Sultan. This Prince is practically the only link between the Empire and the island, which has a separate flag and customs *régime* and pays a fixed annual tribute. Turkish troops were excluded by the Statute, but since disturbances in the 'sixties a small garrison has been stationed at Vathy. The curious feature of the matter is that, short as the Statute is, not only does the greater part seem to have been modified by amicable arrangement between the Sultan and the islanders, but that in 1852 a Constitution of a democratic character was obtained in the same way, and modified in 1900 in a still more democratic sense. But it is perfectly explicable that the Sultan should be as good as a suzerain as he is bad as a sovereign. The institutions which have this very instructive origin consist of a Council of four representatives, elected for two years by an Assembly of delegates. There appears to have been frequent friction between the Princes and the islanders, in which the Sultan has inter-

vened generally in favour of the latter. The system, which gives ample scope for intrigue, appears on the whole to suit the Greek character better than our cast-iron administration of Cyprus.

In 1842, the ill-treatment of the Maronite Christians of the Lebanon occasioned a conference of the Ambassadors of the five Powers, who endeavoured to secure peace without, however, providing for any decentralization. No improvement was effected, and at length, in 1860, the massacre of 5000 Christians by the Druses caused joint action by the Powers. This took the form of the despatch of a French expedition of 6000 men, the summoning of a Conference, and the appointment of a Commission to study resettlement on the spot. The Commission submitted two alternative proposals, and finally the Ambassadors negotiated with the Porte the Statute of 1864. In this case, unlike that of Samos, it is the Governor and not a popular body that represents the decentralized local authority, with a foreign guarantee. This Governor is nominated by the Sultan, who has first "to come to an understanding" with the Ambassadors. This amounts practically to selection by the unanimous vote of the Ambassadors. The term of the Governor's appointment is five years. The only representative body is an Administrative Council with advisory powers which has control over the finances. Its twelve members are divided between the different races and religions

in proportion to their importance. The members are elected by the village Sheikhs, who also act as *juges de paix*. The judicature of the Lebanon affords almost as satisfactory evidence of the advantages of decentralization as the democratic institutions of Samos. Under the Statute an independent judicature was provided, but the first Governor, on his own responsibility, replaced this by the judicial institutions then being introduced into the Empire. The present state of the administration of justice in the Empire, in spite of subsequent reforms, is notorious; but the same institutions in the Lebanon have worked so well that no notice appears to have been taken of the arbitrary change of the Statute. This is not the only benefit conferred by the suzerain, for under the Statute the Empire has annually to make good a considerable deficit in the provincial budget, which seems, moreover, actually to be paid. This does not mean that the Lebanon is not prosperous; its condition is as satisfactory in every respect as that of Samos, although it includes races and factions which half a century ago were waging continual guerilla warfare on each other and the authorities.

Crete, after the occupation by Mehemet Ali and his Egyptian army in 1830, remained in continuous turmoil, insurrections breaking out in 1833, 1840, 1859, and 1866-68. Finally, in that year the Powers intervened and forced the Sultan to introduce certain reforms embodied in the

Organic Law for Crete of 1868. The supreme authority in the island was placed in the hands of a Muslim Vali, advised by a Muslim and a Christian Councillor. The organization of the Laws of the Vilayets was introduced with the concession that half the Kaimakams and Mutessarifs were to be Christians; but Vali, Councillors, Mutessarifs, and Kaimakams were all alike appointed by the Sultan. On the Administrative Councils the elective element of six members, three Musulmans, and three Christians, was about equalled by the official element. There was also a General Council of the island, composed of elected members, two from each Kaza, empowered to suggest works to promote the popular welfare, which the Sultan might authorize and pay for if he chose. Under this original scheme the taxes which the Sultan might demand were limited in nature, but not in amount. This scheme thus differed from those of Samos and the Lebanon in that separation from Constantinople was not effective. Without such effective separation, popular institutions and Christian officials were valueless, and disturbances continued. The Congress of Berlin tried as a further remedy a measure of financial separation, providing that the cost of the administration of the island should be a first charge on the local revenues, and that half only of the excess should be paid to the Imperial Treasury. Still, this was not enough, and more blood had to be shed and

more ink to flow before at last separation was secured in a form which was all the more definite for having been too long delayed. There was no reason why Crete should not have been spared a half-century of misery, and the Empire have been saved the loss of the fairest island in the Ægean, had its treatment by the Powers been as timely and thorough as that of Samos. Crete is now an autonomous province, united by its ruler to the Greek and not to the Ottoman Dynasty, so that the suzerainty of the Sultan has been reduced to vanishing point.

These reforms have succeeded, not because they were carefully elaborated, or because they calculated every consideration. The Samos Statute consists of eight Articles, and most of its provisions were found inadequate; the abortive Macedonian scheme of 1880, on the other hand, contains several hundred Articles, and its protocols are a mine of information. The responsibilities incurred by foreign Governments in consequence of these effective settlements have, in each case, been less onerous than those undertaken in the various Macedonian schemes. Their interference on behalf of Samos ceased with their signatures on the Act of 1832. The Lebanon has made no further calls on them except for a new Governor from time to time. Crete is only too anxious that the Powers should cease to take an inconvenient interest in her concerns. On the other hand, the story of their relations to Macedonia since 1880 tells of thousands spent in special

missions of every sort, and in relief, volumes of correspondence, constant waste of time for those whose time is most valuable, and a perpetual menace to the peace of Europe.

A distinction has been drawn between reform and reconstruction, but a practical reform might be the basis of reconstruction. It has been shown that a reorganized gendarmerie, placed under foreign control and command, would have been a sound step in advance. The line of least resistance lies in extending this system to the other departments, by placing at all events the financial, and preferably also the judicial and public works departments, under the full executive control of foreign administrators nominated by the Powers. All relations with the central Government would pass by the channel of these administrators, who would have the power of appointment and dismissal in their departments. They would also meet as a Board of Control, which should be commissioned to report within a fixed period as to the alterations required in the law. Such a measure would fulfil the requirements of reform; it would pacify the insurrection; it would arouse no international questions by disturbing the *status quo*, and it would provide a measure of decentralization ensured by a foreign guarantee which would pave the way to a peaceable and permanent settlement. In an attempt to patch up a superstructure of good government on a rotten foundation, the foreign administrators

would form an impervious damp course, and keep the corruption of Yildiz from again ruining the reformed administration; they would take the place of the foreign guaranteed Governor of the Lebanon, or of the indirectly foreign guaranteed democracy of Samos.

A settlement of this sort would of course be provisional, but it would also be progressive and stable; and once started on these lines, the province might be left to work out its own reconstruction. Under it the peasants would settle down to their occupations, and the politicians would await the report of the Board of Administrators, who would perhaps recommend such alterations in the financial arrangements, as their administrative experience had shown to be necessary under the new conditions, and the institution of some general representative body with advisory powers. This body would succeed to the powers of the Board of Administrators whenever it should seem safe to withdraw the direct foreign control. The privileges of the province as recommended by the Board would be guaranteed by an Act with the Porte, and reconstruction would have been attained by safe and easy stages.

In considering the immediate course to be adopted, circumstances compel one who would not travel beyond the sphere of practical politics to reject for present advocacy all but the irreducible minimum of reform. But the political situation in the Balkan Peninsula contains a constant possibility

of change, even in its most important and apparently most permanent features. At the present time the existing configuration of political interests and influences seems on the point of a sudden rearrangement. The event of war between Turkey and Bulgaria, some conspicuous success on the part of the insurgents or atrocity on the part of the Turks, or the indirect action of political upheavals in another part of the world, may throw the whole Macedonian Question open to reconsideration from the very beginning, and by sweeping away the *status quo* beyond hope of recall, enable those whose only object is to benefit the Macedonians to effect a final and complete solution of the whole question.

Were circumstances to offer this golden opportunity, there would be no further need, in suggesting reform, to approach the subject with anxious reservations. A Conference of the Powers to deal with the situation created by a political convulsion might be summoned, just as Conferences of this nature followed the Druse massacres of 1861 and the Slav insurrections of 1875-76. The precedents to which reference has been made would provide this body with the outline of a design upon which to construct the new *régime*. The demands of the insurgents might be conceded, and the suggestions of the scheme of the Constantinople Conference of 1876-77 carried into effect by the creation of a European Commission, to act as temporary rulers of the province for the

purpose of establishing reforms. Crete and the Lebanon were pacified by landing European troops; so in Macedonia peace might be restored, and one of the particular prayers of the Macedonian Internal Organization granted, by the creation of an international force of occupation, similar to that suggested by the Constantinople Conference, whose existence should terminate with that of the Commission. A force of this nature would make it possible, by protecting the province from its neighbours and its own factions during the critical period of weakness, to exclude Turkish troops, as they have been excluded from Samos and Crete, replacing them by Macedonian levies. The task of the Commission would be to institute a system of Home Rule under a Christian Governor. Complete provincial autonomy being postulated, it must be of such a nature and within such limits as will place it in stable equilibrium under the pressure of the interests of Bulgaria, Turkey, the Albanians, Austria, Russia, Greece and Servia, the nature of which is known to readers of previous chapters. The measures of reform already indicated, the Board of Administrators, the Advisory Assembly, and the Christian Governor are required by the internal interests of the province, and do not come into conflict with any of the external interests above mentioned. They may therefore be taken as the basis of reconstruction. By the addition later of a legislative council with powers subject only to a restrictive right of veto by the Governor,

the destinies of the province would finally be placed in its own hands for good or evil.

But it would be impossible to extend this scheme to the whole of Turkey in Europe, or to arrange the boundaries of any such self-governing province, if those of the present vilayets are followed. It is in the direction of a re-arrangement of political divisions, and perhaps even of frontiers, that the opportunity of reconstruction would be of the greatest value.

The Adrianople Vilayet is not part of Macedonia either geographically or politically, and yet to abandon the Bulgar districts of that province is scarcely possible if the settlement is to be general, complete, and permanent. A natural and simple solution does not seem to exist. Of the various methods of cutting the knot, the following is as little violent as possible: that Bulgaria should buy from Turkey the Bulgar districts of Adrianople, the new frontier running from Iniada on the Black Sea inland to include Kirk-kilisse, and to join the present frontier near Ak Bunar. The money would be affected to the new Macedonian administration, and perhaps obviate the necessity of raising an international loan as in the case of Crete.

Albania would, of course, be excluded from the arrangement above suggested. Its circumstances are peculiar, with the peculiarity of the untameable disposition of its inhabitants. To include these impassable mountains and turbulent mountaineers under a government necessarily weak

at first in physical force, would be to invite disaster for any scheme whether of reform or reconstruction. To the Albanians reform means less foreign brigandage and family throat-cutting, and is accordingly unpopular. They might well be left to make their own arrangements. Cut off from the pernicious influence of Constantinople, the district might become as prosperous as Montenegro, and quite as capable of taking care of itself.

In this connection, and to complete the circuit of the new province, a special proviso must be made for the Chalcidic Peninsula, of which the population is Greek. One of its three promontories, Athos, already possesses a privileged administration, that of local government by monks under a Turkish kaimakam paying an annual tribute. This arrangement might be extended to the rest of the district, which would form an independent mutessariflik with all the privileges now limited to Athos. Thus constituted internally and circumstanced externally, the future autonomous province of Macedonia would be a perfectly workable polity, and the solution of such details as the amount of the contribution to the Imperial Exchequer, the regulation of railway guarantees, the disposal of the lands in charitable trusts, etc., might be safely left to the Board of Control to work out on previous precedent.

The boundaries of the present Macedonian vilayets of Monastir, Kossovo, and Salonica, are drawn for the purpose of dividing the races and

promoting dissension. Were they preserved under the above Constitution, local friction might stop the wheels of the machine. But, as it is pointed out in a previous chapter, it is possible so to redistribute the vilayets as to produce a very fair degree of homogeneity in the population of each: and this also would be labour appropriate for the Commission.

As regards the finances of the autonomous government, in addition to the provisions which have been insisted upon over and over again in every suggestion for reform, and best formulated in the Lebanon *règlement*, the suggestion has been made that the finances of the province should be transferred to the Controllers of the Ottoman Debt, to be managed by them as security for the bondholders. The germ of this idea is contained in the proposals of the Constantinople Conference. It is not inequitable that Macedonia should continue to contribute towards the Imperial liabilities in respect of the National Debt of the Empire; for whoever may have enjoyed the benefit of the various loans, they were advanced as much upon the security of the revenues of Turkey in Europe, as of any other part of the Empire. Were the revenues collected under the supervision of the European officials of the Debt, the province would secure in return for its contribution, economy and efficiency in financial matters.

As there is no question of attacking her suzerainty, the interests of Turkey chiefly lie in

the question of her garrison. There is apparently no objection in the internal interests of the province to the maintenance of Turkish garrisons in the towns. In view of the developments to be expected, it is, however, obviously desirable that by the time the province is able to shift for itself, the Turkish garrison should not be a political factor. The international act creating the new autonomous province should therefore provide for an immediate reduction to, say, thirty thousand, and a reduction of ten thousand a year to a minimum of a thousand. Nor would there be any objection to the maintenance of Turkish forces in Macedonia along the frontiers. The insurgent leaders themselves recognize this.

It has been impossible in the space of this chapter to deal with more than the broad outlines of reform. Space forbids fuller treatment, and details are in any case best left to be elaborated by the reformed administration itself. It would be idle to deny that the ties which would bind a Macedonian province with any democratic element in its constitution to the Turkish Empire would be but feeble. Reform is the first step towards reconstruction, and reconstruction is the first step towards repartition. But having travelled so far from the region of what is immediately practicable, it is pleasant to push on a little further from that solid ground and to imagine a new State, stimulated by the diversity of its population, but unified by the segregation of the diverse elements into

distinct administrative units, meeting only in the common arena of a popular assembly. Should an independent Macedonia, the common home of Bulgarian, Greek, and Servian, prove that it is possible for these nationalities to work harmoniously together, the seeds of confederation might grow fast in the soil of the Balkans. This may be but a dream, and yet stranger combinations have happened, more hostile elements united in a common bond.

CHAPTER XII

THE EXECUTION OF REFORMS : A PLEA FOR A BRITISH POLICY

BY ARTHUR PONSONBY

THE various attempts to introduce reforms into Turkey have been reviewed in another chapter, and from the effect of those attempts it is clear that only when they are executed by or under the auspices of the European Powers have they been successful. Throughout the nineteenth century the Turkish Empire has lived on with a greatly restricted territory and an increasingly degenerate government, although its break-up has often seemed imminent. At the same time the conditions of its subjects, especially of its Christian subjects, has become every day more unbearable; and the Powers, whose policy and ambitions with regard to the Near East have been generally selfish, continue to watch in apprehensive uncertainty as to when and how the final dismemberment will take place, and what flag is destined to fly on the shores of the Golden Horn. But they hesitate and shrink from the responsibility of hastening the cataclysm.

During the past thirty years, that is to say, since the Bulgarian massacres in 1876, the chief deterrent to decisive action in dealing with the great crises which have arisen from Ottoman misgovernment has been this natural, though not always reasonable, fear of plunging Europe into war, a fear bred and fostered, it is to be regretted, by mutual mistrust of motive amongst the great Powers themselves.

At the time of the Cretan disturbances in 1897, when Great Britain was inclined to take the initiative in bringing about a settlement of that controversy, which formed only a very small part of the many-sided and complex Eastern Question, it was with difficulty that Russia and Germany could be convinced of the wholly disinterested character of British action. They—that is to say, the press and the people if not the Governments themselves—preferred to believe that it was our intention to occupy the island in order to convert it into a British possession. This is an example of this apparently unavoidable feeling of jealousy and mistrust. Its prejudicial effect, however, is unfortunately not confined to intercourse between the Powers, for, as every one knows by now, it forms a very formidable and effective weapon in the hands of the Sultan. But it is not perhaps fully realized with what skill he handles this weapon, and with what absolute confidence he relies on its being placed in his hands at the very instant when negotiations of any sort are set on

foot. The conferences of the Concert assemble, reforms are mooted and discussed, Abdul Hamid waits, knowing that the divergence of aims and interests will soon create difference of opinion in the Ambassadorial Councils. Then he seizes his opportunity and deftly throws this dangerous missile for exciting international jealousies into the heart of the machinery, thereby impeding its action, and frequently arresting its progress.

And when after long-drawn-out proceedings and interminable interchanges of Notes, a scheme of reforms is evolved, the only merit of which is that it has received the consent of all the six Powers, a scheme which must not interfere with the ambitions of those directly interested in the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, and which falls very short of the hopes of those who are, for the time being, disinterested, the Sultan receives it, and a further prolonged period of procrastination and bargaining commences. With infinite patience, with unfathomable duplicity and cunning, he alters, he amends, he bargains like the carpet vendor in the Stambul bazaars, being determined that the ultimate price decided upon shall not entail any loss to himself. And then when the great machine by ponderous representations shows signs of impatience, he accepts what remains of the original project with a great display of friendly magnanimity, the Concert after an exchange of mutual congratulations breaks up, exhausted from its labours, and Europe is satisfied with the work

of her delegates. But insufficient attention is paid to the manner in which the reforms are executed and the extent to which they are adopted. The crafty diplomatist at Yildiz takes every precaution that they shall not operate in such a way as to interfere unduly with his ideas of government, or allow any real control to pass out of his hands. In short, the net result is inadequate and diminutive in comparison to the vast expenditure of united effort and the loudness of the first indignant remonstrance.

This was the method of procedure with regard to the Armenian reforms. In the case of the Cretan Settlement more was effected. The problem was easier, circumstances were more favourable, the district in dispute was distant, isolated, and strategically valueless to a fleetless Power, and joint occupation was a satisfactory and effective means of enforcing the new *régime*. The result therefore was more successful.

At the present moment in Macedonia we have a question which bears more resemblance to the Armenian problem; but it is infinitely more complicated and fraught with special ethnological difficulties which would not be encountered in any other quarter of the globe. Moreover, owing to the position of the territory in question, the discussion of a settlement is likely to engender a greater degree of suspicion amongst the Powers and of obstinacy in the Sultan; because, unlike Armenia, unlike Crete, the question of Macedonia,

if treated radically, affects vitally nothing more nor less than the continued existence of the Turk in Europe. The Powers, therefore, will be doubly on the alert, and the Sultan, foreseeing the possibility of a considerable restriction of his Sovereignty, will clothe his resolute obstinacy with ingratiating complacency as skilfully as he has ever done.

The *modus operandi* determined upon on this occasion has been to leave the negotiations in the hands of the two neighbouring Powers who are particularly and directly interested in the dissolution of Turkey — two Powers between whom there must exist on this point the maximum amount of rivalry, and whose genuine desire for reform in a region, the ultimate destiny of which they both of them believe to be partition, must be very questionable. As Lord Newton said in the House of Lords, in the debate on Macedonia (Feb. 15th, 1904), the Powers “called in as physicians also considered themselves to be the heirs of the Sick Man.”

Under Russia's rule the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula would hardly be better off than they are at present—in fact, were they given the choice they would probably prefer Turkish to Russian misrule, just as in many instances the Armenians did whenever they had an opportunity of expressing an opinion. Austria's hands are ever fully occupied with internal disputes, and her clouded horizon promises more storms in the

future. This, then, of all possible methods would appear to be the most short-sighted and the most certainly doomed to failure. Theoretically, perhaps, it is plausible and calculated to satisfy the superficial indignation of Europe, which demands that at all events something should be done; but practically, to those who desire that this opportunity should be taken at last for attacking fundamentally the very core of the evil, any action on the part of these two Powers must be hopelessly ineffective, and can only amount to a flimsy makeshift for tiding over an awkward situation. Besides creating a prospective danger, this is the more to be regretted as the failure of the reforms may not be sufficiently speedy or obvious to justify serious intervention. Also we must fully consider with regard to the present arrangement what may be the consequences if we are content to follow in the wake of Austria and Russia. It is by no means impossible that if they were sufficiently provoked their present inability to cope with the situation might turn into active hostility, in spite of stipulations to the contrary which may exist in some agreement with the other Powers, but which in the face of a crisis would count for nothing. An advance on the part of Russia might mean the occupation of various strategical points which would for ever be a grave menace to our interests in the Mediterranean, and the Near East. Nevertheless, as matters now stand,

although issues of the greatest importance to us may at any moment arise, we have placed ourselves at the mercy of events that are completely outside our control.

What alternative policy is there? How are these ever more frequently recurring outrages to be met, granted—and there can be no doubt that so much can be taken for granted—that we have a genuine desire to see peace and order take the place of anarchy and violence?

Before coming to the subject of policy we must make sure of a very necessary preliminary, which is that our methods for the despatch of business and the management of intercourse with foreign nations are entirely satisfactory. That is to say, there must be no manner of doubt that the Foreign Minister has at his command a very highly efficient and carefully trained organization for obtaining information and conducting the negotiations, and that he also has it in his power to place a man of special ability on the spot, to assume the responsibility due to a representative who is watching the course of events from close quarters, and to deal cautiously and judiciously with the wiles and traps of Oriental stratagem. Accurate knowledge and tactful firmness are two leading and indispensable elements of successful diplomacy. In fact, it must be clearly understood that our tools for conducting these delicate operations have to be polished and perfectly adapted to the most modern requirements; and the idea should be

abandoned once and for all that we are still to depend on antiquated usages and precedents and preserve early nineteenth-century traditions of business as a training for our officials—for at the very outset this is as good as casting sand instead of oil into the wheels of diplomatic intercourse.

Fully prepared and equipped, and having decided on our scheme of reform, the irreducible minimum being fixed, founded, as is shown in the previous chapter, on the principle of decentralization, the all-important question of policy presents itself as to how we are to bring pressure to bear on the Sultan in order to induce him to accept our scheme, and once it is accepted how we are to see that the spirit of reform is truly interpreted and the letter of reform effectually carried out. It is useless to confine this discussion to what is *likely* to be done, because taking in view the many questions that absorb public attention far more deeply at the present moment, that will amount to very little. If the Foreign Office considers that an attitude of inaction can safely be assumed without attracting attention, the responsibility then lies with those few who feel keenly the real and pressing importance of the matter to see that so far as is possible the people of this country should be instructed as to what *can* and *ought* to be done. This, therefore, is the real subject for discussion.

The idea that reform can come from within,

as we have seen, must be dismissed at once, not only because of the unprogressive nature of the Ottoman character, and the reactionary influence of Muhamedanism, but because of the 'Turks' mistrust, or, more accurately, contempt for reform in general—except perhaps military reform—for they are shrewd enough to see that it would only weaken their hold on the country by giving the Christians the upper hand. A further unpropitious element lies in the mutual antipathies of the different Christian races of Macedonia, who have never been able to organize and combine against Turkish rule. Reform in the administration, therefore, must not only be elaborated but enforced from outside. The Macedonians themselves appreciate this, and are ready to trust in effective and joint foreign intervention.

Although concerted action on the part of the six great Powers is in the abstract always the most advisable course, the time in this case has almost passed for slow international deliberations, and the fact that the entire Concert did not from the very first undertake conjointly to deal with the last Macedonian crisis makes the adoption of this method so late in the day much more difficult. There can be no doubt that the immediate resolve of the Powers to occupy various zones in the disturbed district until order is restored, and until a satisfactory system of autonomous government is established, would speedily solve the difficulty; but it seems beyond the bounds of probability

that a course of such direct efficacy will be taken by a cordially united Concert. The action of the Concert of the six European Powers, as already indicated, entails endless delay, and is not likely to be attended by any really satisfactory result in this case, where the territory under dispute is closely bound up with the interests of two of the Powers in question.

Under existing circumstances, therefore, the intervention of the three Western Powers suggests itself as the best expedient. This proposal, let it be understood, is not in the least degree offered in opposition to Russia and Austria; it is merely suggested that the Western Powers should take the lead in advance, owing to the extreme urgency of immediate action. If Great Britain, France, and Italy are resolved to press Turkey more resolutely than the other Powers would be inclined to, and at the same time to give a definite assurance that they are acting, not from any selfish motive, but in the earnest and sincere desire to prevent the inevitable recurrence of further pillage and massacre, and to obviate the alternative, or more probably additional, eventuality of war between Turkey and Bulgaria, this attitude of the Western Powers, if clearly explained, would not necessarily exclude the combined action of the entire Concert, nor need it be interpreted as an unfriendly act towards the other three Powers. To make sure of the sympathy, if not the co-operation, of Russia

would certainly be politic, considering that as she holds a position of such predominant importance, politically and geographically, in Eastern Europe, her immediate interests must in some way be affected, and consequently cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, she may not be ready at the right moment: her attention is most likely to be fixed for some time to come on another portion of her vast frontier. The absolute adhesion of Russia, therefore, must not be taken as a *sine quâ non* any more than that of Germany and Austria, and neither the disinclination of any one of them to agree to what the alliance considers to be a full and complete measure of reform, nor their refusal to participate in active pressure, should it become necessary, can be allowed to handicap in the slightest degree the bolder action of the Western Powers.

As to the actual negotiations, judging by the experience of past dealings with the Sublime Porte, it might perhaps seem advisable, and at the same time more conducive to a prompt and successful issue, were their manipulation and management entrusted to one Power only. This would strike the old-fashioned diplomatist as novel and dangerous, contrary to all precedent, and warranted inevitably to excite international discord; but there need be no risk whatever of such consequences, provided always that the Power in question is in constant and intimate consultation with her associates, on whose support

she may rely should the emergency arise. The advantage to be gained by substituting single for triple or more widely combined representation, and making one Power the spokesman and agent for the others is clear ; for with a single adversary to deal with, the Sultan finds himself at once at a disadvantage, he awaits in vain his usual opportunity for playing one Power off against another, and unnecessary delay is avoided. In all probability his first step would be to look around for friendly support, and there can be little doubt in which direction he would seek it. But if Germany knew that the one Power who was negotiating was in reality in complete agreement with, and actually, though not ostensibly, supported by two others, and that the Western Alliance had openly repudiated any idea of partition or the grabbing of territory, but on the contrary was acting vigorously in the name of humanity and in the interests of peace, it is highly improbable that she would support the Sultan in his opposition.

In developing a plan of action we must take the conditions existing to-day in Turkey, permeated as it is in every branch of its administration and government both civil and religious by the predominating and malignant influence of its Sovereign. No one can foretell what kind of authority will have to be dealt with on his death. It is not even safe to conjecture who his successor will be. Conceivably a Constitutional party may

emerge whose sympathy and assistance could be enlisted in the cause of reform, but for the present it is on Abdul Hamid that the skill, strategy, and diplomacy of civilization must be brought to bear, not through concerted and thereby enfeebled protest, but by the isolated and therefore forcible demands of one single Power speaking in the name of the others. Of the six *notes identiques* that have hitherto been received by the Sublime Porte, we may be sure that it is only one that has escaped the Oriental waste-paper basket. It is time now to substitute the one for the many. The point to be settled is, to which one is the Sultan most likely to give proper attention? This difficulty need not be regarded in the slightest degree as insuperable, so long as it is clearly borne in mind that reform and not spoliation is the objective, and that therefore the very essence of the whole project is that the acting Power should be inspired by purely disinterested motives.

During the last few years the prestige of this country is said to have been on the wane in the Ottoman Empire. The most noticeable of the various reasons which have given rise to this supposition is the growing influence of Germany, who has placed herself almost on a par with Turkey's great neighbour in her military ascendancy, and higher than any other Power in general favour with the Sultan. Nevertheless our influence is still considerable, our reputation for

political integrity is not destroyed, and the weight of England's material assistance or opposition is not under-estimated. Therefore, when due consideration is taken of our responsibilities, and of the fact that we have finally and irrevocably abandoned the policy of bolstering up the Sick Man, as we are realizing at last that to insist at all costs on the maintenance of the *status quo* in countries which have no inherent power of progressing or of reforming themselves, is not only a mistaken but a dangerous policy, may it not be concluded without presumption that it would be for us to undertake the *role* of spokesman for the Western Alliance, abandoning the timid and precarious opportunism which we have adopted of late, and assuming an intrepid initiative in conjunction with France and Italy? The suggestion does not seem an extravagant one, for it is a great error, and one very popularly accepted, to suppose that resolute action will aggravate the situation. On the contrary, it is only by dealing promptly the very instant the crisis arises that eventual catastrophe can be warded off.

The Sultan's fear of the English Press has become traditional. It is based not only on a natural aversion to having disagreeable things published about himself and his Empire, but on the apprehension that the popular feeling which the Press kindles may set in motion a force of which he stands in mortal terror, and which he

dreads more than the plots of the Young Turks, more than secret societies or revolution, more, perhaps, than the knife of the assassin, and that is the approach of the British Fleet.

If we are serious, and have confidence in our demands for freeing the Christian races from the scourge of Turkish rule, we must cast off the faltering and tentative attitude and adopt a new line of firm, unflinching insistence. This will render any recourse to force of arms, any deliberate act of war, unnecessary, but it will make the mere threat of it effective. We must not shrink for a moment from the possible contingency of having resort to more severe measures when friendly representation has been exhausted, and we must bear in mind that when matters come to such a pass we shall not stand alone; the use of force cannot be entrusted to one Power alone, and our allies will be at our side.

A joint demonstration of the fleets at Smyrna or Salonica, or their approach towards the Dardanelles, would suffice to show that the threat is not an empty one. The Turk can see through mere bluff quickly enough, but if convinced that there was no idea of compromise or retraction, and that an inexorable increase of pressure indicated an unflinching determination to secure the object demanded, there can be little doubt that he would yield, reluctantly perhaps, but speedily. It is not at all a matter of whether we are prepared to fight,

but rather whether we have got the courage to stand up boldly, not for the sake of material gain, but in the cause of international justice and equity, by fulfilling our moral obligations to a Christian people, and our Treaty obligations to an oppressed race. The point to be aimed at is that the approved scheme should be pressed through unaltered in its essentials, and unweakened by the usual modifications, and that steps in this direction should be taken soon enough to anticipate the inevitable outbreak which in their despair these exasperated subjects of the Sultan most certainly meditate, and not to await a fresh series of hideous outrages in order to justify our action. The obstacle in securing the acceptance of any project does not consist so much in the inherent nature of the reforms as in deciding on the exactly suitable method of urging them.

On the whole, Great Britain seems better qualified to take the part of negotiator than either of the other two Western Powers. In neither of those two countries has public opinion risen to such a high pitch of indignation against the brutality of the Turk as it has in England. In the case of France, the fear of running counter to the wishes of the "*nation amie et alliée*" might deter her from undertaking a part which, though not in fact one of isolated or separate action, might in her opinion excite suspicion. She would unquestionably be prepared to co-operate loyally

with England and Italy, she can be depended on to espouse with enthusiasm a cause that rests on principle and not on material gain, but she would probably not think herself justified in taking the prominent leading share. Italy has hardly sufficient prestige or weight with Turkey. It would seem more natural for her to support her powerful allies than to act as negotiator on their behalf. The choice therefore falls on England, who through her position and good name in Europe may rightly claim to be the active champion of international justice.

The practical objection that will be made is—does England really care enough about Macedonia to go such lengths, and would any Foreign Minister undertake so serious a step? The question of England's responsibility has been fully discussed in this volume; it is sufficient here to remind those who are unable to care about the fate of Macedonia of the purely material aspect, namely, that there are signs in this crisis of a far more extensive issue, possibly even the long-expected European conflagration, and England will have to decide whether she is to be an apathetic spectator, losing her position in the council of nations, or whether she is to make her power and influence strongly felt. But the decision cannot be delayed: it must be made now.

After all, the arrangement of a single negotiator is not a point that need be obstinately insisted

on, if met by strong opposition, nor perhaps would it be expedient if armed occupation were found to be the only satisfactory method of enforcing the execution of reforms; but none the less it is a suggestion worthy of serious consideration as being a means, as yet untried, of facilitating very largely the course of proceedings. In any case the intervention of the Western Powers, prompted and led by England, is a clear and practicable line of policy which cannot fail to accelerate a solution of the problem.

Failing the acceptance of this proposal, a Conference of the Powers must be summoned and convened without delay. Even this, which is a return to the slow action of the Concert, can only be brought about by a strong initiative, that is to say, on the invitation of England. But such an alternative, although disappointing and clumsy, would be infinitely preferable to the present arrangement, the failure of which is being brought home to us every week by the news from Macedonia.

Do not let us suppose that the attention of the world has been so greatly distracted by the war in the Far East that this fact will help to ward off a crisis in the Near East. The exact contrary is the case. Russia being fully occupied and prevented from acting in the Balkans either for good or for evil, the opportunity will undoubtedly, and very naturally, be counted as

favourable by Bulgarians, and the prospect of war between that Principality and Turkey, in spite of any paper agreement, becomes more likely. In fact, the existence of war in the Far East should be taken as a strong reason for immediate action to prevent eventualities of a far more serious nature in the Balkan Peninsula. The lull in hostilities during 1904 sufficiently proved the readiness of the insurgents to give the Austro-Russian scheme a fair trial. There is full justification for vigorous diplomatic action, and it would be folly to await the breaking of the storm.

It is not for a moment to be supposed that a solution of this intensely intricate problem can be attempted without very detailed information, not only of the facts of the case as it stands at present, but of the attitude and intentions of every nation concerned, such as only a Foreign Minister can have at his disposal. But in any case it must be openly acknowledged that whether from lack of initiative, from vacillating indecision, or from the weakness of our co-operation, we have failed signally to stop the persecution of Christians in South-Eastern Europe, and that now we are on the road to court further failure. And this because we are taught to be content with passive and sentimental indignation, and are told that the most sagacious and far-sighted course of action is to wait and see what others will do. British citizens should be vividly reminded on every opportunity that presents itself

what this inaction and failure signifies. To put it simply, it means each time the loss of numberless lives, the suffering and torture of scores of our fellow-creatures, and the perpetual menace of an outbreak of war involving all Europe, a war for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, a hideous scramble for territorial aggrandizement in which every Power would join, impelled by the very worst instincts of Imperial greed.

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
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